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ABSTRACT 
 
During well drilling operation, there is a possibility of a kick (influx). When a kick is not 
controlled properly it will become a blow out. This is an uncontrolled and sudden flow of 
formation fluid that releases from a reservoir through a well bore into surface as a result of 
pressure difference in formation and well. The kick could flow to surface and create 
explosions causing fatality, environment damage and loss of asset resulting in high cost. 
There are procedures and methods to deal with the occurrence of kicks and blowouts in 
order to control a well flow. Moreover, well barriers should be established and designed 
based on the characteristics of the reservoir and rock formation. The last line of protection in 
well barriers is known as Blowout Preventer (BOP). It is one of the most important barriers to 
prevent unintentional hydrocarbon release when all well barriers in a well have failed. There 
are many factors that influence the performance of a BOP. The purpose of this thesis is to 
determine the criticality of components in BOP related to the redundancies they have during 
well shut in, stripping, snubbing and BOP testing operation. By knowing the criticality of BOP 
components, we can assure which components that should be focused on for maintenance 
and testing. It will also indicate which components that gives redundancy to the BOP during 
well shut in, stripping, snubbing and BOP testing operation, if one or more components are 
failed. A literature study is the main work of this thesis. Studying the principal, functions, 
operations and factors related to drilling activity with respect to the use of BOP. In addition, 
relevant regulations and standards are also describes to specify the required specification of 
BOP. The analysis of criticality is done by using risk tools such as reliability block diagram, 
FMECA, criticality matrix, redundancy and effect table. All of these risk tools complement 
each other to give the final conclusion of critical component in a BOP. The result of the 
analysis shows five critical components in a BOP with the prioritization start from shuttle 
valve (blind shear ram function), blind shear ram (ram piston), flange (BOP stack), gasket 
(BOP stack) and annular preventer (rubber housing) respectively. In the event of kick and 
well shut in is initiated, the above critical component is very critical to the safety of personnel. 
Stripping and snubbing operation also require the critical components to be function properly, 
but with less critical when well shut in has been done earlier. During BOP testing operation, 
the critical components might not be critical if it fail as there are many safety measure and 
procedure for safety. 
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TERMINOLOGY 
Annulus    The space between two concentric objects, such as between the 
wellbore and casing or between casing and tubing, where fluid can 
flow (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Blow out    A flow of formation fluids into the wellbore that cannot be controlled at 
surface (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Bell Nipple    A pipe located on the top of a casing string that provides guidance for 
drilling tools into the hole .It is also called mud riser or flow stack 
(Schlumberger, 2012) (Goins, W., C., Sheffield, R., 1983)  
 
Blow Out Preventer  A structure with a large set of valves and rams placed on the top of 
the well that can be closed when the drilling crew have uncontrolled 
flow of formation fluids (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Burst Pressure   The differential internal pressure where a joint of casing will fail. It is a 
key consideration for well control and contingency operation as well as 
an indicator in the well design process (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Casing    Steel pipe used to protect the wall of the well after drilling to prevent it 
from collapsing and prevent the fluid in the rocks to enter the well 
bore. (Stoneley, R., 1995) 
 
Caving    Rocks fragments that come from the well bore but not necessarily 
come from the drill bit cuttings nor drilling fluid flow (Schlumberger, 
2012). It could the fragments from the broken weak or impermeable 
rock formations. 
 
Completion    Assembly of down hole tubulars and equipments required to enable 
safe and efficient production from an oil and gas well (Odland, J., 
2010) 
 
Connection Gas    A short entry of gas into drilling fluid in the drilling operation during 
pipe connection as a result of mud pumping stoppage which allows 
gas to enter the wellbore. It is also occur as a result of swabbing 
effects from the drill string movement during connection 
(Schlumberger, 2012)  
 
Cut set    A set of events/components in a system whose occurrence (at the 
same time) ensures the system to fail (Rausand, M., Høyland A., 
2004) 
   
Differential Sticking  A situation where the drill string is stick into the well bore/bore hole 
embedded by mud cake or filter cake and cannot be rotated 
(Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Draw Works    A large horizontal hoist carrying cable on the drilling rig used to raise 
and lower the drill string (Stoneley, R., 1995) 
 
Drill Bit    The tool used to crush or cut rock. It works by scraping or crushing or 
both, usually as part of a rotational motion (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Drill Break    A change in the rate of drilling penetration as a result of drilling into a 
different rock formation such as from shale into limestone (Malhotra, 
S., M., 2005) 
 
Drill Collars    Tube that is used between drill pipe and bit in the drill string to provide 
additional weight on the bit and give more pendulum effect to the drill 
string (Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
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Drill Stem Test   A test to determine the productive capacity, pressure and permeability 
of a hydrocarbon reservoir (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Drill String    The steel pipe where the drill bit is attached on the bottom and which 
is rotated in the well during drilling. It consists of section(s) with a 
length of 30 ft (Stoneley, R., 1995) 
 
Drilling Fluid/Mud   A fluid that is used in drilling operation that contains solid 
suspensions, mixtures and emulsions of liquid, gases and solids 
(Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Emergency Disconnect   A package which enables quick disconnection between marine riser 
Package    and blow out preventer (BOP) in case of emergency (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Equivalent Mud Weight  specific weight of drilling mud that is exerted to hold the pressure of 
the formation fluid in the equivalent value (SPE E&P, 2011) 
 
Flowing Well   A well that has enough natural pressure from reservoirs to flow oil 
without the aid of pump (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Gas-Cut Mud   A drilling fluid that is contaminated by gas causing reduction in its 
density (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Hydrostatic Pressure  The pressure exerted by a fluid at rest. It increases along with the 
density and depth of the fluid and is expressed in pounds per square 
inch (psi) (Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
 
Kelly     The top section of the drill string, square or hexagonal in cross 
section. It is used to transmit rotary motion from the rotary table or 
kelly bushing to the drillstring, while allowing the drill string to be 
lowered or raised during rotation (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Kelly Bushing   An adapter to connect the rotary table to the kelly (Schlumberger, 
2012) 
 
Kick     An incoming flow of formation fluid into the wellbore that can be 
controlled at surface (Hawker, D., 2001) 
 
Kill     Stop the flow of fluid inside the wellbore by circulating higher mud 
weight to balance the pressure in the well when influx (kick) occur 
(Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Landing String   A tool to facilitates well control during completion and workover 
operations (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Log (Logging)   The examination of one or more physical characteristics in or around a 
well against the depth or time or both (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Lower Marine Riser Package A package that makes a quick disconnection between marine riser 
and blow out preventer (BOP) in case of emergency (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Lower Riser Package  A package which enables well control in case of emergency 
(Subsea1, 2010)  
 
Marine Riser   A pipe connection between drilling platform and Blowout Preventer 
(BOP) on the seafloor (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Minimum cut set   A cut set that cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set 
(Rausand, M., Høyland A., 2004) 
 
Minimum path set    A path set that cannot be reduced without losing its status as a path 
set (Rausand, M., Høyland A., 2004) 
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Nipple    Part of a pipe which have threaded section at both ends with male 
threads (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Open Hole    Parts of a well that are not protected with casing (Schlumberger, 
2012) 
 
Path set     A set of events/components in a system whose occurrence (at the 
same time) ensures the system to function (Rausand, M., Høyland A., 
2004) 
 
Pay/Pay Zone   A reservoir or portion of a reservoir which contains economically 
producible hydrocarbons (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Perforation    The path or channel in the final casing or liner that gives 
communication into the reservoir formation where hydrocarbon is 
produced (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Rate of Penetration  A rate of how fast the bit drills into formations, usually expressed in 
feet or meters per hour or minutes per foot (meter) (Malhotra, S., M., 
2005) 
 
Rotary Table   The rotating part of the drill floor that supplies power to rotate the drill 
string in a clockwise direction (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Shut In     Sealing a well to protect against kick by closing BOP and chokes 
(Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
 
Slips     A device used to grip and suspend the drill string on the rotary table 
(Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Snubbing    The process of placing drill pipe into the well bore by pushing it down 
when the BOPs are closed and pressure is contained in the well. The 
pushing force is necessary because the pressure inside the wellbore 
exerting the pipe upward. It is important because well kill operations 
should always be conducted when there is drill pipe inside the well 
bore. (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Spacing out    measurement of average length of drill pipe in the well to prevent the 
BOP close on tool joints or drill collar (Well Control School, 2004) 
 
Stand     The number of joints of pipe that can be pulled and stood back at one 
time by the rig, e.g., double or triples (GEKEngineering, 2010) 
 
Stripping    The process of placing drill pipe into the well bore by its own weight 
when the BOPs are closed and pressure is contained in the well. It is 
important because well kill operations should always be conducted 
when there is drill pipe inside the well bore. (Schlumberger, 2012)  
 
Swabbing    The situation where drilling fluid tends to follow the drill string as it is 
pulled from the hole causing a reduction in well/annulus (Malhotra, S., 
M., 2005) 
        
Thief Zone    A formation encountered during drilling into which circulating fluids can 
be lost (Schlumberger, 2012). Usually as a result of large open pores 
in the formation where sealing mud filter cake cannot be formed 
(Westergaard, R., H., 1987). 
 
Transition Zone   A zone where the type of flow is changing as a result of gas breakout, 
gas expansion, shear or turbulence (SPE E&P, 2011) 
 
Trip Margin    An amount of additional mud weight that is used to balance the 
reduced mud pressure in the well bore as a result of swabbing effect 
when performing tripping out of the hole (Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
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Trip Tank    A small mud tank with a capacity of 10-15 barrels (1590–2385 liters) 
usually with 1 barrel or 0.5 barrel (159 or 79.5 liters) divisions, used to 
make sure the required amount of mud when it is displaced by drill 
pipe (Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
 
Tripping    Pulling out or replacing the drill string from the hole to change the 
inefficient and dulled drill bit (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Tool Joint    The enlarged and threaded ends of joints of drill pipe used as a pipe 
connection (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Tool Pusher    Supervisor for the drilling contractor to accommodate administration 
including materials, spare parts and crew’s quality assurance for 
efficient operations (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Top Drive    A pipe rotation mechanism in the travelling block section used to turns 
the drill string. It is suspended from the hook, so the rotary mechanism 
is free to travel up and down the derrick (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
Tubing Hanger Running Tool Tools for installation/retrieval of tubing hanger (Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Underground Blowout  An uncontrollable flow of fluids from one formation into another 
weaker formation through wellbore. One formation could make a kick 
while at the same time another formation is losing circulation (Hawker, 
D., 2001) 
 
Weight on Bit   The additional weight on a drill bit by adding drill collars to improve 
rate of penetration (Malhotra, S., M., 2005) 
 
Wellhead    The equipment used to seal and control the flow of fluids from the well 
that is attached on the top of the well and act as an interface between 
the X-mas tree/tubing hanger and the well. (Odland, J., 2010), 
(Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Workover Riser   A pipe connection between the drilling platform and the landing string 
deployed inside the marine riser to give the availability of circulate 
fluid, test production, well control and deployment of wireline tools 
(Subsea1, 2010) 
 
Wireline    Activities related to logging which employs an electrical cable to lower 
tools into the wellbore and to transmit data (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
X-mas Tree    A structure consists of control valves, pressure gauges and chokes 
located at the top of a well where the primary function is to control the 
flow into or out of the well (Odland, J., 2010) 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
f  feet 
g  gravity (specific gravity)  
m  Meter 
psi  Pounds per Square Inch 
AAV  Annulus Access Valve 
AMF  Automatic Mode Function 
AP  Annular Preventer 
BOP  Blow Out Preventer 
BSEE  Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
DST  Drill Stem Test 
EDP  Emergency Disconnect Package 
EMW  Equivalent Mud Weight 
ETA  Event Tree Analysis 
FCP  Final Circulating Pressure 
FMEA Failure Modes, Effect Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FTA  Fault Tree Analysis 
GOM  Gulf of Mexico 
HCR  Hydraulically Controlled 
KT  Kick Tolerance 
LMRP Lower Marine Riser Package 
LOT  Leak Off Test 
LOP  Leak Off Pressure 
LPR  Lower Pipe Ram 
LRP  Lower Riser Package (LRP) 
MAASP Maximum Allowable Annular Surface Pressure 
MPR  Middle Pipe Ram 
MTTF  Mean Time To Failure 
MTTR Mean Time To Repair 
MW  Mud Weight 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
OCS  Outer Continental Shelf 
PLMV  Production Lower Master Valve 
PMV  Production Master Valve 
PUMV Production Upper Master Valve 
PPG  Pounds Per Gallon 
PWV  Production Wing Valve 
P&ID  Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
QRA  Quantitative Risk Analysis 
ROP  Rate of Penetration 
ROV  Remotely Operated Vehicles 
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RPN  Risk Priority Number 
SCR  Slow Circulating Rate 
SEM  Subsea Electronic Module 
SG  Specific Gravity (gm/cc) 
SICP  Shut In Casing Pressure 
SIDPP Shut In Drill pipe Pressure 
THRT  Tubing Hanger Running Tool 
TVD  True Vertical Depth 
UPR  Upper Pipe Ram 
WOB  Weight on Bit 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 Safety during drilling operations is the most important aspect to be considered. 
Procedures, design, specifications and requirements of all aspects of drilling activities are 
established to make sure that the operation is safe. All companies and organizations which 
participate in drilling operations should perform and implement their activities to valid and 
approved standards and regulations. Standards and regulations vary for different geographic 
areas, due to many factors such as government policies, level of safety, environmental and 
geographical condition, etc. It should also be updated continuously to meet the specific 
needs and requirements which are relevant to present situation.  
 There are many problems that might occur during well drilling operations, particularly 
for subsea well drilling where remoteness and access become challenges during operations. 
One of the main issues that could result in a catastrophe is the occurrence of kick (influx). 
Kick is described as the unwanted influx of formation fluid into a wellbore during drilling 
operation as a result of pressure difference in the wellbore. This influx is unwanted because 
it can flow into surface and create blowout which can harm people's lives, the environment 
and cause property damage. The pressure inside wellbore, which is exerted by drilling fluid 
through drill bit, should be higher than the pressure from the formation fluid in order to make 
a controllable well drilling. This is known as overbalanced pressure condition. Safety 
precaution should be established for procedures and equipments to handle kicks and 
blowouts. The blowout preventer (BOP) is one of several barriers in the well to prevent kicks 
and blowouts and it is the most important and critical equipment as it becomes the last line of 
protection against blowout. The BOP is a structure with a large set of valves and rams placed 
on the top of the well that can be closed when the drilling crew have uncontrolled flow of 
formation fluid in the wellbore. If the BOP is not working properly during a kick, it will keep the 
well open and which can lead to a kick flow to surface and it can become a blowout. 
 
Figure 1.1 Barrier failures in the Deepwater Macondo Accident (BP Investigation Team, 2010) 
Page | 2  
 
 Figure 1.1 shows an example of how barrier failures escalated into a disaster at the 
Macondo Deepwater Horizon accident on 20 April 2010. In this case the last and very critical 
barrier, the blowout preventer, failed causing uncontrolled explosion and fire resulting in 
eleven losses of lives, massive oil spill, environmental damage, loss of asset and reputation 
as well as the impact on cost. According to the BP Investigation Team (2010) the causes of 
the barrier failures were not only from technical problems, but also from other factors such as 
human error, management and organizational issues. Some of them are related to the 
discrepancies of the standard and requirement for the drilling operation, particularly for BOP 
maintenance, procedure and operations. Therefore it is very important to identify and 
describe the critical components in a BOP to ensure the functionality of BOP by having the 
right components that should be put more focus for maintenance and testing.  
 
1.2 Purpose 
 The purpose of this thesis is to determine the criticality of components in BOP related 
to the redundancies they have for well shut in, stripping, snubbing and BOP testing 
operation.  
 
1.3 Content  
 This thesis describes general activities of drilling and the problems that might occur 
such as kicks and blowouts. The blowout preventer (BOP) as the main barriers against kicks 
and blowouts is the main focus in the report. Work principles, components and the use of 
BOP for different operations are described. The analysis of critical component in a BOP 
during drilling operation is discussed. To support the analysis of the criticality, some risk 
assessment tools are used such as reliability block diagram, failure mode effect and criticality 
analysis (FMECA), criticality matrix, redundancy and effect table. Standards and regulation 
regarding to the requirements of BOP are identified to make sure the alignment of the 
analysis against them. 
 To provide a thorough knowledge, this thesis consists of some chapters which are 
structured in sequence. Chapter one, gives a background, purposes, content, methodology 
and limitation of the thesis.  Second chapter presents the general operations of drilling and 
how kicks can be evaluated. Kicks and blowouts as part of the problems in drilling operation 
are described together with its causes and indications. In order to cope with kicks problems, 
basic well control principles are described in chapter three. The equipments needed to 
control and eliminate kicks such as BOP stack and BOP control system are described in 
chapter four. These equipments are somehow should have redundancy in order to ensure 
the availability and reliability of the functions. The minimum redundancy requirements are 
described in chapter five including other general requirements for the design of BOP. It refers 
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to a company policy (Sedco Forex and Schlumberger) and local regulations BSEE for OCS 
(e.g., GOM). The use of BOP in drilling operations is described in chapter five. It includes 
some procedures for conducting well shut in, stripping, snubbing and testing of BOP. In order 
to conduct criticality analysis of blowout preventer, the suggested risk tools is presented and 
discussed in chapter seven. It includes reliability block diagram, FMECA, criticality ranking, 
criticality matrix, redundancy and effect table as the main discussion. The analysis of 
criticality by using the suggested risk tools is presented in chapter eight. Chapter nine 
present and discuss the result of criticality analysis of component in BOP as well as a 
discussion with regards to the use of BOP in drilling operations. Some conclusion, 
recommendation and suggestion for further works are presented in chapter ten. The rest of 
the report consists of references and appendices presented in chapter eleven and twelve. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 The methodology use in this thesis is an integrated process of guidance from 
supervisors, discussion with practitioners, literature study through textbooks and publications 
to describe drilling activity in general and to focus on the BOP by defining its function, 
principal, components, characteristics and operations. Relevant factors that influence the 
criticality of components in a BOP are described and analyzed through the literature study, 
aid of supervisor and practitioners. In order to analyze the criticality component of BOP, 
some suggested risk tools are presented and discussed. It includes reliability block diagram 
(RBD), failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), criticality ranking, criticality 
matrix, redundancy and effect table. All of these methods are complement to each other to 
support the decision of the critical component in a BOP. 
 
1.5 Limitation 
 This study is intended to analyze the criticality of component (barriers) in a subsea 
BOP. It is only focus to the components of BOP in the general stack arrangement and 
general control system. The analysis is conducted related to the drilling operations where the 
BOP is used as it gives the most contribution for the occurrence of kicks. The discussion and 
analysis are to some degree refers to general operations of drilling due to many variations in 
applications for drilling technologies, methods, government and company regulation. 
Moreover, the analysis is limited to qualitative approach as there is a scarce of quantified 
data and the limited amount of time for the works of the report.  
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2. BASIC WELL DRILLING CONCEPT 
2.1 Drilling and Completion 
 Drilling an oilfield is an elaborate tasks which consists of drillers, complex machineries, 
tools and equipments that are use to drill a well up to five to six miles below the ground to 
reach hydrocarbon reservoirs as efficiently and as safely as possible. All necessary 
equipments are mostly driven from a drilling rig which is use to lower a set of steel string 
carrying drill bit to make a hole and to pull it out again (Stoneley, R., 1995). Drill rigs have 
their own specifications and equipments needed to perform the drilling, but generally it can 
be as shown in the figure 2.1 below. 
 
The drill bit is connected to the 
bottom of the drill string where the drill 
collars can be attached on it to add 
more weight which is necessary to give 
more efficient force to break rock 
formation. Lowering and raising these 
sets of drill pipes are done by means of 
draw-works which is connected to the 
travelling block. It also used to endure 
most of the weight of the drill string(s), 
drill bit and drill collar(s). The drillers 
should monitor the required weight of 
the bit to control the amount of the 
added weight applied.   
Drill string and drill bit are both 
rotated by rotary table where kelly 
bushing are attached and connected to 
the drill string via kelly. The rotary table 
itself is driven by rig motor.  
 
 
Alternatively a top drive could be used instead of rotary table. A top drive is a device that 
turns the drill string(s) from above where it is suspended from the hook (travelling block), so it 
gives free vertical movement while rotating. Kelly and kelly bushing allow connection 
between drill strings as the well is drilled deeper while maintaining its flexibility to rotate, raise 
and lower the drill string and the drill bit.    
Figure 2.1 The important parts of the drilling rig 
(Stoneley, R., 1995) 
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 Debris and cuttings of rock during drilling are carried out from the well bore into the 
surface by drilling fluid (mud) to be collected, examined and logged. The rock sample gives 
information about the formation of rock in the different depths of a well and also to give 
indication for the potential hydrocarbon location. Moreover, drilling fluid lubricates and cools 
the drill bit, balances the pressurized formation fluid that flow in the well bore and cleans out 
the hole. Figure 2.1 shows the flows and circulations of drilling fluid which is pumped from 
the mud tank into the kelly through flexible mud hose, down the hole of the drill string until it 
reaches and out from drill bit, goes up again to the surface carrying debris through annulus 
and vibrating screen to separate debris and cuttings from the mud before it end up in the 
mud tank again. The volume in the mud tank and the composition of mud after circulation 
could be a good indicator for the integrity of the well.   
 Protecting the wall of the hole after drilling is important to prevent it from collapsing, 
loss of circulation and withstand the hole from the kick. Casing is established in some depth 
of the well and the diameters (sizes) are varies according to the depth and formation 
characteristics. Generally, the deeper the depth, the less the diameters and sizes are. There 
are several concentric casing that would be required in the well such as conductor casing, 
surface casing, intermediate casing and production casing. In some depths of the well, 
usually where the production casing and production tubing are in place, packer would be 
placed in their annulus to make sure it seals completely.  
 Another kind of protection is blow out preventer (BOP). It is used to close and seal the 
well if the drilling crew loss control of formation, also known as kick and blowout. It is 
attached on the top of the well and consists of some types of rams that can be used for 
different purposes when closing a well in the emergency situation. BOP is very critical to the 
safety of the crew, the rig, and the wellbore itself (Subsea1, 2010).   
 Cementing job is important after casing has been placed in order to prevent the loss of 
drilling fluid and to seal the annulus between casing and well bore by filling it with proper 
cement so there is no spaces in the annulus. Primary cementing is placed right after the 
casing has been run into the hole and if deficiency occurs, then secondary cementing might 
be done. Casing and cementing operations are parts of the well completion during drilling 
operation. Drilling and completion operations usually are in line as they are acted as 
complement to each other to make a good well integrity. 
 Offshore drilling operations have quite similarities with the onshore drilling as 
mentioned above. There are some differences in the equipments used particularly during 
completion as it is drilled from the seabed. Marine riser, work over riser, lower marine riser 
package (LMRP), lower riser package (LRP), emergency disconnect package (EDP), landing 
string and tubing hanger running tool (THRT) might be used. There are many different 
systems and approaches that can be used, but the most common systems are landing string 
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systems for running in marine riser, simplified landing string systems for running in marine 
riser, open water systems with workover risers and riserless open water system (Subsea1, 
2010).  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the example of 
completion by using landing string 
systems for running in marine riser. 
The number of components can be 
listed as follows (Subsea1, 2010) : 
1. Surface Flow Tree  
2. Rig  
3. Marine riser  
4. Workover riser 
5. LMRP 
6. Landing string 
7. BOP 
8. THRT 
9. Tubing hanger & X-mass tree  
10. Wellhead 
11. Completion/tubing 
12. Well 
 
 
 The offshore drilling can be 
done from fixed structures (e.g. 
jacket platform, gravity based 
platform, etc) or floating structures 
(e.g. semisubmersible platform). To 
secure the position of drilling on the 
seabed, subsea drilling template 
might be used. Blow out preventer 
and X-mass tree could be installed 
on the platform (surface/dry tree) for 
fixed platform or on the sea bed 
(subsea/wet tree) for floating 
platform where the well head is 
attached on the seabed. 
Figure 2.2 Completion by using landing string systems for 
running in marine riser (Subsea1, 2010) 
    Figure 2.3 Surface and Subsea Tree (Odland, J., 2010) 
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 The tree is installed by replacing (removing) BOP during completion operation when 
drilling is finished and the well is ready for production. To start production, perforation is 
conducted by making a hole in the casing and formation. The hole in the formation will make 
a differential pressure which allows the hydrocarbon to flow from high pressure reservoir into 
the lower pressure of well and up to the surface. The flow of the fluid is control by the tree. 
The design, installation, operation and maintenance for surface trees are simpler than for wet 
tree. 
 The design of well construction is different from one area to other area, it depends on 
the location (depth) of the reservoir, layers of rocks that should be drilled, drilling fluid, 
pressure, temperature, integrity, fracture strength, hole stability of the formation, the available 
equipment, the economic operation and most importantly the safety of personnel. Here is an 
example of typical well construction in the North Sea (Odland, J., 2010), (Serene Energy, 
2010): 
1. Drill 30” – 36” hole to approximately 120 m below seabed by using sea water as a 
drilling fluid. To place the conductor, it can also be done by using piling technique. 
2. Set conductor of 30” diameter.   
3. Drill 26” surface hole to approximately 500 m by using mud as a drilling fluid.  
4. Run and set 20” surface casing.  
5. Cement surface casing and wellhead housing is installed on the top of the casing to 
provide the weight support of the casings that will be installed after. The BOP is also 
installed on the top of the casing to anticipate the possibility of high pressure 
formation fluid that might contain in the next drilling phase. 
6. Drill 17½ “ intermediate hole to approximately 1800 m.  
7. Run and set intermediate casing (13 3/8”). 
8. Cement intermediate casing. 
9. Drill 12 1/4” hole to top of reservoir. In this dept there would be a possibility of 
hydrocarbon presence in the formation and the sample of drill cutting are collected 
and examined. The formation in the well is also examined by using wireline technique 
to know the porosity of the rocks, shale and sands. Drill stem test can also be 
performed here after knowing the possibility of potential hydrocarbon and the 
formation fluid that flows in the well.  
10. Run and set production casing (9 5/8”) 
11. Cement casing.  
12. Drill 8 ½” hole. 
13. Run, set production tubing (7”) and placed packer in the annulus between production 
casing and production tubing 
14. Remove BOP and replace with Xmass tree  
15. Perforate and production 
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2.2 Kicks and Blowouts 
 
 During drilling operations many problems that can occur such as casing collapse, 
casing burst, kick, blow out, leaking tube, gas filled casing, etc. Kick and blow out could 
result in the most catastrophe event in the term of costs, assets, environmental damage and 
personnel safety when its occurrences and escalations are not handled properly. A kick 
should be detected early before it reached surface and become a blow out. The crew who 
work with drilling activities should understand the behaviors and characteristics related to the 
kick as well as the principles, the causes, the warning signs and the indicators. Drilling and 
tripping activities are contributing the most for the kick event to occur. In addition, it is also 
very important to comprehend the theories and procedures for well control operations.  
 The causes of kicks and blowouts are principally a result of pressure difference in the 
annulus between the wellbore and the formation. The pressures that are exerted from the 
drilling fluid should balance the pressure from the formation fluid. It should be larger than the 
pressure of fluid from the formation. However, the drilling fluid pressure could not be larger 
than the fracture pressure in the formation which can cause a formation fracture. When 
fracture occurs, there will be a diversion flow of drilling fluid (mud) into the fracture area 
resulting in a loss of mud circulation which reduces hydrostatic pressure in the annulus 
allowing formation fluid to flow up through the annulus and possibly to the surface. Moreover, 
the fractured formation allows high pressure fluid to flow inside it and if the formation is weak 
the flows could break the weaker formation above and reach the surface on any random 
location known as cratered blowout. The blowout will make well control operations become 
harder.   
 Kick is occur when the pressure of drilling fluid 
(mud) in the wellbore has less pressure than the 
pressure flows in the formation fluid, whether as a 
result of the loss of mud circulation or increase 
pressure in the deeper formation, making an 
unwanted influx of formation fluid into the wellbore. A 
blowout (surface blowout) occur when an 
uncontrolled kick in the wellbore reaches the surface, 
endanger the safety of rig, personnel and 
environment. Underground blowout occurs when the 
uncontrolled flow of formations is flowing into another 
weaker formation.  
   
 Figure 2.4 Underground blowouts from a well reach surface (Chu, D., L., 2010) 
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 Blowout could occur when there are some failures in the equipment, operations caused 
by human error and the force of nature such as annular losses, poor cement, casing failure, 
swabbing, low density of mud weight, tubing plug failure, well test string failure, gas cut mud, 
unexpected high well pressure, trapped gas behind casing, shallow gas, etc (Hauge, S. et 
al., 2011). 
 Drilling from a floating platform gives another challenge when bad weather occurs or 
when there is a problem with station keeping. The platform might have to disconnect LMRP 
from BOP and the well is shut in. If there is a kick and the well is not stable a blowout might 
occur. Ship or platform collision could also become an indirect cause of a blowout. Gas 
blowout around the pipe could sink a floater in a relatively shallow water as a result of 
decrease buoyancy (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield R., 1983).  
 The well need to be shut in when there is a kick and surface shut in pressure is 
required to add more pressure balance in the bottom hole of the well which gives additional 
pressure that are already exerted by drilling fluid (mud hydrostatic). Both pressures (surface 
and drilling fluid pressures) should not exceed the maximum fracture pressure in the 
formation and there would be a maximum allowable annular surface pressure (MAASP). 
     Pfrac > Phyd at shoe + Pshut in (MAASP) 
Therefore,     MAASP = Pfrac – Phyd at shoe 
 In addition to the maximum annular surface pressure, we also need to know the 
maximum pressure that can be exerted by drilling mud without fracturing the formation called 
kick tolerance (KT). 
    KT = [TVDshoe x (Pfrac – MW)] / TVDhole  
   𝐾𝑇 =
𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑒 × 𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐 −𝑀𝑊 
𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑒
−
 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑥  𝑕𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡× 𝑀𝑊−𝑔𝑎𝑠  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦   
𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑕𝑜𝑙𝑒
   
 
2.2.1 Causes of Kick  
 Kick occurs when there is underbalanced pressure in the well. The under balance 
could occur principally when there is a deviation in the drilling fluid volumes and pressures 
that are acted in the well. According to Rig Train (2001), the main causes of kick are failing to 
fill the hole properly when tripping, swabbing in a kick while tripping out, insufficient mud 
weight, abnormal formation pressure, lost of circulation, shallow gas sands and excessive 
drilling rate in gas bearing sands. 
a. Deviation in the drilling fluid as a result of: 
i. Tripping  
Tripping will create additional volume of drilling fluid that need to be filled in the 
well replacing the volume of the pulled pipe/string. If the volume of the drilling fluid 
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is reduced or not maintained properly, there will be a reduction in the hydrostatic 
pressure in the drilling fluid giving the possibility of formation fluid to enter the 
wellbore. In this case keeping the hole full when drill string are pulled from the hole 
is very important 
ii. Fracture formation 
Fracture could happen naturally in the formation or when it is not strong enough to 
hold the pressure coming from the drilling fluid. It will lead to a deviated drilling fluid 
flow from annulus into formation resulting in a loss of mud circulation in the well 
and reduces well pressure. The loss of circulation could also happen when the 
drilling fluid flow into thief zone. According to Nas (2011), the fracturing of 
formation could be the result of excessive in drilling fluid density, surface back 
pressure and annular circulating pressure. In addition, pressure surges related to 
pipe movement and breaking circulation could also become the source of fracture 
formation.  
iii. Insufficient mud weight 
Principally when the drilling fluid hydrostatic is less than the hydrostatic exerted by 
the formation, there will be influx in the wellbore. Insufficient mud weight can be 
the result of unexpected penetration fluid from abnormally high pressure zone. 
Dilution of mud weight with water, for example in mud tank, could also become the 
causes of insufficient mud weight. In addition, mud weight are reduced intentionally 
for the underbalanced drilling operation (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
b. Deviation in the hole pressures as a result of: 
i. Swabbing and surging 
Swabbing is the situation where drilling fluid tends to follow the drill string as it is 
pulled from the hole causing a reduction in well/annulus (Malhotra, S., M., 2005). 
According to Hawker (2001), swabbing effect could be overcome by having a 
slower speed when pulling the pipe and maintain low mud viscosity  
ii. Excessive rate of penetration (ROP) during drilling in the gaseous formations could 
create the release of gas into the hole and it will give some void in the drilling fluid 
resulting in loss of annular pressure. The characteristics of gas can be described 
with the relationship between pressure, volume and temperature. Pressure and 
volume varies inversely with temperature (PV/T) with the constant value. The 
pressure will be higher in the deeper depth and vice versa. From here we can see 
that when we have a constant value of PV/T, half pressure (half depth) will result in 
double volume and vice versa. In application, gas will have double volume as the 
depth is reduced into half. Therefore, the volume of gas in the surface is much 
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bigger compare to the volume of gas when it is still in the bottom of the hole.  
iii. Underpressured formations could occur when there is a fracture resulting in 
diversion of drilling fluid that creates loss of circulation 
iv. Overpressured formations occur when the pressure in the formation exceeds the 
annular pressure.  
v. Shallow gas 
In most cases of gas influx, gas is much lighter than the normal drilling mud 
hydrostatic causing fast flow of gas up to the surface. The behavior of gas that can 
expand as the pressure is reduced resulting in quick migration of gas from the 
wellbore into the surface. This situation is very critical to the operator as they must 
act quickly and properly to know the sign of influx and the treatment of gas influx. 
Furthermore, it is also very dangerous to the integrity of the hole, particularly when 
the drilling progress is still in the shallow depth. In the shallow hole, the short 
surface casing is placed in a relatively weak formation giving the possibility of 
fracture and broaching. It is necessary to divert the flow of gas influx instead of 
shut in the well to reduce the risk of formation fracture. In case of gas influx during 
drilling from floating platform, the occurrence of fracture on seabed which gives 
expanding air bubbles could cause instability to the platform and even could 
sinking the platform. The risk for shallow water drilling is higher than drilling in the 
deeper water.   
 
Figure 2.5 Loss of stability in shallow gas kick (Rig Train, 2001) 
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2.2.2 Kick Warning Signs 
According to Hawker (2001), there are a number of signs that are potential to become a kick 
and can be categorized in three areas such as shown in table 2.1 below.  
Table 2.1 Indicators of the occurrence possibility of kicks (Hawker, D., 2001) 
Area Indicators 
Lost Circulations Zones - Large surge pressures (sign of formation fracture 
and loss of circulation) 
- Increase in ROP and irregular torque (sign of 
fracture formation) 
- Reduction in the volume of the returned mud 
(indicate loss of fluid into formation) 
Transitional Zones - Increase in ROP  
- Increase in gas levels 
- The occurrence of connection gas 
- Hole instability indications such as irregular torque, 
drag, etc 
- Increase in mud temperature 
- Increase in cutting volumes 
- Reduce shale density 
Sealed Overpressured Bodies - Immediate change in ROP (indicate pressure 
differential and high porosity in the formation) 
 
The indication of kicks are varies according to the permeability of the formation and the 
pressure exist in the hole. Goins and Sheffield (1983), mentioned some indications of kick in 
different pressure and permeable formation. 
 
Table 2.2 Indicators of the occurrence possibility of kicks (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) 
Area Indicators 
Very permeable formation underbalanced by mud 
pressure 
- Increasing flow rate and pit volume 
- Reduction of drill pipe pressure and increasing 
pump rate 
Very permeable formation slightly underbalanced by 
mud pressure 
- Initially small rate of flow and slow pit level gain 
- Expansion of gas at surface causing : 
- Reduction in bottom hole pressure 
- Rapid increase of flow in the bottom 
- The occurrence of drilling break 
Low permeability formations underbalanced by mud 
pressure 
- Slow rate of pit gain level and gas cut mud 
Formation with slightly overbalanced by mud  
Pressure 
- Increase in pit volume 
- Occurrence of small amount of gas after mud 
circulation 
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2.2.3 Indication of Kicks  
1. Indications of kicks while drilling (Hawker, D., 2001): 
a. Increase or decrease of pump pressure (pumping rate) gradually or exponentially 
b. Increase of mud flow from annulus. The measurement of mud flow can be done with 
flow meter  
c. Increase in mud pit volumes 
d. Contaminated mud marked with the reduced in mud density, change in chloride 
content, change in mud pressure and temperature.   
e. The appearance of connection gas due to pipe connection or caving signed with the 
reduction in pressure and mud hydrostatic 
f. Variations in weight on bit (WOB) 
2. Indications of kicks while tripping (Hawker, D., 2001). 
a. Insufficient volume of drilling fluid in the hole due to swabbing effect or loss of 
circulation. It can be balanced by adding some pressures according to the trip margin.  
b. The change in a trip tank volume due to swabbing effect 
c. Increase of mud volume in a trip tank 
d. Mud flowing at surface 
e. Increase of mud levels added by caving indicate the possibility of influx 
f. Pinched bit shows imbalance pressure in the hole. When the drill pipe or drill bit is 
stuck or broken, circulation of mud might not flow properly causing a possibility of 
harder well control (Westergaard, R., H., 1987) 
3. Indications of kick while pulling out of the hole is quite similar to the indications while 
tripping as it has the same operations. In addition, a small flow of mud in the flow line 
and the reduction of fluid level during pulling could contribute the indication of kick.  
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3. BASIC WELL CONTROL PRINCIPLES  
 When a kick occur, the well need to be closed (shut in) to control the kick. However, 
not every situation with kick should be handled through well shut in. There are factors such 
as pressure, casing depth and formation strength that need to be considered before 
choosing to shut in a well. First consideration is that there would be an increase of pressure 
in annular which will give a possibility of formation fracture when a shut in is initiated. The 
fracture could cause other problems such as loss of circulation. Moreover, if the casing is set 
shallow, it could create fracture until it reaches surface. This phenomenon is also known as 
"broaching" which is very dangerous to the safety of personnel and can result in loss of well 
and rig. Therefore, according to Goins and Sheffield (1983), a well should only be shut in 
when there is an influx of formation fluid and no possibility of broaching to occur. Casing 
depth and formation strength should be measured to determine the well shut in possibility. 
The reasons to shut in the well are to protect the crew and rig, stop the influx of formation 
fluid into the wellbore, allows shut in pressure to be determined and provide opportunity to 
organize the kill procedure (Well Control School, 2004, p.5-2) 
 There are some considerations when performing drilling on a floating platform 
regarding to the kick killing procedure (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield R., 1983) : 
 The fracture gradient in deep water are less which require additional casing strings 
to protect the formation from fracture 
 There is a possibility that the floater sink if a gas blowout occur around the string 
and in relatively shallow water 
 There will be an increase of bottom hole pressure as the effect of long choke lines 
from the subsea wellhead to the choke at surface. 
 Special procedure should be established to cope with the vessel's motion in order to 
perform kick killing 
 When a kick occur, there are two basic principles that can be used in order to balance 
the pressure in the well. First, is to give additional pressure into the well to counter the 
pressure from the kick and secondly by adding mud weight so it gives higher hydrostatic that 
can balance the formation pressure.  
 For a drill bit and the circulation of fluid that take place in the bottom of the hole, 
principally there are two pressures that are contained in the well during drilling to balance the 
pressure in the well. One is the pressure in the drill pipe and one is in the casing (annulus). 
U-Tube model is present to illustrate the pressure in the bottom of the hole and further to 
measure the required pressure and mud weight that might be needed to balance the 
pressure in the well. On the left side of the tube is drill pipe and on the right side is the 
annulus (Grace, R., D., 2003). 
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Figure 3.1 U-Tube model of the bottom hole pressure (Grace, R., D., 2003) 
 
 During shut in process these pressures are called shut in drill pipe pressure (SIDP) and 
shut in casing pressure (SICP). The principle is to balance the pressure both in drill pipe and 
annulus so there is no influx takes place in both holes. The minimum requirement to balance 
the pressure is when bottom hole pressure is equal to mud hydrostatic. In case of kick occur, 
bottom hole pressure is equal to the formation kick pressure which shows the highest 
pressure in the well for balance situation. SIDP is required when hydrostatic mud in the drill 
pipe is less than the pressure exerted by the formation/kick. In the same way SICP is also 
required when the hydrostatic mud and hydrostatic of influx is less than the pressure exerted 
by the formation/kick.  Therefore, in order to balance the pressure in the bottom hole we can 
conclude that: 
Phyd mud drill pipe + SIDP ≥ P formation / kick  
Phyd mud casing/annulus + Phyd mud influx + SICP ≥ P formation / kick  
 The above method is only useful when the influx is happening in the bottom of the hole. 
In case that it happens in other places or any other type of influx with related operation (e.g. 
kick in the middle of the well with further migration), then other method would be useful. The 
U-tube principal is quite useful in determining the early estimation of influx. The influx volume 
is normally assumed to be equal to the increase in a pit volume. The indication of migration 
of gas influx during shut in is when SICP never reach the estimate balance condition while it 
is still increasing (Hawker, D., 2001). 
 The required mud weight to counter the pressure of the influx is called kill mud and it is 
circulated into the well with an initial slow circulating rate (SCR) to minimize the excess of 
pressure in the well. As the heavier mud is replacing the lighter mud, pressure exerted by the 
pump into drill string can be reduced. When the kill mud has replaced all the lighter mud, the 
pressure should be kept constant and final circulating pressure (FCP) can be reached. These 
procedures are often called constant bottom-hole pressure method. In order to make it 
practicable the drill pipe should be in the bottom-hole to give the required mud density to kill 
SIDPP SICP 
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the well. If there is no pipe in the hole, the pipe must be placed inside by using either 
stripping or snubbing method.  
 In order to control the well when influx occurred, there would be some procedures 
before commencing one of the above methods. Figure 3.2 shows an example of flow chart 
for a kick control procedure during drilling, tripping and pulled out of hole (no pipe in BOP).  
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Figure 3.2 Flow chart of kick control procedure (Schlumberger, 2012) 
Well influx
operation 
in progress
Drilling bit 
on bottom
Raise kelly
Stop pump
Close 
Annular 
Preventer
Open 
choke line
close kelly 
choke
install kill 
assembly 
and test
check 
space out
close 5" 
pipe rams
land string, 
close 
posilocks
pressure up to 
shut in drillpipe 
pressure
open kelly 
choke
Tripping
Install open 
kelly cock
Close kelly 
cock
close 
annular 
preventer
Open 
choke line
Collars 
in BOP?
No
Install kill 
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test
check 
space out
Close 5" 
pipe rams
land string, 
close 
posilocks
open kelly 
cock
Observe 
Well
Muster all crews for 
information
Prepare to 
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Withdraw 
all work 
permits
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standby 
boat
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surface 
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Upward 
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No
Drop string, 
wait then close 
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Close shear 
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4. KICK CONTROL EQUIPMENTS 
Controlling the flow of a kick is very important to maintain balance pressures in a well so that 
drilling operation can be safely performed. In case of uncontrolled flow which turns into 
blowout, there should be barriers to stop and mitigate the consequences. Kick control 
equipments are required to control and regulate fluid flow in a well and to seal wellbore from 
the uncontrolled flow of fluid.     
 
4.1 Blowout Preventer (BOP) Stack 
Blowout preventer (BOP) is a structure with a large set of valves and rams placed on the top 
of the wellhead that can be closed when drilling crew have uncontrolled flow of formation 
fluids (Subsea1, 2010). It is also used to hold erratic pressures of a flow that comes from a 
well during drilling. Other purpose is to centre and hang off the drill string in the wellbore 
(Hauge, S. et al., 2011). During well killing, BOP also allows the drill pipe to be laid into down 
hole while maintaining the sealing of the well. The processes are also known as stripping and 
snubbing. Generally, subsea BOP is incorporated with LMRP to enables quick disconnection 
between marine riser and BOP in emergency situation. Figure 4.1 shows the main 
components in BOP and LMRP. 
 
Figure 4.1 Typical main components in subsea BOP and LMRP (Subsea1, 2010) (Transocean, 2011) 
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From figure 4.1 (left) the components from number one to ten sequentially are kill line, choke 
line, annular BOP, accumulator, shear blind ram, upper pipe ram, middle pipe ram, lower 
pipe ram, accumulator and hydraulic line. There are also other components as can be seen 
in figure 4.1 (right) such as riser adapter, flex joint, rigid conduit line, wellhead connector, 
yellow and blue pod. 
 
Figure 4.2 Example of cutaway view of blowout preventer stack components (Transocean, 2011) 
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 BOP has different styles, sizes and pressure ratings. Its varieties are depending on the 
intended function, hazard expectation and the design of the well. Some type of BOPs can be 
designed to close, seal and cut through drill pipe. On a regular basis BOPs are inspected, 
tested and refurbished with respect to risk assessment, local practice, well type and legal 
requirements in order to ensure the reliability and functionality of a BOP (Subsea1, 2010).  
 BOP mainly consists of preventer, valves, spools and rams that are positioned on the 
top of the wellhead. The arrangement of these items as can be seen in the above pictures 
are often called stack. The purposes of the stack are (Hawker, 2001): 
 Control the flow of formation fluid by sealing of the well 
 Prevent fluid from flowing into surface 
 Allow the release of fluids from the well under controlled conditions 
 Balance the pressure from formation and prevent further influx by allowing drilling 
fluid to be pumped into the well under controlled condition 
 Allow the drill string to be moved in and out from the well 
 The configuration of the stack is depending on the expected operations, redundancy, 
flexibility and the trade off between the advantages and disadvantages of each configuration. 
The basic typical configurations of the BOP stack from the top to the bottom are bell nipple, 
flow line, fill line, annular preventer, blind rams, pipe rams, drilling spools, kill line and choke 
flow line (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983).  
 When kick occurs, the well will be shut in and annular preventer and/or rams will be 
closed to stop the influx going further into the surface. The closing and opening of the 
preventer and rams are mainly driven by hydraulic fluid that is controlled manually from the 
surface (control room) through BOP control system or by the use of ROV (Remotely 
Operated Vehicles). Automatic mode function (AMF) or dead man function is an important 
part of BOP to close blind shear rams automatically in case of loss of communication 
(hydraulic control and power) from the surface. The required mud weight to balance the 
pressure from a kick will be circulated into the well through kill line and the flow of fluid in the 
well will be circulated through choke flow line into mud pit. Figure 4.3 shows the blowout 
preventer stack with preventer closed, pipe rams closed and blind rams closed. 
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Figure 4.3 Blowout preventer stack with preventer and rams close (Goins, W.,C., 
Sheffield, R., 1983) 
 
 The position of annular preventer is always on the top of the BOP stack. On the other 
hand, the stack configuration of ram type (e.g. blind ram above pipe rams, blind ram below 
pipe rams, etc) can be varies and there will be some advantages and disadvantages of these 
configurations as follows (Hawker, 2001): 
 Lower blind rams 
When the well is shut in and blind rams in the lower part is closed, it allows other 
rams on the upper part of the rams to be repaired or changed, but it has a 
consequences where the rest of the string below the blind rams could not be hung 
off. The lower blind rams is act as a master valve (Hawker, 2001). 
 Upper blind rams 
When the blind rams in upper part is closed, the rest of the pipe below the blind 
rams can be hung off by pipe rams below. Moreover, it can be replaced by pipe 
rams for stripping (ram to ram stripping) to minimize wearing (Hawker, 2001). 
Consequentially, it prevents other rams for repair or changed.  
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 The configurations of blowout preventer 
should maximize the advantages and minimize 
the disadvantages. One can configure blind ram 
on top or in the middle for one size drill pipe. It 
allows the pipe to be hung off in the pipe rams 
and the circulation can be made through drill 
string with proper, ram to ram stripping and 
partial utilization of the blind ram as a master 
valve to give access for equipment repair 
(Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983). Figure 4.4 
shows the common subsea BOP arrangement. 
Stripping and snubbing during well shut in or 
well control will make some wear in the sealing 
element inside rams or preventer. It requires 
replacement and in this case the ease of repair 
and access should be taken into consideration 
when deciding the configuration of the stack. 
  
 
Circulation of killing mud and the flow 
from the formation in the well should be 
considered in the well control operation. 
The configuration and position of kill line 
and choke line also have to be in line 
with the ram configuration to give 
access for killing mud, allows equalizing 
pressure before opening other rams (in 
case of the other functioning ram) and 
giving measurement for pressure 
monitoring. Figure 4.5 shows the 
example of kill and choke lines 
configuration for four ram stack. 
 
 
 
 
 
Kill line 
Choke line 
Figure 4.4 Typical subsea BOP stack (Rees, 
A., Daniel, M., 2011) 
Figure 4.5 Typical kill and choke lines configuration 
(Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) 
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Components of blowout preventer can be described as follows: 
4.1.1 Annular Preventer 
The annular preventer is a preventer used to seal and close around the pipe in any sizes 
(diameter) and shapes such as drill pipes, kelly, tool joints, drill collars, casing or wire 
line. The prime sealing element is reinforced packer consisting of rubber seal with steel 
reinforcement segments. Annular preventer allows slow rotation and vertical movement 
of the pipe while maintaining the sealing which is useful for snubbing and stripping 
process. It becomes the first barrier to close in a BOP stack when controlling and it is 
capable to seal on any drill pipe component in the well bore (Hawker, 2001) (Vujasinovic, 
A., 1986). 
The advantages of having annular preventer as an additional barrier compare to ram 
preventer are (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) : 
 Closure can be made on drill collars or casing 
 Closure can be made on tool joints or on the kelly 
 Closure can be made on any segment of a tapered drill string 
 Closure can be made on swab, logging and perforating lines and tools 
 Drill pipe can be reciprocated 
 Faster well closure is possible because the pipe does not need to be positioned 
 The string can be stripped in or out of the hole 
 A back up for both blind rams and pipe rams is provided 
There are some types of annular preventer that are mostly produced and used in the oil 
and gas industry such as Shaffer spherical BOP, Annular Cameron DL, Annular Hydril 
GK and Annular Hydril GL. Each of these annular preventer have their own features.  
 
 Shaffer spherical BOP 
Shaffer annular is a common type of annular preventer that can seal on almost any 
shapes or sizes such as drill pipes, tool joints, drill collars, casing or wire line. It is also 
provide positive pressure control for stripping drill pipe into and out of the hole. The 
closing of the annular is operated by hydraulic pressure. It has some features such as 
(Rig Train, 2001): 
- Simple hydraulic system where it only needs two hydraulic connections 
- Prolongs preventer life by reducing metal to metal contact by having wear rings 
on movable parts  
- Suitable for H2S service 
- Element can be changed without getting mud and grit into the hydraulic system 
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Figure 4.6 Sealing element and steel reinforcement segments in an annular preventer 
(Vujasinovic, A., 1986) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Shaffer spherical BOP (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
Figure 4.8 The closing of Shaffer spherical BOP (Rig Train, 2001) 
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Figure 4.8 shows the closing step of Shaffer spherical BOP. Hydraulic fluid is pumped 
into the closing chamber and it pushes the sealing element up and closes as it goes 
further up (left). The steel reinforcement element support the rubber element in the 
sealing element as the well pressure pushes it upward (middle). When there is no pipe 
in the annular, the sealing element will continue close until it fully closed (Rig Train, 
2001). 
 Annular Cameron DL 
This type of annular has a different type of sealing element compare to the previous 
one, but the main functions are still the same to seal on almost any size of shape 
object that will be used in the well bore. It is also has a capacity to strip pipe, close and 
seal on open hole. Additional feature allowing the preventer to be split for installation 
while pipe is in the hole (Rig Train, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.9 DL Annular Blowout Preventer (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Packing element components and operations (Rig Train, 2001) 
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The closing operation is start when a pressure forcing the operating piston and 
pusher plate to close upward (see figure 4.10). Packer inserts will rotate inward as 
the packer closes and forming support to the top and bottom of the packer.  
 Annular Hydril GK 
This annular is suitable for onshore installation as well as offshore platform and 
subsea installation. The closing is driven by hydraulic pressures which push the 
closing chamber to raise the piston and packing unit for sealing (Rig Train, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.11 Annular Hydril GK type (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 Annular Hydril GL 
The annular has additional secondary chamber which provides greater flexibility of 
control hook up, reduce closing pressure, minimize the closing and opening volumes 
(Rig Train, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.12 Annular Hydril GL type (Rig Train, 2001) 
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4.1.2 Ram Preventer 
 Ram is a tool that can be used to seal and close the well in the event of influx from 
formation into wellbore. It consists of packer and seal divided in two parts which are 
opposing each other and hydraulic pressure pushes the parts in the middle for sealing 
purposes (Schlumberger, 2012). The sealing depends on which type of rams, some are 
intended to close completely by cutting the drill pipe known as blind/shear rams, other are for 
seal which correspond to the diameter of the pipe known as pipe/casing rams. For some 
purposes the pipe rams can be used for more than one pipe size and/or more than one pipe 
known as variable rams.  
 Rams are controlled by pistons from both sides which are operated by fluid pressure. 
Closing ratio and opening ratio are used to know the ratio of well bore pressure to pressure 
required for closure and opening (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983). 
i. Pipe/casing rams 
Ram type that can close around a pipe. It is specifically use for one size pipe only.  
 
Figure 4.13 Typical pipe/casing rams (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
ii. Blind/shear rams 
Blind rams is used to seal a wellbore by cutting through the drill pipe as the rams close 
off and seal the well (Transocean, 2011) 
 
Figure 4.14 Typical blind/shear ram (Transocean, 2011) 
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iii. Variable rams  
a. Variable bore rams (VBR) capable of closing around a range of tubing and drill 
pipe outside diameters (Transocean, 2011) 
 
Figure 4.15 Typical variable bore rams (Rig Train, 2001) (Transocean, 2011) 
 
b. Flex packer can close around a range of tubing and drill pipe outside diameter by 
the use of flexible packer  
 
Figure 4.16 Typical flex packer (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
c. Dual bore flex packer is designed to seal on three different pipe sizes in two 
different packer bores (Rig Train, 2001). 
 
Figure 4.17 Typical dual bore flex packer (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
iv. Test rams  
It is a variable bore rams (VBRs) which is inverted to seal the pressure from above. It is 
useful to reduce the time required to prepare for BOP pressure testing and resume 
drilling operations. (Transocean, 2011).  
 
 
 
Page | 29  
 
4.1.2.1 Rams Closing Principle 
 
Figure 4.18 Blind shear rams closing (Gröndahl, M., et al., 2010) (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 The closing of rams is controlled by BOP control system which is driven mainly by 
hydraulic power. The hydraulic used to close rams are carried out from accumulator into 
subsea control pod. It passes through regulator, SPM valve and shuttle valve. The 
sequences and functions of this system are described in more detail in BOP control system 
chapter.  
 The closing of blind shear rams start when hydraulic fluid from control pod pass 
through shuttle valve and push both pistons inward. The hydraulic fluid from the other side of 
the pistons is circulated into another shuttle valve and later into surface. While piston is 
moving inward, wedge lock is move behind the piston rod to prevent the piston move 
backward. The well is shut completely when both rams are closed and seal the well.  
 The opening of the rams has the same principle like the closing one. The hydraulic flow 
is now pass through the other side of the piston and push it outward. At the same time, the 
wedge lock is move to its original position to allow the opening of the rams.  
 The operating sequence for closing and opening of other type of rams (e.g., variable 
bore rams and fixed pipe rams) are also having the same principle like the mentioned one. 
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4.1.3 Choke Lines and Kill Lines 
 Choke line is a line that connecting BOP stack to surface through choke manifold. It is 
used to circulate the fluid in the wellbore during well control operations. When there is 
overpressure in the wellbore, choke lines circulate the flow into surface and reduce the 
pressure in the well (Schlumberger, 2011). The flow should pass through choke line, choke 
manifold, mud tanks and reserve pit. On floating rig, four or more chokes should be available 
on the manifold. Two are usually remotely controlled and the other two are manually 
controlled. Master valve should be available next to the wellhead of each flow line and should 
not be used during normal operation to prevent unnecessary wearing. It is used to close the 
line when flow line is repaired (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983).  
 Kill line is a high pressure pipe that connecting outlet on the BOP stacks and rig pumps 
(Schlumberger, 2011). It is used to pump killing mud into the wellbore when pumping through 
drill string is not possible. When drill pipe is pulled out and the well is pressured, then the kill 
lines can be used to pump mud into the well. It can be located below blind ram. The working 
pressure of kill line should be equal to or greater than BOPs (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 
1983).  
 The configuration of rams will determine the position of kill and choke lines. Placing it 
below one or more rams allows bleed of fluid and pressure under control. The pressure can 
be monitored by passing choke line into choke manifold. Choke manifold is the arrangement 
of lines and valves which are connected to the BOP stack to give different flow routes and 
capable to stop the flow completely (Hawker, 2001). Subsea BOP that is connected to a 
floating platform, have choke and kill lines which are attached to opposite side of the marine 
riser. Flexibility of these lines is important to handle movement and heave motion of the 
floating platform (Hawker, 2001). Furthermore, the volumetric and frictional effects of these 
long choke and kill lines should be taken into consideration for a proper well control operation 
(Schlumberger, 2012). The position of the choke and kill line outlets should be arranged so 
that circulation for well control can be carried out with the drill string suspended in the BOP 
and the shear ram closed. Each of the choke and kill outlets in the BOP stack should be 
fitted with two gates arranged in series and installed close to the BOP. One choke outlet 
should be located below upper annular in order to handle trapped gas (Norsok D-001, 1998). 
There are some requirements regarding to the choke and kill line as follows: 
- The manifold should have a pressure capability equal to the rated operation pressure 
of the BOP stack (equal to the weakest component) (Hawker, 2001). 
- The choke line connecting the manifold to the stack should be as straight as possible 
and firmly anchored (Hawker, 2001). 
- Alternative flow and flare routes should be available downstream of the choke line in 
order to isolate equipment that may need repair (Hawker, 2001) 
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4.2 Blowout Preventer (BOP) Control System 
 BOP control system is a critical component in a BOP stack because this is the heart of 
a system that drives preventers and rams to close and open with or without using primary rig 
power. There are some essential elements of a BOP control system such as accumulator 
system, operating fluid, high pressure piping to carry and direct hydraulic fluid, remote unit 
for controlling valve with hydraulic unit (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983). 
 
 
Figure 4.19 BOP control system in Macondo Deepwater Horizon (Gröndahl, M., et al., 2010) 
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 Accumulator is a device used in a hydraulic system to store energy or, in some 
applications, dampen pressure fluctuation (Schlumberger, 2012). It contains pre-charge 
nitrogen that is stored in a series of bottles that can supply hydraulic fluid under pressure 
which will be required to close preventers (Hawker, 2001). It can be used to provide hydraulic 
power to close blind shear rams and other rams when there is no communication of power or 
loss of pressure in an emergency situation. In a subsea BOP, the location of accumulator is 
under blue and yellow pod (see figure 4.19 with red tubes). There are two types of 
accumulator, float type and bladder type. Both types are having the same system consisting 
of (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983): 
- Accumulator bottles which contains hydraulic operating fluid under compressed nitrogen. 
The pre-charge nitrogen usually within the range of 750 psi – 1000 psi and when power 
fluid is pumped into the bottles the pressure inside is increasing and resulting in operating 
pressure with 1200 psi - 3000 psi (Hawker, 2001) 
- High pressure pumps to recharge the accumulator with power fluid. Electric or pneumatic 
pumps are usually used to deliver hydraulic fluid under pressure (Hawker, 2001) 
- A control manifold to regulate the pressure and direct flows into the correct ram and 
preventer. Pneumatic operation is typically used for the mechanism of opening and 
closing of preventer, choke, kill lines and to monitor and regulate pressure (Hawker, 
2001) 
- a reserve tank for storing operating fluid at atmospheric pressure  
 Activation of control from the 
surface on floating/offshore platform to 
a subsea control pod can be delivered 
by the use of hydraulic system, 
electrohydraulic system and multiplexed 
(MUX) system with separate hydraulic 
line. Control pod is a set of valves and 
regulator that are grouped together in 
one place. Nowadays, multiplexed 
system and electrohydraulic system are 
the most common use for subsea BOP 
control system as it gives simplicity for 
the cost and the size of the lines (hose 
bundle) as well as reducing the 
operational problems when running and 
retrieving large hose bundles.  
Figure 4.20 Typical electro hydraulic cable (top left), MUX cable (top right) and hydraulic hose (bottom) 
(Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) (Umbilicals, 2009) (Rig Train, 2001) 
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 The time taken for the hydraulic system to activate BOPs is longer than the other two 
systems with electric signal. Therefore, hydraulic system is not recommended for deep water 
drilling as it will require more hydraulic fluid, more pressures to be pumped, high pressure 
drop and longer activation time to close BOPs.  
 Instead of supplying hydraulic fluid, hydraulic system also control the activation of the 
BOPs through hydraulic control. From figure 4.20 (bottom), we can see that the power fluid is 
carried out by supply hose and the control line are transmitted by a pilot hose. On the other 
hand, electrohydraulic system uses multiple conductor electric cable for activation control 
and supply hydraulic fluid through hydraulic hose (figure 4.20, left). Multiplex system will only 
consists of electric cable for variety of controlling purposes and hydraulic fluid is carried out 
by a separate line which is connected to subsea control pod. 
 There should be a minimum of two independent pods to give redundancy and only one 
pod is activated at a time. Inside a pod, there are pilot valve for the hydraulic system and 
solenoid valve together with pilot valve for the electrohydraulic and MUX system. Pilot valve 
will receive hydraulic fluid to regulate and control the flow of power fluid. Before power fluid is 
regulated by shuttle valve in electrohydraulic and MUX system, the system will give electric 
signal to operate solenoid valve which will directs hydraulic fluid into pilot valve.  Power fluid 
stored in the accumulator flows pass through the pilot valve to give a regulated power fluid 
needed to close and open the rams and preventers. The closing and opening of the BOP are 
regulated by means of shuttle valve. In addition, the hydraulic fluid is not only used to 
transmit fluid into pod for control on command, but also into accumulator both on surface and 
subsea control system for storage.   
 
Figure 4.21 Example of redundancy between pods and stack (Rig Train, 2001) 
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 Figure 4.21 shows the redundancy of pods to operate the closing and opening of a ram 
preventer with one pod activation a time. While one pod is activated to close or open the 
ram, the flow of hydraulic fluid of the other pod will be closed by means of shuttle valve. The 
flow of the fluid is controlled by pilot valve. Shuttle valve is used to divert the flow from the 
active pod and isolate the inactive pod. 
 In the emergency situation (blowout), there could be two alternatives to close the rams, 
manual and automatic. Manual approaches is when operator on the rig activates the 
emergency button which will provide signal to control pod to directs fluids from accumulators 
into a shuttle valve and drive blind shear ram to cut and seal the well (Gröndahl, M., et al., 
2010). In the automatic mode (AMF), the pod will detect if there is no communication of 
power and hydraulic from the surface and will activate accumulator automatically to direct the 
pressurized hydraulic fluid into shuttle valve to close blind shear ram and seal the well. In 
addition, acoustic system could also be used as a back-up system for emergency plan when 
there is no hydraulic and electric communication from the surface. It uses acoustic signal to 
activate the system in a pod to close blind shear ram. Manual intervention can be conducted 
by the use of ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) which activate the system through ROV 
intervention panel attached in the BOP stack. 
 
4.2.1 Hydraulic subsea BOP Control System Overview for BOP Function 
 Hydraulic BOP control system uses hydraulic power to operate the closing and opening 
of annular and ram preventer where the initial command is come from electric control panel 
in the control room. The systems mainly consists of master electric panel, electric mini panel, 
electric power pack with battery back-up, electric power cable, hydraulic power unit (consists 
of surface accumulator and central hydraulic control manifold), hydraulic jumper hose bundle, 
hose reel, subsea hose bundle, subsea control pod, subsea BOP and subsea accumulator. 
Figure 4.22 shows the general arrangement of hydraulic subsea BOP control system.  
 The signal initiation of hydraulic control system is using electric signal. This signal can 
be transmitted from master electric panel or electric mini panel. Independent supply of 
electric power can be brought by electric power pack with battery back-up. The electric signal 
will trigger solenoid valve to open pilot control valve and pod select valve inside central 
hydraulic control manifold to control and direct the hydraulic fluid from surface accumulator 
into one of the subsea control pod. This direction of hydraulic flow is important since 
hydraulic control system should have two subsea control pods for redundancy purpose. Blue 
control pod and yellow control pod are the common name for these two subsea control pods. 
The hydraulic flow from hydraulic power unit is forwarded into hydraulic jumper hose bundle, 
hose reel, subsea hydraulic hose bundle (umbilical), subsea accumulator and finally subsea 
control pod.  
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Figure 4.22 General arrangment of hydraulic subsea BOP control system (Rig Train, 2001) 
 
 
 The hydraulic pressure from surface and subsea accumulator usually has 3000 psi. 
This pressure will be regulated by mean of subsea regulated valve into the required pressure 
to operate rams and annular preventers. The regulated pressure usually contains 1500 psi. 
 Information of a more detail sequence of control system operation is needed in order to 
know which components are required to make the system functioning. The main functions 
can be divided into three operations which are close function, block function and open 
function. These three operations require the same components and have some differences in 
operating the closing and opening of the solenoid valve, pilot control valve and sub plate 
mounted (SPM) valve. Figure 4.23-4.25 shows the full schematic for operating sequence of 
block, open and close function in subsea BOP control system. 
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Figure 4.23 Schematic of block function for subsea BOP control system (Rig Train, 2001) 
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Figure 4.24 Schematic of open function for subsea BOP control system (Rig Train, 2001) 
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Figure 4.25 Schematic of close function for subsea BOP control system (Rig Train, 2001) 
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 The close function (figure 4.25) start when the operator press the close panel in the 
control panel (master electric panel or electric mini panel). The electric signal is sent to the 
associated solenoid valve to open which allows high pressure air to pass and actuate pilot 
control valve to be in close position. The actuation of pilot control valve gives access to high 
pressure (3000 psi) hydraulic pilot fluid stored in the surface accumulator to flow through 
hydraulic jumper hose bundle, hose reel and subsea hydraulic hose bundle into closed sub 
plate mounted (SPM) valve inside subsea control pod. There are two SPM valves inside 
subsea control pod. One function is to regulate the valve so it allows the flows of power fluid 
into the ram and perform the closing/opening function. The other one is to regulate the valve 
so that power fluid on the opposite side of the ram can be vented up to the surface.  
 At the same time, the position of pod selector valve is set to allows and directs the flow 
of power fluid (3000 psi) from surface power fluid accumulator into subsea regulator valve 
inside one of subsea control pod. Power fluid (3000 psi) from subsea power fluid 
accumulator are also directed into this regulator as a backup. The regulator valve reduce the 
pressure in the power fluid into 1500 psi in order to operate the BOP function. The regulated 
power fluid is pass through shuttle valve into the rams and push it for closing function. The 
power fluid in the opposite side of the rams is vented through the open SPM valve and pass 
through pilot control valve into mix water tank for fluid treatment. Shuttle valve has a function 
to close the flows of power fluid into another control pod (inactive control pod) and allows 
them to pass through the designated BOP functions. 
 Block function is initiated to vent a flow in a pilot control valve in order to detect leakage 
in the control system and preventer. The operation sequence is similar with the closing 
operation (see figure 4.23). The differences are both solenoid valves are open half way 
allowing the pilot control valve to be centered and give access for pilot fluid to be vented into 
both SPM valves inside the subsea control pod. The vented pilot fluid makes the SPM valve 
to seal against any power fluid to enter into shuttle valve. It makes the power fluid inside 
BOP rams become available to be vented back through SPM valves.  
  The open function operation is similar to close function operation. The differences are  
the position of closing and opening of solenoid valve, pilot control valve and SPM valve. All of 
the position in the mentioned components are opposite to the closing function. The 
schematic of open function can be seen in figure 4.24. The pilot control valve will direct the 
the pilot fluid into the opposite SPM valve to allows flow of power fluid into open rams. 
 In order to simplify the understanding of operation sequences, type of components and 
the redundancy they have on subsea BOP control system, the reliability block diagram can 
be developed based on the function flow from the schematic operation mentioned above.  
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4.2.2 Control Fluid Circuit and Subsea Accumulator Recharge  
 BOP control systems is not only function for the closing and opening of BOP rams and 
preventer but also to control the subsea regulators, provide readback pressure, latch/unlatch 
the subsea control pods and charge the subsea accumulator (Rig Train, 2001).  
 Control fluid circuit and subsea accumulator recharge system can be described in the 
same schematic flows as shown in figure 4.26 below. The control circuit is mainly driven by 
isolator valve and selector valve which are commanded from hydraulic control manifold and 
subsea control pod. 
 
Figure 4.26 Schematic flows of control fluid circuit and accumulator recharge system (Rig Train, 2001) 
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 The recharge operation of subsea accumulator starts from the fluid mixing system and 
mixed fluid reservoir for preparing the required hydraulic power fluid for storage. The power 
fluid is flowed into surface accumulator by using pump and to subsea accumulator later. In 
order to reach subsea accumulator, the fluid flows in two ways. One flow through 
accumulator isolation valve (AIV) and pass through accumulator isolator pilot valve (AIPV) 
and the other flow pass through pressure switch, flow meter and pod selector valve. The 
pressure switch set the required pressure for storing (3000 psi). Flow meter is needed to 
measure and read the flow of the fluid. Pod selector valve (PSV) is used to direct the flow 
into one of a subsea control pod. 
 After pass through AIPV and PSV, the fluid is go into one of the subsea control pod by 
passing through hydraulic jumper hose bundle, quick disconnect junction box, hose reel and 
subsea hydraulic hose bundle (umbilical). From there it can be routed into annular or 
preventer for closing/opening purpose by passing through subsea regulated valve, SPM 
valve and shuttle valve. In addition, the fluid can directed into shuttle valve directly or pass 
through pod mounted accumulator isolation valve (PMAIV) and shuttle valve for accumulator 
recharging purposes.   
 
 
4.2.3 Pilot Fluid Circuit 
 The control of pilot valves in the subsea pods are performed by using control valve 
located in the hydraulic control manifold. BOP stack function can have a system of open or 
close function (2 position function) and open and close function (3 position function). This 
control can be operated manually from the control manifold or remotely by means of solenoid 
valve. The pilot fluid function for 2 position functions have two solenoid valves, while 3 
position functions have three solenoid valves. These valves are commanded by electronic 
connection via electric panel and are driven by air in order to move the pilot valve. The 
schematic operation of this function is generally the same as mentioned in the system 
overview of BOP function (chapter 4.2.1). In addition, pressure switch is connected to each 
line of the control valve and will transmit signal to the appropriate control panel lamp. Figure 
4.27 shows the schematic flows of pilot fluid circuit for 3 position functions. 
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Figure 4.27 Schematic flows of pilot fluid circuit (Rig Train, 2001) 
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5. REQUIREMENTS FOR BOP   
5.1 Redundancy Requirements for BOP 
The critical components and system in a BOP should be made redundant in order to give 
functional availability in case of system or component failure during kicks occurrence. The 
required redundancies can be determined by the local standard regulations and company 
policy based on their best knowledge and expertise to reflect the minimum requirements of 
redundancies. According to Sedco Forex (p 192-193, 1999) together with Schlumberger 
expertise, the subsea BOP should consists of five BOP rams and two annular preventers in 
order to have minimum redundancies requirements. 
1. 5 BOP rams: 
 3 pipe rams 
 1 casing shear rams 
 1 blind shear rams 
2. 2 annular preventers: 
 1 upper annular BOP 
 1 lower annular BOP 
 Figure 5.1 shows the example of preferred stack arrangement for subsea BOP  
 
Figure 5.1 Subsea BOP stack arrangement (Sedco Forex, 1999) 
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When a tapered drill string is used, the BOP stack should be equipped with one of the 
following pipe ram configurations (Sedco Forex, 1999, p.193): 
a. 2 sets of pipe rams for the larger size string and 1 set for the smaller size string of 
drill pipe 
b. 2 sets of pipe rams for the larger size string and one set of variable bore pipe 
rams to fit both sizes of drill pipe 
c. 2 sets of variable bore pipe rams to fir both sizes of drill pipe 
d. 1 set of pipe rams for the larger size string and 1 set of variable bore pipe rams to 
fit both sizes of drill pipe 
e. 1 set of pipe rams for the larger size string and one set of pipe rams for the 
smaller size string and 1 set of variable bore pipe rams to fit both sizes of drill pipe 
 
Another regulation such as from Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), 
which formerly known as Mineral Management Service as an American body for energy 
regulations maker in the outer continental shelf (OCS), announced their minimum 
requirements for a subsea BOP stack as follows (BSEE, 2012): 
 1 annular preventer 
 2 pipe rams 
 1 blind shear ram 
 
According to Norsok D-001, the BOP should have a minimum component consists of the 
following: 
 1 annular preventer 
 1 shear ram preventer 
 2 pipe ram preventers 
 1 choke line outlet 
 1 kill line outlet 
 1 wellhead coupling or connector 
 2 manual gate valves 
 2 remote operated gate valve 
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5.2 General Requirements for BOP 
Overall, the general requirements for a BOP stack and systems must be met and are 
describe as follows: 
 There must be sufficient casing to provide a firm anchor for the stack (Hawker, 2001) 
 It must be able to close off and seal the well completely, with or without string in the 
hole (Hawker, 2001) 
 It must have a simple and rapid procedure (Hawker, 2001) 
 It must have controllable lines through which to bleed off pressure (Hawker, 2001) 
 It must provide the ability to circulate fluids through both the string and annulus 
(Hawker, 2001) 
 There must be the ability to hang or shear pipe, shut in a subsea stack, detach the riser 
and abandon the location (Hawker, 2001) 
 Subsea stacks cannot be affected by the lateral movement of the riser caused by 
currents movement and tidal variations. This achieved through a ball joint connection 
(Hawker, 2001) 
 BOP must have ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) intervention capability equipment. 
At a minimum the ROV must be capable of closing one set of pipe rams, closing one 
set of blind shear rams, and unlatching the LMRP) (BOEM, 2011) 
 BOP must have auto shear and deadman systems (BOEM, 2011) 
 BOP system must have an automatic backup to the primary accumulator-charging 
system. The power source must be independent of the power source for the primary 
accumulator-charging system. The independent power source must be able to close 
and hold the closure of all BOP components (BSEE, 2012) 
 There must be at least two BOP control stations. One placed on the drilling floor and 
the other should be placed in the readily accessible location away from the drilling floor 
(BSEE, 2012) 
 BOP must have separate side outlet for kill and choke lines. If the stacks does not have 
side outlets, drilling spool must be installed with side outlets (BSEE, 2012) 
 Remote controlled of subsea choke and kill line valves. Choke lines must be installed 
above the bottom ram and kill lines can be installed at the bottom ram (BSEE, 2012) 
Annular preventer closing time 
- API RP 53 state that surface annular preventers closing times should not exceed 30 
seconds for smaller than 18 ¾” and 45 seconds for 18 ¾” and larger  
- Subsea annular preventers should not exceed 60 seconds 
Ram Preventer closing time 
- API RP 53 requirements state that surface rams must close within 30 seconds 
- Subsea rams must close within 45 seconds 
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6. THE USE OF BOP IN DRILLING OPERATION 
 Principally, the use of BOP is to hold the flow and pressure of reservoir fluid in case of 
influx entering the wellbore up to the surface when other barriers inside the well have failed. 
It is acting as a last line of protection against kicks and blowouts. In general, the use of BOP 
during drilling operations can be divided into four operations, well shut in, stripping, snubbing 
and testing BOP. Well shut in is required in the most of the well control methods (e.g., wait 
and weight method, driller’s method, concurrent method, etc.) in order to close and seal the 
wellbore. Stripping and snubbing can be useful for giving a possibility of access for 
circulation of influx and drilling fluid (kill mud). It is important that testing of BOP is performed 
to ensure the functionality of system and components in a BOP.  
 
6.1 Shut In 
 Shut in is a process to seal a well in order to protect it against kicks, by closing BOP 
and chokes. There are some situations during drilling operation where the well must be shut 
in such as (Well Control School, 2004): 
1. Shut in when the pipe is on the bottom 
2. Shut in while tripping pipe 
3. Shut in when on trip with top drive 
4. Shut in while spacing out  
5. Shut in on collars 
6. Shut in while out of hole 
7. Shut in while running casing  
8. Shut in while running pipe 
From all of the shut in situations mentioned above, principally they are conducted in either of 
three ways which are hard shut in, modified shut in and soft shut in. The differences between 
them are the sequences of closing and opening of choke line and BOP as shown in table 5.1. 
It is important to know that shut in process is the first approach to close the well in order to 
protect the crew, stop the flow, gain time and read pressures 
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Table 6.1 Shut in procedures (Well Control School, 2004) 
Step Hard shut in  Modified shut in  Soft shut in  
1 Open choke line valve on 
BOP stack 
Close designated BOP Open choke line valve on BOP stack 
2 Close designated BOP Open choke line valve on 
BOP stack 
Close designated BOP  
3 Notify company crew Notify company crew Close choke, follow the pressure in the casing 
to ensure it does not exceed the limit or 
pressure trapped 
4 Read and record SIDPP 
and SICP each minute 
Read and record SIDPP 
and SICP each minute 
Notify company crew 
5   Read and record SIDPP and SICP each 
minute 
 
 
6.2 Stripping and Snubbing 
 Stripping and snubbing are the process to put in/out drill pipe in the wellbore in order to 
distribute and circulate killing mud into the bottom hole. It is conducted when either preventer 
or rams in the BOP is closed to prevent influx travel up to the surface. Stripping use its own 
weight to enter the wellbore as the pressure inside is less than the pressure exerted by the 
weight of the pipe. Snubbing is performed when the pressure exerted by the pipe is not 
enough to enter the wellbore by its own weight. It has to be snub in by exerting additional 
pressure using back pressure to force drill pipe enter the wellbore. There are two types of 
stripping/snubbing operation: 
 1.Stripping in/out the hole with annular preventer 
  2.Stripping in/out the hole with pipe rams 
 
6.2.1 Stripping in the hole with the annular preventer 
 When stripping in, fluid will have to be released from the hole equal to total cross 
section area of pipe. Some steps to perform stripping in the hole with the annular preventer 
(Well Control School, 2004): 
1. Construct landing nipple and backpressure valve and install open safety valve on 
top of pipe 
2. Lower pipe into the hole slowly and pass tool joints through preventer carefully (the 
preventer are closed according to the diameter of the lowered pipe). At the same 
time check annular regulator valve on accumulator to ensure it is working and 
regulated pressure to preventer is remaining constant. To keep the bottom hole 
pressure constant during the stripping operation, the drilling fluid is circulated 
through kill line and choke line 
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3. Land the pipe, fill the pipe, install safety valve on the next pipe which will be 
stripped into the hole. Remove safety valve from the previous pipe. The new pipe is 
connected to the next pipe and repeat step two until the pipe has reached the 
bottom  
 
6.2.2 Stripping out of the hole with the annular  
 When stripping out, fluid will have to be pumped into annulus to keep the hole full. The 
safety valve should be open during stripping out to prevent the pipe pulled up (float) by the 
pressure inside the well in case of float leak situation. Some steps to perform stripping out of 
the hole with the annular preventer (Well Control School, 2004): 
1. The annular preventer should be closed according to the diameter of the pipe. 
Stripping out can be started by circulating the drilling fluid through kill and choke 
line with initial pressure greater than shut in pressure (100 psi difference). Install 
safety valve and begin to pulling the pipe slowly 
2. While stripping out, check the annular preventer from leaking and the hole must be 
ensured to be circulated by drilling fluid in order to keep the constant bottom hole 
pressure. Pass the tool joints in the pipe carefully through the preventer. Check 
annular regulator 
3. Land the pipe on slips. Check drilling fluid displacement and annular pressure. 
Break off stand and install safety valve. Repeat the process from step one for the 
next stripping out pipe until all the string has been pulled out 
 
6.2.3 Stripping in the hole with pipe rams 
 Stripping in the hole can be performed with ram to ram stripping technique where it 
uses combination of closing and opening (depends on the diameter of pipe) of rams to allow 
drill string stripped into the hole. The upper rams should be used to take maximum wear 
when stripping the pipe/string. If rams on bottom are used as a master valve or safety valve, 
ram to ram stripping should be conducted with four stacks of ram or an annular preventer 
with a set of rams stack. Stripping rams must have some distance so that tool joint in the 
pipe will not interrupt both rams when they are close. During the stripping process, the safety 
valve must always be installed and keep open to prevent float leak situation. Some steps to 
perform stripping in the hole with two upper pipe rams and one blind ram at the bottom of the 
stack (Well Control School, 2004): 
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1. Shut in the well with blind ram. Lower the pipe until the bottom edge of the pipe is 
just above the blind ram. Use open safety valve on each stand and keep annulus 
pressure constant by circulating drilling fluid through kill and choke line 
2. Close the upper stripping ram and pressure up the fluid between closed blind ram 
and upper ram until it reached the same pressure in the well by using pump 
3. Open blind ram and lower the next tool joints into the stack until it is just above the 
upper stripping ram 
4. Close the lower stripping ram. Bleed off pressure between the two rams. Open 
upper rams 
5. Lower the pipe until the tool joint is just below the upper stripping ram 
6. Close upper rams and choke, circulate and pressure up the drilling fluid between 
rams until it reach the equal pressure in the well by using pump through kill and 
choke line 
7. Open lower pipe until tool joint is just above upper stripping ram and repeat the 
sequences starting from step four until the pipe has reached the bottom 
 
6.2.4 Stripping out of the hole with pipe rams 
 Most requirements for stripping out of the hole with pipe rams are the same as for 
stripping in operation. The upper rams should be used to take maximum wear when stripping 
out the pipe/string. The float must be ensured that it can be hold properly and safety valve 
should always be opened. Some steps to perform stripping out of the hole with two upper 
pipe rams and one blind ram at the bottom of the stack (Well Control School, 2004): 
1. Close upper pipe ram (according to the diameter of the pipe). Begin circulating 
drilling fluid through kill and choke line until it reach the equal pressure in the well. 
Slowly raise the pipe until next lower tool joint is just below upper stripping ram. 
Automatic drilling fluid injection should fill the hole as the pipe is pulled out of the 
hole 
2. When lower tool joint is below upper stripping ram, stop the pipe, close the lower 
stripping ram. Shut down the drilling fluid circulation pump and bleed off the 
pressure between stripping rams 
3. Open upper ram, pull tool joint above the upper ram 
4. Close upper stripping ram, circulate the drilling fluid again and pressure up until it 
has the same pressure in the well by using pump through choke and kill lines 
5. Open the lower stripping ram and repeat the sequence from step one until the pipe 
has been pulled out of the hole 
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6.3 Testing of BOP 
 BOP testing is very important to be performed to ensure the functionality of system and 
components in a BOP. It should resist the maximum pressure they are intended according to 
their design specifications. The test includes function test, reaction time test, low and high 
pressure tests. Each of these tests should be recorded. Low pressure test should be 
performed first by giving pressures between 200 to 300 psi (13.79 bar to 20.69 bar). The high 
pressure test should be a little lesser than the maximum expected surface pressure, 
minimum burst pressure of the well’s tubing or the rating of the stack. The fluid for conducting 
the test must not cause pollution and harm the personnel in case of leak occurs (Well Control 
School, 2004). Testing of BOP can be divided into BOP simulation and BOP testing.  
 
6.3.1 BOP Simulation  
BOP should be tested by having simulation of drilling operation to reflect the functionality of 
BOP in real situation. The simulation usually concerns on the reaction time during operation 
such as crew’s reaction time, time of drill, time for closing and opening of rams and 
preventer, etc. All of the times taken during simulation are recorded. The simulation 
conditions are divided into four categories as follows: 
 On bottom drilling  
 While tripping drill pipe 
 When drill collars are in the blowout preventer 
 Out of the hole 
Here are some examples of procedure for conducting BOP simulation during drilling 
operation based on Goins and Sheffield (1983). In this example, the drilling rotation 
mechanism is driven by rotary table instead of top drive. The simulation can be different 
depends on the required specification.  
 
6.3.1.1 Condition 1: On bottom drilling 
1. Stop rotary, hoist kelly joint above rotary table and shut down the pumps while 
picking up. Check for flow 
2. Record the time taken and pit level for the above operations into drill report and pit 
level chart 
3. Open choke flow line while one choke is open 
4. Close annular preventer or pipe rams (steps 3 and 4 are done simultaneously) 
5. Close variable choke or choke line valve at choke  
6. Check all lines and BOP from leakage and record the total time taken  
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6.3.1.2 Condition 2: Tripping drill pipe 
1. Position upper tool joint just above rotary table and set slips 
2. Install a full opening valve or inside blowout preventer to close the drill pipe 
3. Open choke flow line while one choke is open 
4. Close drill pipe rams (annular preventer acceptable) 
5. Close variable choke or choke line valve at choke 
6. Record the time taken and pit level for the above operations into drill report and pit 
level chart 
7. Check all lines and BOP from leakage  
 
6.3.1.3 Condition 3: Out of the hole 
1. Open choke flow line, keeping one choke line open 
2. Close blind rams 
3. Close variable choke or choke line at choke 
4. Record the time taken and pit level for the above operations into drill report and pit 
level chart 
5. Check all lines and BOP from leakage  
 
6.3.1.4 Condition 4: Drill collars in preventers 
1. Position upper drill collar box at rotary table and set slips 
2. Open choke flowline with one choke open 
3. Install a full opening valve and close in the drill collar string 
4. Close annular preventers 
5. Close variable choke or manifold valve at choke 
6. Check that all actions have been correctly accomplished. If only one stand of drill 
collars remains to be hoisted, the stand should be pulled and the well treated as in 
condition 3 
7. Record the time taken and pit level for the above operations into drill report and pit 
level chart 
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6.3.2 BOP Testing  
 The components inside BOP do not always work as intended, sometimes they fail 
because of defects from factory, bad design, wear, ageing, etc. Component testing gives 
status of its availability and performances. The deviation from its intended function can be 
adjusted by doing maintenance including repair and replacement. According to Goins and 
Sheffield (1983), there are many likely causes of failure in the BOP components such as 
improper equipment design and construction, leakage of seal gaskets and rings caused by 
vibration or added loading, wearing in casing, abrasion of lines and fittings by mud flow, 
accumulation and deposition of cement, freezing valves, loss of lubricants, partially closed 
valves caused by erosion, deterioration of rubber seal, etc. Some considerations when 
performing BOP component test are: 
 All choke manifolds, choke and kill lines should be flushed out  
 Always use clean water for testing the inner system. The use of drilling mud is 
not recommended as it will create sealant 
 Pipe rams should be closed only where there is pipe in the hole. The closing 
on open hole and wrong size of pipe diameter can create ram-packer damage 
 Casing head valves should always be open when a casing head plug tester is 
used. The opening allows detection of leakage and prevent overpressure 
burden inside 
 For specific equipment test procedures, always consult manufacturer’s guide 
as well as local regulations  
 Always perform low pressure test before commencing high pressure test 
 The minimum time, required component and pressure required are depends 
on the policy, regulations and standard 
The testing of components in BOP can be vary depends on their configuration, type and the 
number of components being tested. It can be divided into: 
 Closing unit pump capability test 
 Accumulator closing test 
 BOP inspection and test 
 
6.3.2.1 Closing unit pump capability test 
 Pressure testing on BOP should be conducted after the closing unit test has been 
performed. The closing mechanism should be driven by the accumulator instead of main 
power unit to ensure the redundancies in power supply in case of emergency situation during 
the test. Each well should be tested with BOP closing unit test. The test generally should 
include the following steps (Well Control School, 2004): 
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1. Position a joint of drill pipe/tubing in the BOP stack 
2. Isolate the accumulator from closing unit manifold by closing the necessary valves 
3. If the pumps are powered by air, isolate rig air system from the pumps. A separate 
closing unit air storage tank or nitrogen bottles should be used to power the pumps 
during the test. For two redundancies power supply, both system should be tested 
separately 
4. Simultaneously turn the control valve for the closing of annular preventer and turn the 
control for the opening of hydraulically controlled valve (HCR) 
5. By using the power from the pump, the time taken for annular preventer closing and 
hydraulically controlled valve opening are recorded. Moreover, the remaining 
pressure is also recorded. According API RP 53 (1997), the recommendation time for 
this test should less than two minutes 
6. Close the hydraulically controlled (HCR) valve and open the annular preventer. Open 
the accumulator system to the closing unit, charge the accumulator system to its 
proper operating pressure and record the time required to do this 
 
 
6.3.2.2 Accumulator closing test 
 Accumulator closing test should be performed on each well before BOP testing is 
performed. Some typical procedures are as follows (Well Control School, 2004): 
1. Position a joint of drill pipe/tubing in the BOP stack 
2. Close power supply to accumulator pumps 
3. Record the initial accumulator pressure. Adjust the annular regulator to 1500 psi or 
designated pressure 
4. Depending on standard, policy or regulations, perform the functions that are required 
such as close the annular, pipe ram and the hydraulic choke line valve 
5. Record the time required for accumulators to close. Record the final accumulator 
pressure. It should not be lower than 200 psi above the pre-charge pressure 
6. After preventers have been opened, recharge accumulator system to designed 
operating pressure and record time for complete power up 
 
6.3.2.3 BOP inspection and test 
 Some verification of BOP components is necessary before conducting the test. It 
includes verification of wellhead type, wellhead bowl protector, preventer type, drilling spool, 
spacer spool, valve types, pump type, rams type, drill pipe/tubing connection type, and all 
their working pressure rates. It is also important to verify the placement of rams. Other things 
that should be considered for the test are (Well Control School, 2004): 
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1. Open casing valve during test, unless pressuring the casing or hole is intended 
2. Test pressure should not exceed the manufacturer’s rated working pressure for body 
or seals of assembly being tested 
3. Test pressure should not exceed the values for collapse and internal yield pressures 
tabulated for the appropriate drill pipe/tubing used. Do not exceed tensile strength of 
pipe 
The main concern for this testing is the capability of BOP components, particularly 
accumulator, preventer, rams, chokes line, kill line and valves, to works under the maximum 
designated pressure and minimum closing time of BOP. Figure 5.1 and 5.2 shows the 
example of performing the BOP testing on some components in the BOP. The explanations 
of symbols in the figures are as follows: 
 Test pressure 
 Test pressure inlet 
 Equipment being tested 
 
In the figures, the arrow point may be subjected to components being test 
 
Procedures in performing blind ram 
testing (Goins, W., C., Sheffield, R., 
1983): 
1. All equipments should be tested at 
200-300 psi and then to the rated 
working pressure of the weakest 
member 
2. Install one stand of drill collars 
below an appropriate casing-head plug 
tester. Land the plug tester and back 
off the running joint. Open bore type 
plug testers can be provided with a 
plug in order to test blind rams with the 
drill string removed. Fill the BOP with 
water and close the blind shear rams 
3. Open casing head valves to prevent casing rupture or formation breakdown if the plug 
tester leaks 
Figure 6.0.1 Testing blind ram (Goins, W.,C., 
Sheffield, R., 1983) 
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4. Apply test pressure as illustrated in the figure. This test also applied to other component 
than blind ram as indicated by the arrows in the figure 
 
 
Procedures in performing BOP 
components testing (Goins, W., C., 
Sheffield, R., 1983): 
* Bottom pipe ram tested by using same 
procedure as for top pipe ram 
** Annular preventer tested using same 
procedure as for pipe rams 
 
1. All equipments in the test should be 
tested to rated working pressure of the 
weakest member 
 
 
 
 
 
2. From previous test, open the blind rams and install appropriate test string and screw into 
the plug tester. Fill BOP with water and close top pipe ram  
3. Apply test pressure down the drill pipe and through a perforated sub or through the pug 
tester if it has an integral port 
4. The bottom ram can be tested in a similar manner. The test string must fit ram size 
5. The annular preventer can also be tested similarly, but do not test to more than 70% of 
rated working pressure unless required, or 50% of rated working pressure where 
regulations do not specify 
 
 
Figure 6.0.2 Testing pipe rams, annular and all choke and kill manifolds, flowlines and 
BOP wing valves (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) 
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7. SUGGESTED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR BOP CRITICALITY 
ASSESSMENT 
Risk analysis is the process of identification, definition, analysis and measurement of 
problems, hazard, causes, consequences and alternatives in a system to give a risk picture 
that will be used for a decision making process through some accepted parameters. 
According to Norsok Z-013 (2001), risk analysis is the process of using information to identify 
hazards and estimate risk. It covers the analysis of cause and consequence of risk to 
personnel, environment and asset. 
Typically there are two approaches for risk analysis, qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis. Qualitative risk analysis uses the knowledge of risk from experts through 
brainstorming and group discussion to present the simplify risk picture in a descriptive 
categories or coarse scale, i.e. high, medium, low, etc, while quantitative risk analysis (QRA) 
use the knowledge of risk from model-based risk such as event tree analysis, fault tree 
analysis and other tools to represent the risk picture in more detail (Aven, T., 2008, p. 4). The 
limitation of information and data in the beginning of a project make brainstorming and group 
discussions among experts become a good way to conduct risk picture. Quantitative risk 
analysis needs quantified data in order to assess risk in more detail, usually by combining 
the judgment from the expert. The risk picture resulted from risk analysis should be 
evaluated with regard to risk acceptance criteria and when applicable compared to 
alternative. Risk reducing measures is presented and cost benefit analysis can be used as 
part of decision making. Figure 8.1 shows the schematic to determine the appropriate risk 
analysis approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Step to determine appropriate risk assessment (HSE, 2006) 
Qualitative risk 
assessment (Q) 
Adequate for 
decision making 
Semi-quantitative risk 
assessment (SQ) 
Quantified risk 
assessment (QRA) 
Adequate for 
decision making 
Adequate for 
decision making 
Carry out 
assessment record 
findings and 
recommendations 
Increase depth of 
modelling 
Increase depth of 
modelling 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
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There are tools to support the risk analysis process. The use of tools depends on the 
intention of the analysis and result. In some risk analysis, criticality and reliability can be the 
main focus of the analysis, particularly for the design of components or machineries in the 
production and safety systems where functionality is the most prominent aspect to gives the 
highest value of production and safety assurance. The needs for robust and redundant 
system are determined through this process. Moreover, criticality and reliability analysis are 
also used in maintenance area where the assessment of the component’s reliabilities are 
very important to determine maintenance plan which is needed to optimize component’s 
uptime, reduce component’s downtime and prevent unplanned maintenance.  
Engineering system, such as BOP, usually consists of a number of subsystems and 
components that interacts with each other to perform some specific function. Critical 
components in the system need to be identified and ranked to determine the robustness and 
redundancies of the system if one or more components in the system fail. Mainly, the criteria 
are chosen from the severity of consequences, occurrence (frequency or probability) of 
failure, detection of failure, functionality requirement of the items and redundancy in the 
system. Knowing these criteria can help us to determine the proper risk analysis tools to 
determine the criticality of components in a system such as reliability block diagram (RBD), 
failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), risk (criticality) matrix, redundancy 
and effect table. 
 
7.1 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
 Reliability block diagram is used for BOP criticality assessment because it presents 
functional flow diagram of how the logical relation of components in the BOP system runs a 
BOP function. It ensures that all components that make up a BOP function are presented 
which can be useful for failure identification. Identification of component’s failure in the BOP 
system is important to find out which components are the most critical to the availability of 
the BOP function. It can be achieved by identifying minimal cut set. The components in the 
minimal cut set are then considered as the critical components. 
 In the reliability block diagram, a system can be assumed to consist of n components 
and have a state of functioning or failure. We can assign the binary state of component i with 
xi and binary state for a system with Φi, (Aven, T., 1992, p.87-88). 
𝑥𝑖 =  
          1  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
  
𝜙𝑖 =  
          1  𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
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The state of a system is determined by the state of components in the system, therefore 
structure function Φ(x) is: 
𝜙 = 𝜙 𝑥  , where x = (x1, x2,…, xn) 
 Basically, the components in a system have two logic structures, series and parallel 
structure. There may be series, parallel or combination of both structures. These structures 
determine the failure characteristics of a system. In the series structure, the system fails if 
one of the components in a system fails. On the other hand, parallel structure will have a 
system failure if all of the components in the system fail. Table 8.1 shows the difference 
between series and parallel structure and formula to determine the state (function or failure) 
of a system.  
 
Table 7.1 figure and formula of series and parallel structure in RBD 
Series Structure Parallel Structure 
 
 
𝜙 𝑥 = 𝑥1 ∙ 𝑥2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑥𝑛 =  𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝜙 𝑥 = 1 −  1 − 𝑥1  1 − 𝑥2 ∙∙∙  1 − 𝑥𝑛  
𝜙 𝑥 = 1 −   1 − 𝑥𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
=  𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Example of reliability block diagram of BOP activation (Tumer, I., et al., 2010) 
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7.2 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
 The critical component analyzed in the reliability block diagram is not enough to 
present the criticality on BOP system. There could be more than one critical component in a 
system and it is quite hard to determine which component that gives significant 
consequences to the BOP system by only knowing the failure state of the components. Other 
factors related to the occurrence of component’s failure such as failure causes, failure effects 
and level of consequences need to be identified to get a broader scope of the component’s 
criticality. One of the tools which analyze these factors is failure modes, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA).  
 Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis identify all possible failures modes and its 
effects that may occur as well as the criticality of each component to know the reliability and 
performance of a system. The diagram from RBD is useful to identify components and the 
effects of failure modes against other component in the system. This analysis also identifies 
the compensation activity or risk reducing measures to prevent the occurrence of 
component’s failure and to mitigate the effects of failure in a system.  
The main goals of conducting FMECA for BOP system are: 
1) Identify failure modes for the subsystem/function of the BOP systems and the resulting 
effects of these failure modes on each subsystem or component at a local level and for 
the total system/component as a whole 
2) Identify how the failure modes can be detected, and describe the possible existing, 
provisions and safeguards that prevent the system from failing. If none is available, alert 
mode should be defined if hazards are present when the system fails. It shows attention 
to increase safety and reduce the probability or consequence which reduces the risk as 
well 
3) Assess the criticality of the failure modes by estimating the probability and severity, and 
then plot it in the criticality matrix 
 The approach of conducting FMECA can be done in qualitative and quantitative way. 
Quantitative method is used when failure rates, failure modes, failure mode ratios and failure 
effect probabilities are known which are required to quantify the criticality number of 
components. Qualitative method is used when there is no available data for failure rates and 
failure modes. The criticality in qualitative method is determined by making some subjective 
measurements for ranking the severity and occurrence of the failures (Department of the 
Army, 2006). In this report, the analysis is conducting in a qualitative approach as there is 
inadequate time and effort to do the quantitative as well as scarcity in the BOP system data. 
Discussion, brain storming and using experience from experts is considered a good way to 
present the criticality of the BOP components. 
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Figure 7.3 Flowchart of FMECA (IEC 60812, 2006) 
  
 
 
Initiate FMEA or FMECA of an item 
Select a component of the item to analyze 
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Select the failure mode to analyze 
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Propose mitigation method, corrective actions or compensating 
provisions. Identify actions and responsible personnel 
Do severity and/or 
probability of 
occurrence warrant 
the need for action? 
Document notes, recommendations, actions and remarks 
Are there other 
components for 
analysis? 
Are there more of 
the component 
failure modes to 
analyze? 
Complete FMEA. Determine the next revision date as appropriate 
No 
Yes 
No No 
Yes 
Yes 
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7.2.1 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Methodology 
 
 The construction of FMECA is systematically created in a sheet containing some 
parameters. These parameters can vary from one sheet to other sheets, but basically it 
contains parameters which describe identification (item number), function (operation state), 
failure modes, failure mechanism, effect on other units in the system, effect on system, 
corrective measure, failure frequency, failure effect ranking and remarks (Aven, T., 2008, 
p.64).  The sheet for qualitative and quantitative method may have some distinction in the 
parameters. Moreover, a good work flows are also required to conduct a thorough analysis of 
FMECA. Failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) is usually conducted first before 
assigning criticality analysis (FMECA).  
a. Defining the system clarifies the purpose of the system and gives an initial schematic and 
operational detail of the system. Rules and assumptions should be made when 
conducting the analysis to give more understanding of the system. Typically, there are 
two systems which are mostly defined in the analysis, functional and hardware 
(component) systems.  
 Functional systems definition usually uses in the early phase of design and 
commonly conducted in the top down approach. It will be used to analyze the 
effects of a system or subsystems on a specific condition. To do this the analyst 
should define and identify each system functions, potential failure modes and 
failure causes for each functional output.  
 Hardware systems definition commonly outlines the components in the system and 
their possible failure mode. It uses bottom up approach to analyze the component’s 
failure mode. 
b. Reliability block diagram is constructed to give a representation of interrelationship and 
interdependencies of functional component in the intended operation of a system. The 
interdependencies are illustrated with the functional flow sequence with series and 
parallel structure. It also helps the analyst to follow the failure mode and its effect of 
component and function.  
c. Failure and fault sometimes been interpreted in the same meaning. According to Norsok 
Z-008 (2001), failure can be described as the termination of the ability of an item to 
perform a required function, while fault can be described as the inability of an item to 
perform a required function. Further, failure mode is the observed of failure in a function, 
subsystem, or components. It can be identified by studying the output of the various 
functions. Failure mode concern depends on the specific component, system, 
environment and past history (Department of the Army, 2006). According to Blanche and 
Shrivastava (1994), the failure mode can be classified into two categories such as: 
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1. Intermittent failures is failures that caused by some problems in the functionality of 
components and only happen in a short period of time 
2. Extended failure is failures that caused by some problems in the functionality of 
components continuously until some parts are repaired. This type of failure can be 
classified again into : 
 Complete failures is failures that cause complete lack of a required function 
 Partial failures is failures that lead to a lack of some function but do not cause a 
complete lack of a required function  
 Sudden failures is failures that could not be predicted by testing or examination 
 Gradual failures is failures that can be predicted by testing or examination 
 Catastrophic failures is failures which are sudden and complete 
 Degraded failures is failures which are partial and gradual 
The application of failures is not only limited to the above categorizations. It sometimes 
depends on the application they are applied on such as primary failure, secondary 
failure and command failure are introduced. Primary failure is a failure that is cause by 
the natural ageing of the component(s). Secondary failure is a failure that is cause by 
load or stress that is beyond the limited design of a component. Command failure is a 
failure cause by an improper control signal or noise (Rausand, M., Høyland A., 2004, 
p.85-86).  
Thorough failure mode analysis can be done by examining each component failure 
mode and/or output function for the following condition (Department of the Army, 2006): 
 Failure to operate at the proper time 
 Intermittent operation  
 Failure to stop operating at the proper time 
 Loss of output 
 Degraded output or reduced operational capability 
d. Another important parameter in FMECA is failure cause or mechanism. According to IEC 
50(191), failure cause is the circumstances during design, manufacture or the use that 
have led to a failure. Failure cause can be defined in different aspects such as design 
failure, weakness failure, manufacturing failure, ageing failure, misuse failure and 
mishandling failure (Rausand, M., Høyland A., 2004, p.87). 
e. Failure effect analysis is performed to all relevant components prior to the failure mode 
on the system. To simplify the work, the relevant component can be taken from the 
reliability block diagram which defines the functional relationship between components in 
the system. Normally, there are three types of failure effects in the FMECA: 
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- Local effect is the specific effect as an immediate result from the failure mode of 
component. Local effects are determined without taking into account existing 
provisions and safeguards 
- Global effect is the effects that influence other failure mode in the operation and 
functionality of other components in a system.  
- End effect shows the state of the system whether function or failure. It is determined 
after taking all the existing provisions and safeguards into account. It consists of 
different categories as follows: 
1. System failure which shows that the failed component can make disturbance to 
the operation and function of the system 
2. Degraded operation which shows that the failed component can influence the 
operation of the system but it still can be performed as intended 
3. No immediate effect of failed component in the system 
f. Prior to the failure of component(s), there should be indicator(s) to detect failure so that 
operator can perform the required action in order to prevent system failure or other 
sequence that can influence the performance of other component and system as a 
whole. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is one example of detection 
system with visual or audible warning devices and automatic sensing device. If there is 
no detection device in the working component, the failure effects should be examine 
whether it is affecting the objective of the system or safety. The Indicator can be a normal 
indicator, abnormal indicator or incorrect indication. Normal indicator shows a normal 
operation condition, abnormal indicator shows that the system or component has failed or 
malfunction, incorrect indicator shows an opposite indication status of component or 
system from its actual condition/status (e.g., fault indicator while the component/system is 
still functioning normally). 
The failure detection system or method gives the availability to operator to perform 
compensating provisions to prevent and mitigate the effect of a failure in a system. It can 
be achieved by adding active or passive compensating provisions such as (Department 
of the Army, 2006): 
- Redundancies in a system to ensure the operability and allow more safe operation 
- Safety devices such as alarm or monitoring systems which gives the indication of 
limited parameter in the operation. Monitoring system can be done with regular 
testing or regular condition monitoring 
- Automatic self compensating devices that can set the required operation parameter 
automatically to ensure the performance of the intended component (e.g., automatic 
adjustment of variable speed in a pump) 
- Manual operator action such as manual turn on/off of a component’s function 
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g. The assignment of severity (consequences) and probability of occurrence ranking is to 
give first overview of the criticality of component in a system. It is derived from generic 
data and will be discussed with experts in the workshop.  
 Probability (P) is derived from qualitative assessment of the likelihood for the 
failure mode to occur, rated from 1 (least likely/frequent) to 5 (most likely/frequent) 
 Consequence (C) is derived from qualitative assessment of the consequence or 
severity of the failure mode, rated from 1 (least severe) to 5 (the most severe) 
 Risk (R) is the risk rank of failure mode rated as low (L), medium (M) and high (H) 
The available provisions and safeguards are taken into consideration when assigned 
probability and consequence value.  
h. Remarks field consists of additional information and recommendation as well as the 
responsible party who are in charge for resolving the problem. 
 
7.3 Criticality Ranking and Criticality Matrix  
The criticality ranking can be described by showing the failure mode with 
consequences and the probability of occurrence. The consequence and probability can be 
ranked based on the subjective probability based on the knowledge from experts and 
engineering judgment.  
Table 7.2 Failure probability rank 
Failure probability rank Description 
P=1 Could occur, but never heard of in the world (<1/10,000 years) 
P=2 Has occurred in the world, but very unlikely (1/10,000 – 1/1000 years) 
P=3 Incident has occurred in some operations (1/1000 – 1/100 years) 
P=4 Incident has occurred several times in some operators (1/100 – 1/10 years) 
P=5 Incident has occurred several times in most operators (1/10 – 1 years) 
 
Table 7.3 Effect severity rank 
Effect severity rank Description 
C=1 First aid/medical treatment case 
C=2 Serious injury 
C=3 1-10 fatalities 
C=4 10-30 fatalities 
C=5 30+ fatalities 
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Criticality matrix (risk matrix) is established to show the criticality level and risk 
acceptance criteria of failure modes in the BOP components. Normally, there are three levels 
of risk in the matrix, low, medium and high (Gudmestad, O.T., 2001). The matrix has 
probability and consequence values as their axes where the criticality (risk) value taken from 
FMECA can be plotted in the matrix to see the level of criticality of the BOP’s component. 
The failure modes within the area of high or intolerable critical (risk) level must be reduced to 
the medium region by using risk reducing measures/actions and/or barriers.  
High (H) level or Intolerable risk level is considered as the most critical failure mode 
for components and indicated by the red area in the risk matrix. 
The medium (M) region is also known as ALARP (As Low As is Reasonably 
Practicable). This is where the criticality of component should be treated and assessed for 
possibility of another risk reducing measure or whether a more detail studies should be 
performed (Norsok Z-013, 2001). Intermediate region is indicated by the yellow area in the 
matrix. 
The low (L) region is considered as a low critical area and indicated by green area in 
the matrix. 
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Figure 7.4 Criticality matrix  
 
 When consequence and criticality of one or more components are same, the 
alternative of the criticality can be reassessed by considering the safety and the objective of 
the component’s function. If the most concern in the system is safety or functionality of 
component, then area on the top side of the diagonal in the criticality matrix should be put 
more emphasize for criticality because high severity is considered more important than high 
occurrence. 
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7.4 Redundancy and Effect Table 
 Redundancy can be described as a duplicate system or component to serve as a back 
up when the other system with the same function has failed. Redundancy should be added in 
the system or components that are critical to the safety and functionality. If redundancy is 
considered to be unavailable, then robust system or component needs to be employed. If it is 
also unavailable, then reaction plan or operation should be created to replace the function of 
the failed component. Redundancy and effect table lists all the numbers and types of 
redundancies for the specific component that is assumed to be in the total failure in the BOP 
system as well as showing the effects of the redundancy given the failure of the component. 
It might have the similarity with FMECA, but it is specifically present the redundancy when 
total failure of component is considered. The critical component can then be identified from 
the component failure effects and the redundancy they have. 
 
7.5 Discussion of the Suggested Risk Analysis Tools for BOP Criticality 
Assessment   
 The suggested risk tools for BOP criticality assessment are reliability block diagram 
(RBD), failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), criticality matrix, redundancy 
and effect table. All these tools are complement to each other to give a better perspective of 
criticality in the BOP system.  
 Reliability block diagram (RBD) is important to shows the functional flow of the 
components and their logic relations in the BOP system. The construction of RBD in this 
report is based on the hydraulic BOP control system schematic, function flow and P&ID. 
Knowing the relations between components, give the ease of reliability identification in the 
system. We can assume which component failure that can make a failure of the system 
through minimum cut set. The components in the minimum cut set can be considered as the 
critical components. In this case, one component is more critical than more than one 
component in the minimum cut set. Due to the complexity of BOP control system, the 
minimum cut set is only considered for one component that can make a system to fail.  
  In this RBD analysis, the components are only considered to have binary states 
(function or failure). Reliability analysis based on the quantified data of failure rate is not 
conducted as there is a lack of source and it requires a lot of time and man work to conduct 
quantitative analysis. 
 Binary state analysis in the RBD is the first overview of criticality in BOP regarding to its 
simplicity. However, RBD has lack of information of how the component fails and what 
compensating measures can be taken into account to prevent the failure of the component. 
Thus, one of the tools to assess that, FMECA, is needed to cope with the issues. 
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 FMECA is used to describe failure modes, failure causes and safeguards of the 
components as well as giving the description of its effects for other component and the 
system as a whole. It is also describe the level of failure modes occurrence and the 
consequences that might occur. FMECA is considered to be an easy way to assess criticality 
in a system.  
 The method used in FMECA is qualitative analysis by using expert judgment and 
discussion among other interest parties. The lack of BOP’s component failure data and less 
time consuming make qualitative method is the best approach for the criticality analysis. The 
failure modes in the analysis are based on the best knowledge of experts and are presented 
only for the most important for the BOP function. The level of occurrences and 
consequences of failure modes are plotted into the criticality matrix by considering the 
safeguards to see the critical level of the component.  
 Regarding to the ease of using qualitative FMECA analysis, there are some 
considerations to take into account. FMECA does not include the relations between 
components in the system and assume that other components are function perfectly. It might 
give a wrong conclusion given the system fails as a result of components failure sequences 
in the system. Furthermore, the assignment of consequence value is based on individual 
component which might give inaccurate value of criticality of the system as a whole.  
 Despite of the issues, qualitative FMECA is a simple tool that can systematically 
analyze the critical component in a system to provide a preliminary reliable overview of 
critical components in a BOP system given that the data is rare. Table 8.4 shows the pros 
and cons of FMECA. 
Table 7.4 Pros and Cons of FMECA 
Pros Cons 
FMECA is a systematic analysis and reliable 
method to evaluate the performance and criticality 
of component and system as a whole (Rausand, 
M., 2005) 
FMECA is not suitable for multiple failures as it 
assumes only one failure occur at a time and 
other components are working perfectly 
(Rausand, M., 2005) 
Simple concept and application allow that can be 
easily learned (Rausand, M., 2005) 
The process of constructing FMECA may be 
tedious, time consuming and expensive 
(Rausand, M., 2005) 
Complex system can be evaluated easily 
(Rausand, M., 2005) 
FMECA is not suitable for analyzing system with 
some redundancies (Aven, T., 2008, p.69) 
FMECA can be used as a good basis for more 
comprehensive quantitative analysis (Aven, T., 
2008, p.69) 
FMECA put more emphasizes on technical 
failures and sometimes ignore the human failure 
contribution (Aven, T., 2008, p.69) 
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 The FMECA sheet for BOP system produced in this report are refers to the FMECA 
workshop done by some interest company who own and operate the BOP control system 
such as Statoil, NOV, Fabricom as well as from consultancy company, Scandpower.  
 The FMECA workshop is done by having discussion and brainstorming between 
experts from different expertise related to the operation of BOP. It involves field operator 
engineer, drilling engineer, technician (maintenance and inspection of BOP), BOP risk 
consultant and BOP project manager. The step in conducting the FMECA is the same as the 
flow shown in figure 7.3. The item identification, failure modes, failure causes, failure effects, 
detection, compensating provisions (safeguards), consequences, probability, risk value and 
additional information are discussed thoroughly among experts. The information of these 
parameters is taken from the specific P&ID (piping and instrument diagram) of the related 
item/component and the experience from experts through discussion among them.  
 The FMECA is performed by dividing the relevant BOP systems into subsystems or 
main components and looking at the functions, these subsystems and main components 
needed to perform in order for the BOP systems to work as intended. Then it is assessed in 
the FMECA meeting how these functions could fail (the failure modes) and the effects of 
these failures, as well as the criticality rated as a combination of the probability and 
consequence of the failure modes which are based on the knowledge from the meeting. 
 The FMECA facilitator makes a preliminary breakdown of the BOP systems and a 
proposal for potential generic failure modes. The proposed division of the BOP systems and 
the generic failure modes is presented at the start of the FMECA meeting. The final divisions 
of the BOP system into main components and subsystems, and the potential failure modes 
for these are then modified and agreed by brainstorming with the FMECA participants during 
the meeting. Moreover, for each of the subsystems, the scoring of probability and 
consequence of the failure modes are also discussed and agreed between participants. 
These values are then plotted into the criticality matrix.    
 The effect severity rank (scale) is related to personnel injuries or fatalities due to a 
failure. The consequence has been divided into five categories according to the severity. The 
effect consequence scale is available during the FMECA workshop and is determined based 
on the subjective prediction from experts through discussion in the meeting. 
 The criticality matrix and the rank of failure mode occurrence probability are derived 
and proposed by risk consultant company, Scandpower, based on their expertise and related 
discipline. The cause probability or frequency related to failures was determined using 
engineering judgment. The assessment of probability of each FMECA items is based on 
experiences with the different parties in the company and from the joint experience of the 
participators, and engineering judgments. 
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 Some failure modes in this report are not discussed in the workshop and thus the 
assessment of some occurrence probabilities and consequences in this report are based on 
the Sintef report by Holand, P., (2007) and case study report of Deepwater Horizon risk 
assessment by Tumer, I., et al., (2010). Sintef report gives failure data occurrence 
probabilities (failure rates) for some BOP component’s failure modes. Failure mode rate (λ) is 
taken by dividing 1 with MTTF (Mean Time To Failure). 
𝜆 =
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹
 
 In this analysis the effects of consequences are only focus on the personnel injury or 
fatalities due to a component failure. It is considered as the most critical element for safety. 
Potential loss of money due to delays/material damage, environment damage and loss of 
reputation might not be discussed directly.   
 There are some failure modes that might not really influence the functionality of a 
component. In this case, the analysis of criticality should also be based on the assumption if 
one component is totally not functioning and analyze its effect to other component in the 
system. The number of redundancy based on the back up component/system and alternative 
operations are documented in the redundancy and effect table. The information of effect and 
redundancy can be taken from FMECA. Through this table, we can see which component 
that has high effect (consequence) with less/no redundancy to be the critical component.  
 The purpose of using redundancy and effect table together with FMECA is to give 
different views of criticality based on their failure modes. The results of both methods are 
compared and final critical component in the BOP system can be presented. 
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8. ANALYSIS OF CRITICALITY COMPONENT IN BOP  
The analysis of BOP components in this report is based on some parameters and 
assumptions as follows: 
 The components analyzed are hydraulic BOP control system, BOP stack, choke 
valve, kill valve, connector (LMRP and wellhead) and general component inside 
rams and preventer 
 The analysis is based on the simple schematic and/or simple P&ID of the BOP 
control system 
 Some analysis in FMECA is taken from the BOP control system workshop done 
by some interest companies 
 The analysis use subsea BOP stack arrangement typically similar as shown in 
figure 5.1 consisting of: 
o 1 Annular preventer: 
o 4 rams: 
 1 blind shear ram 
 1 variable bore ram 
 1 middle pipe ram 
 1 lower pipe ram 
o 2 pairs of choke and kill lines with standard valves configuration 
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8.1 Reliability Block Diagram 
8.1.1 Reliability Block Diagram for Close Function of Subsea BOP control System 
 
Figure 8.1 Reliability block diagram for BOP rams close function 
Legends of BOP rams close function block diagram 
MEP  : Master Electric Panel   PSV  : Pod Selector Valve    AC  : Air Control 
EMP  : Electric Mini Panel    HR Y/B  : Hose Reel Yellow/Blue    MC  : Mechanical Control 
EPC  : Electric Power Cable   SHHB Y/B : Subsea Hydraulic Hose Bundle Yellow/Blue PiF  : Pilot Fluid 
EPBB  : Electric Power Pack with Battery Back-up SPFA  : Subsea Power Fluid Accumulator   PoF  : Power Fluid 
SoV  : Solenoid Valve    SRV Y/B : Subsea Regulated Valve Yellow/Blue  RF  : Regulated Fluid 
AO  : Air Operator     SPMV Y/B : Sub Plate Mounted Valve Yellow/Blue  VF  : Vent Fluid  
PiFA  : Pilot Fluid Accumulator   SV  : Solenoid Valve 
PCV  : Pilot Control Valve    MWT  : Mix Water Tank 
PoFA  : Power Fluid Accumulator   EC  : Electric Control 
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The reliability block diagram above based on the schematic flow figure 4.22 and 4.25. The 
opening and blocking function of the subsea BOP control system have the same reliability 
block diagram as the closing one. There are only some differences in the operations of some 
components as shown in table 8.1 below. 
 
Table 8.1 Operation modes of components for different BOP functions 
Component 
Position of Operation 
Close Function Open Function Block Function 
Solenoid Valve (SoV) 
 
Open Close ½ open 
Pilot Control Valve 
(PCV) 
 
Close Open ½ open 
Sub Plate Mounted 
Valve (SPMV) 
 
Close Open ½ open 
BOP rams/annular 
preventer 
 
Close Open ½ open 
 
 
Critical components based on the minimum cut set (one component): 
 Solenoid valve (SoV) 
 Air operator (AO) 
 Pilot control valve (PCV) 
 Pod selector valve (PSV) 
 Rams or annular preventer 
 Shuttle valve 
 Surface fluid accumulator (pilot and power fluid is in one accumulator) 
 Subsea fluid accumulator 
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8.1.2 Reliability Block Diagram for Control Fluid Circuit and Subsea Accumulator Recharge System 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Reliability block diagram for control fluid circuit and subsea accumulator recharge system
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Legends of BOP control fluid circuit and accumulator recharge system block diagram 
 
FMS  : Fluid Mixing System 
MFR  : Mixed Fluid Reservoir 
SuFA  : Surface Fluid Accumulator 
AIV  : Accumulator Isolation Valve 
AIPV  : Accumulator Isolation Pilot Valve 
PSV  : Pod Selector Valve 
HJHB Y/B : Hydraulic Jumper Hose Bundle Yellow/Blue 
QDJB Y/B : Quick Disconnect Junction Box Yellow/Blue 
HR Y/B : Hose Reel Yellow/Blue 
SHHB Y/B : Subsea Hydraulic Hose Bundle Yellow/Blue 
PMAIV Y/B : Pod Mounted Accumulator Isolation Valve Yellow/Blue 
SRV Y/B : Subsea Regulated Valve Yellow/Blue 
SPMV Y/B : Sub Plate Mounted Valve Yellow/Blue 
SV  : Shuttle Valve 
SMAIV : Stack Mounted Accumulator Isolation Valve 
SFA  : Subsea Fluid Accumulator 
MF  : Mixed Fluid 
PF  : Power Fluid 
RF  : Regulated Fluid 
 
 
The diagram based on figure 4.26. It has critical components based on minimum cut set (one 
component) as follows: 
 Fluid mixing system (FMS) 
 Mixed fluid reservoir (MFR) 
 Pump 
 Surface fluid accumulator 
 Shuttle valve (SV) annular 
 Annular preventer 
 Shuttle valve (SV) rams  
 Rams preventer 
 Shuttle valve (SV) accumulator  
 Stack mounted accumulator isolation valve (SMAIV) 
 Subsea fluid accumulator 
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8.1.3 Reliability Block Diagram for Annular Preventer 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Reliability block diagram for annular preventer close and open function 
 
Legends of annular preventer function flow block diagram 
SV  : Shuttle Valve 
CHC  : Closing Hydraulic Connection 
OHC  : Opening Hydraulic Connection 
CC  : Closing Chamber  
OC  : Opening Chamber 
P  : Piston 
SE  : Sealing Element 
LW  : Locking Wegde 
 
The diagram based on figure 4.7. All of the components in the diagram, except locking 
wedge, are critical.  
 
8.1.4 Reliability Block Diagram for Ram Preventer 
 
Figure 8.4 Reliability block diagram for ram preventer 
 
Legends of ram preventer function flow block diagram 
SV  : Shuttle Valve 
PR  : Piston Rod and blade 
WL  : Wedge Lock 
 
The diagram based on figure 4.18. All of the components in the diagram plus shear ram 
housing, except wedge lock, are critical.   
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8.2 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
8.2.1 System Breakdown 
 The BOP system is broken down into components based on the information from 
reliability block diagram and additional component taken from the FMECA workshop that are 
significant for the BOP functionality. Failure mode of each component are identified and 
given a unique identifying number. More than one component may have the same failure 
modes, but it can has different effects depends on the type of component. Main component 
and its corresponding failure mode can be seen in table 8.2 below. 
 
Table 8.2 Lists of components and the corresponding failure modes 
ID No. Item/Functional Identification Failure 
mode(s) 
Description 
Node 1: Hydraulic BOP control system 
1.1 Accumulator bottles F-1.1.1 Burst bladder 
  F-1.1.2 Leakage through nitrogen "fill"- system (valve) 
  F-1.1.3 Lack of stored accumulation pressure, reduced 
capacity, 
  F-1.1.4 Lack of stored accumulation pressure, reduced 
capacity, 
1.2 Hydraulic line from HPU to BOP F-1.2.1 Leakage, bursting, plugged line 
1.3 Solenoids to valves F-1.3.1 Fail to move 
1.4 Pilot valve (air) F-1.4.1 Not operating 
1.5 Subsea regulated valve F-1.5.1 Regulator stuck in position 
  F-1.5.2 Fail to open/close 
1.6 Shuttle valve (rams and annular preventer) F-1.6.1 Not able to change position 
1.7 Fluid reservoir F-1.7.1 Rupture of reservoir 
  F-1.7.2 Contamination of hydraulic fluid 
  F-1.7.3 Too low volumetric capacity of reservoir (1200 
gal. reservoir) 
1.8 Pressure regulator (hydraulic manifold) F-1.8.1 Regulator stuck in position 
  F-1.8.2 Fail to open  
  F-1.8.3 Fail to close 
  F-1.8.4 Seal failure / washout failure 
1.9 Flow meter, instrumentation on HPU, 
pressure transmitter 
F-1.9.1 Failure of pressure transmitter, loss of signal 
  F-1.9.2 Failure of pressure transmitter, wrong signal 
  F-1.9.3 Failure of flow transmitter, loss of signal 
  F-1.9.4 Failure of flow transmitter, wrong signal 
1.10 Pump in hydraulic manifold F-1.10.1 Pump does not start, pump not running when 
intended to run 
  F-1.10.2 Pump does not start, pump not running when 
intended to run 
  F-1.10.3 Pump does not stop 
  F-1.10.4 Pump running but not building up pressure, or 
giving enough flow 
  F-1.10.5 Vibration 
  F-1.10.6 Pump runs when not intended to run 
1.11 Air pressure switch for pumps F-1.11.1 Switch is not switching when intended to 
  F-1.11.2 Switch is not closing when intended to 
1.12 Strainer upstream pumps F-1.12.1 Clogging of strainer 
1.13 Filter downstream pumps F-1.13.1 Clogging of filter 
  F-1.13.2 No filtering effect 
  F-1.13.3 Bursting filter/filter collapse 
1.14 Hose upstream strainers F-1.14.1 
 
Ingress of air into hydraulic system gives potential 
small vacuum/ under pressure on the pump 
suction side when pump is stroking 
1.15 Level transmitter in reservoir F-1.15.1 Fails to read correct level (i.e. reading low level 
when level are not low) 
  F-1.15.2 Fails to read correct level (i.e. not reading an 
actual low level) 
1.16 Pressure safety valve (PSV)s F-1.16.1 Open when not suppose to open (manifold) 
1.17 Pilot control valve/panel valve F-1.17.1 Fails to move 
  F-1.17.2 Wash out 
1.18 Flange and gasket F-1.18.1 Leakage 
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1.19 Master electric panel and electric mini panel F-1.19.1 Fail to give electric signal for some intended 
valves and BOP function 
1.20 Electric power pack with battery back up F-1.20.1 Fail to give electric power for BOP panel 
command initiation 
1.21 Electric power cable F-1.21.1 Not able to distribute electric signal 
1.22 Air operator F-1.22.1 Fail to regulate 
1.23 Pod selector valve F-1.23.1 Fail to move (change position) 
1.24 Sub plate mounted (SPM) valves F-1.24.1 Fail to close 
  F-1.24.2 Fail to open 
  F-1.24.3 
 
Fail between positions (not completely closed nor 
opened) 
1.25 Fluid mixing system F-1.25.1 Fail to make the required hydraulic fluid 
1.26 Accumulator isolator valve (inside HPU) F-1.26.1 Fail to open/close 
1.27 Accumulator isolator pilot valve (inside control 
manifold) 
F-1.27.1 Fail to open/close 
1.28 Pod mounted accumulator isolation valve F-1.28.1 Fail to open/close 
1.29 Stack mounted accumulator isolation valve F-1.29.1 Fail to open/close 
 
1.30 Batteries inside subsea pod F-1.30.1 No voltage 
Node 2: BOP stack 
2.1 Fixed pipe ram F-2.1.1 Not able to close 
  F-2.1.2 Not able to open 
  F-2.1.3 Not able to seal around tubular 
  F-2.1.4 Degradation of packers over time 
  F-2.1.5 External leakage (bonnet/door seal or other 
external leakage path) 
  F-2.1.6 Internal leakage (leakage through a close ram) 
2.2 Variable bore ram F-2.2.1 Not able to seal around tubular 
  F-2.2.2 Not able to close 
  F-2.2.3 Unable to hold the hang-off weight 
  F-2.2.4 Degradation of packers over time or high 
temperature 
  F-2.2.5 Not able to open 
2.3 Blind shear ram F-2.3.1 Unable to cut string, thus unable to seal of 
wellbore 
  F-2.3.2 
 
Not able to close 
Not able to perform complete shut off and seal the 
annulus 
  F-2.3.3 Degradation of packers over time 
  F-2.3.4 Not able to open 
2.4 Annular BOP F-2.4.1 Not able to seal around tubular 
  F-2.4.2 Not able to open to full or within 30 minutes (API) 
  F-2.4.3 Degradation of elements over time 
2.5 Automatic subsea ram locks F-2.5.1 Unable to lock 
  F-2.5.2 Unable to open 
Node 3: Choke valve, kill valve and connector 
3.1 Choke and kill valve F-3.1.1 External leakage (leakage to environment in main 
valve or valve connectors) 
  F-3.1.2 Internal leakage (leakage through a closed valve) 
  F-3.1.3 Failed to open 
  F-3.1.4 Failed to close 
3.2 Hydraulic connector F-3.2.1 External leakage 
  F-3.2.2 Failed to unlock 
Node 4: Component inside rams and preventer 
4.1 Blind/shear ram seal (sealing element) F-4.1.1 Deformed, worn, stiff, eroded 
4.2 Piston on both sides F-4.2.1 Galling, seizure, misalignment, pitting 
4.3 Wedge on both sides F-4.3.1 Galling, seizure, misalignment, impact failure 
4.4. Blade on both sides F-4.4.1 Impact failure, brittle failure, pitting, dulling 
4.5 Shear ram housing F-4.5.1 Deformation, cracking, erosion 
4.6 Annular preventer rubber housing F-4.6.1 Deformation, worn, stiff, eroded parts 
4.7 Annular sealing element (rubber seal and 
steel reinforcement segments) 
F-4.7.1 Deformed, worn, stiff, eroded 
4.8 Annular piston F-4.8.1 Galling, seizure, misalignment, pitting 
4.9 Annular locking wedge F-4.9.1 Galling, seizure, misalignment, impact failure 
 
8.2.2 FMECA Sheet 
The analysis of FMECA sheet can be seen in appendices 12.1. 
Page | 78  
 
8.2.3 Criticality Ranking and Criticality Matrix 
 
 
Probability 
P=1 P=2 P=3 P=4 P=5 
Could occur, 
but never 
heard of in the 
world 
Has occurred 
in the world, 
but very 
unlikely 
Incident has 
occurred in 
some 
operations 
Incident has 
occurred 
several times 
in some 
operations 
Incident has 
occurred 
several times 
in most 
operators 
 Description 
< 1/10,000 
years 
1/10,000 – 
1/1000 years 
1/1000 – 1/100 
years 
1/100 – 1/10 
years 
1/10 – 1 years 
C=5 
 
30+ fatalities 
 
F-1.6.1     
C=4 
 
10-30 fatalities 
 
     
C=3 
 
1-10 fatalities 
 
F-1.8.3, F-4.4.1, 
F-4.5.1 
F-4.2.1 F-2.3.1, F-4.6.1   
C=2 
 
Serious injury 
 
F-4.1.1, F-4.7.1 F-3.2.2, F-4.8.1 F-1.2.1, F-1.18.1   
C=1 
First 
aid/medical 
treatment case 
F-1.1.1, F-1.4.1, 
F-1.5.2, F-1.8.2, 
F-2.1.5, F-3.1.3, 
F-3.1.4 
F-1.1.2, F-1.1.3, 
F-1.1.4, F-1.7.3, 
F-1.9.1, F-1.9.2, 
F-1.9.3, F-1.9.4, 
F-1.10.2, F-
1.10.3, F-1.10.4, 
F-1.10.5, F-
1.11.1, F-1.11.2, 
F-1.12.1, F-
1.13.1, F-1.13.2, 
F-1.13.3, F-
1.14.1, F-1.19.1, 
F-1.20.1, F-
1.21.1, F-1.22.1, 
F-1.23.1, F-
1.25.1, F-1.30.1, 
F-2.1.2, F-2.1.3, 
F-2.1.6, F-2.2.3, 
F-2.2.5, F-2.3.2, 
F-2.3.4, F-2.4.2, 
F-2.5.1, F-2.5.2, 
F-3.1.1, F-3.1.2, 
F-3.2.1, F-4.3.1, 
F-4.9.1 
F-1.3.1, F-1.5.1, 
F-1.7.2, F-1.8.1, 
F-1.8.4, F-1.10.1, 
F-1.10.6, F-
1.15.1, F-1.15.2, 
F-1.16.1, F-
1.17.1, F-1.17.2, 
F-1.24.1, F-
1.24.2, F-1.24.3, 
F-1.26.1, F-
1.27.1, F-1.28.1, 
F-1.29.1, F-2.1.1, 
F-2.1.4, F-2.2.1, 
F-2.2.2, F-2.2.4, 
F-2.3.3, F-2.4.1, 
F-2.4.3 
F-1.7.1  
 
Figure 8.5 Criticality matrix for BOP control system failure modes 
 
We can see that the critical failure modes are in the medium region of the matrix. The most 
critical failure modes can be sorted from the highest consequences and probabilities of 
occurrence as follows: 
Table 8.3 Prioritization of BOP component criticality from criticality matrix 
Priority Component Failure mode Description 
1 Shuttle valve (rams and annular 
preventer 
F-1.6.1 Not able to change position 
2 Blind shear ram F-2.3.1 Unable to cut string, thus 
unable to seal of wellbore 
Annular preventer rubber housing F-4.6.1 Deformation, worn, stiff, 
eroded parts 
3 Piston on both sides F-4.2.1 Galling, seizure, 
misalignment, pitting 
4 Hydraulic line from HPU to BOP F-1.2.1 Leakage, bursting, plugged 
line 
Flange and gasket F-1.18.1 leakage 
5 Fluid reservoir F-1.7.1 Rupture of reservoir 
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8.3 Redundancy and Effect Table 
Table 8.4 Redundancy and effect table of subsea BOP 
No System/Function 
Redundant(Yes
/No) 
How many 
redundancy(ies) 
Possibility to Effect other 
component's functions after 
redundancy 
Redundant equipment 
Local  Global Total 
Hydraulic BOP control system 
 
  
 
      
 1.1 Accumulator bottles Y 3 0 3 Not significant (redundancy)  - Some number of accumulator (25% over capacity + 3 extra bottles) 
 1.2 Hydraulic line from HPU to BOP Y 1 0 1 Not significant (redundancy)  - Line for yellow and blue pod 
 1.3 Solenoids to valves Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) - manual override and manual initiation of pilot control valve 
 1.4 pilot valve (air) Y 0 2 2 Not significant (redundancy)  - Closing sub plate mounted on the shear ram via the panel 
    
          
 - Manual override by closing sub plate mounted on the shear ram 
 1.5 
subsea regulated valve (rams and 
preventer) 
Y 2 1 3 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - subsea regulated valve on other pod 
        
 
     - Can be operated manually 
        
 
     - each rams and annular has separate regulator 
1.6 
a 
shuttle valve (pipe rams, VBR and 
annular preventer) 
Y 0 1 1   
- each rams and annular has separate shuttle valve for operations 
trough other rams or preventer.  
                
1.6 
b Shuttle valve (blind shear rams) 
N 0 0 0 
 - The corresponding blind shear 
ram cannot be operated. Thus 
effecting the operation of well 
shut in   
 1.7 fluid reservoir N/A 0 0 0 
According to FMEA sheet, there 
is no failure mode that gives a 
failure for a component (e.g., 
contamination, rupture, low 
volume) 
N/A 
 1.8 
pressure regulator (hydraulic 
manifold) 
Y 2 1 3 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Can be operated manually 
    
    
 
    
 - Bypass the regulator via high pressure bypass directly to the ram 
valves 
               - Global: separate regulator on rams and annular preventer 
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 1.9 
flow meter, intrumentation, 
pressure transmitter 
N 0 0 0 
Not significant (still possible to 
perform BOP functions) 
(this is just the instrumentation, reading devices, etc. which are not 
directly influence the functionality of the BOP function, but could be a 
problem for well control operations) 
 
1.10 pump in hydraulic manifold 
Y 2 1 3 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - redundant pump 
        
 
     - emergency pump (in case all powers are lost) 
               - accumulator banks 
 
1.11 air pressure switch for pumps 
Y 1 1 2 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - electric driven pumps as primary pumping system 
               - accumulator banks 
 
1.12 strainer upstream pumps 
Y 0 2 2 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy of pump  
               - accumulator banks 
 
1.13 filter downstream pumps 
Y 2 2 4 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundant filters 
               - Bypass of filter 
               - Redundant pump  
               - Accumulator banks 
 
1.14 hose upstream strainers 
Y 1 1 2 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundant strainer 
               - Redundant pump  
 
1.15 
level transmitter in reservoir N 0 0 0 
Not significant (still possible to 
perform BOP functions) 
(it is a level reading of fluid in reservoir which does not directly 
influence the functionality of the BOP function, but could be a problem 
for well control operations) 
 
1.16 
pressure safety valve (PSV)s N 0 0 0 
 - The accumulator will not have 
enough hydraulic fluid pressure 
for BOP functions (failure to 
close allows fluid to leakage)   
 
1.17 pilot control valve/panel valve 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Manual operation/override of valves 
 
1.18 
flange and gasket N 0 0 0 
 - for the worst case, it can drain 
all hydraulic fluid in the 
accumulator (there will be 
alarm for a leakage) and could 
effect the BOP functions   
 
1.19 
master electric panel and electric 
mini panel 
Y 1 0 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundant electric panel (mini panel) 
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1.20 
electric power pack with battery 
back up 
Y 1 0 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundant main power from main generator 
 
1.21 electric power cable 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Manual override of valve or other command 
 
1.22 air operator 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Manual intervention of solenoid and pilot control valve 
 
1.23 pod selector valve 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Manual intervention of pod selector valve 
 
1.24 
sub plate mounted (SPM) valves 
(rams and preventer) 
Y 1 2 3 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundant SPM from other pod 
               - Manual override (possible to manually operate BOP functions) 
               - Redundancy from other rams or annular preventer 
 
1.25 
fluid mixing system N 0 0 0 
According to FMEA sheet, there 
is no failure mode that gives a 
failure for a component (e.g., 
fail to make the required 
hydraulic fluid)   
 
1.26 
accumulator isolator valve (inside 
HPU) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - redundancy by having flow through other valve 
 
1.27 
accumulator isolator pilot valve 
(inside control manifold) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having pod selector vavle to regulate the hydrauic 
flow into subsea accumulator 
 
1.28 
pod mounted accumulator isolation 
valve 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having the flow through other valve 
 
1.29 
stack mounted accumulator 
isolation valve 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having the flow through other valve 
 
1.30 batteries inside both pods 
Y 1 1 2 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having batteries from other pod 
    
          
 - Redundancy of initiating blind shear ram function by using accoustic 
system 
BOP stack             
 2.1 fixed pipe rams Y 1 2 3 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having variable bore rams 
               - Redundancy by having blind shear ram 
               - Redundancy by having annular preventer 
 2.2 variable bore rams Y 1 2 3 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having pipe rams 
               - Redundancy by having blind shear ram 
               - Redundancy by having annular preventer 
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 2.3 blind shear ram 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having annular preventer (possible to close annular 
on empty hole up to 10,000 psi in combination with the choke system) 
 2.4 annular BOP Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having shear ram and/or pipe ram 
 2.5 automatic subsea ram locks 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having hydraulic pressure in the closing chamber 
Choke valve, kill valve and connector             
 3.1 choke and kill valve 
Y 1 0 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by flowing the flow through other choke and kill valve 
 3.2 hydraulic connector Y 1 1 2 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy of secondary connection unlatch 
               - Redundancy of unlatch from LMRP or wellhead  
Component inside rams and preventer             
4.1 
blind/shear ram seal (sealing 
element) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - redundancy by having other rams and/or annular preventer to close 
 4.2 piston on both sides (shear ram) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - redundancy by having other rams and/or annular preventer to close 
 4.3 wedge on both sides (shear ram) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having hydraulic fluid to secure the linier mechanical 
energy on piston 
 4.4 blade on both sides (shear ram) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having other rams and annular preventer to seal the 
well 
 4.5 shear ram housing (shear ram) 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having sealing device such as blind ram and pipe ram 
 4.6 annular preventer rubber housing 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having sealing device such as blind ram and pipe ram 
 4.7 annular sealilng element Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having other rams close 
 4.8 annular piston Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy)  - Redundancy by having other rams close 
 4.9 annular locking wedge 
Y 0 1 1 Not significant (redundancy) 
 - Redundancy by having hydraulic fluid to secure the linier mechanical 
energy on piston 
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The component inside variable bore rams and pipe rams have more or less the same type of 
component inside blind shear ram. The difference is only in the rams parts.   
Based on table 8.5, the critical components can be seen with the green mark having neither 
redundancy/back-up with the same component (local), nor other different types of 
components or actions/operations (global). Some components listed in the table are having 
no redundancy, but it is not significant to the failure of the BOP function. 
 
Table 8.5 Summary of critical component from redundancy and effect table 
ID no. Failure of the critical components Redundancy Effects 
1.6 Shuttle valve (blind shear ram) No The corresponding blind shear ram cannot be 
operated. Thus effecting the operation of well shut 
in 
1.16 Pressure safety valve (PSV)s No The accumulator will not have enough hydraulic 
fluid pressure for BOP functions (failure to close 
allows fluid to leakage) 
1.18 Flange and gasket No For the worst case, it can drain all hydraulic fluid in 
the accumulator (there will be alarm for a leakage) 
and could effects the BOP functions 
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9. DISCUSSION 
9.1 Result of Criticality Analysis 
 Different risk tools give different result for the critical components in the BOP as can be 
seen in the summarized Table 9.1. The highest numbers of critical components are found in 
the reliability block diagram follows by FMECA and redundancy table respectively.  
 In table 9.1, some assumptions are made for some components related to their similar 
functionality. Surface and subsea fluid accumulator are both considered as bottle 
accumulator. All shuttle valves for different functions (e.g., rams, annular preventer and 
accumulator) are assumed to be the same. Closing hydraulic connection, opening hydraulic 
connection, closing chamber and opening chamber of annular preventer are some 
components inside annular preventer rubber housing.  
Table 9.1 List of critical components based on the used risk tools 
ID No. List of critical components based on each risk tools 
Reliability Block Diagram FMECA & Criticality Matrix Redundancy and effect table 
1.1 Accumulator bottles   
1.2 
 
Hydraulic line from HPU to BOP 
(4) 
 
1.3 Solenoid valve   
1.6 Shuttle valve Shuttle valve (1) Shuttle valve 
1.7 Fluid reservoir Fluid reservoir (5)  
1.10 Pump   
1.16   Pressure safety valve (PSV)s 
1.17 Pilot control valve   
1.18  Flange and gasket (4) Flange and gasket 
1.22 Air operator   
1.23 Pod selector valve   
1.25 Fluid mixing system   
1.29 Stack mounted 
accumulator isolation valve 
  
2.1 Fixed pipe ram   
2.2 Variable bore ram   
2.3 Blind shear ram Blind shear ram (2)  
2.4 Annular preventer    
4.1 Blind/shear ram seal   
4.2 Ram piston on both sides Ram piston on both sides (3)  
4.4 Ram Blade on both sides   
4.5 Shear ram housing   
4.6 Annular preventer rubber 
housing 
Annular preventer rubber housing 
(2) 
 
4.7 Annular sealing element   
4.8 Annular piston   
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 The critical components of BOP found in reliability block diagram are only based on 
every single minimum cut set. It is analyzed without considering the effect of compensating 
provisions (safeguard) and no information is used to analyze how the failure mechanism of 
the component failure. In order to assess which components are critical with respect to the 
functionality of BOP system and fatality as parameters, FMECA and redundancy table can 
be used. Both FMECA and redundancy table are complement to each other to determine the 
final critical component of BOP.  
    FMECA and redundancy table might present the similar method. The basic 
assessment between these two methods is from the failure modes being analyzed. FMECA 
method analyzes failure modes where every relevant and significant possibility for the 
deterioration of the component function is assessed and then ranked according to their 
critical levels (e.g., low, medium, high). While redundancy table only consider the failure 
mode when component is in the total failure state.  
 FMECA presents shuttle valve for ram and annular function as the most critical 
component in the BOP, followed by blind shear ram, annular preventer (rubber housing), ram 
piston, hydraulic line from HPU to BOP, flange, gasket and fluid reservoir respectively. This 
criticality rank is based on the level of fatality and the occurrence probability which are in the 
medium area (no failure mode in high are) of the criticality matrix. In this assessment, every 
critical component on the topside/surface can be neglected since problems occurring on the 
surface are consider more accessible for detection, testing, inspection, maintenance and 
repair. Moreover, dual redundancies component can also be considered as not critical since 
they have a back-up system to compromise with one failure for the same function of 
component since FMECA consider one component failure at a time and others are function 
perfectly. Based on this premises, fluid reservoir and hydraulic line from HPU to BOP can be 
excluded as critical component. 
 In the FMECA, annular preventer (rubber housing) and blind shear ram become the 
second most critical component. In this case, we can prioritize annular preventer (rubber 
housing) into the last priority for criticality since it has redundancy component such as blind 
shear ram, variable bore ram and pipe ram to replace the function of annular preventer. 
Although annular preventer rubber housing has redundancies, it can still be considered as 
critical component. It is because annular preventer has an important role in the BOP function 
as a first device to be activated during well shut in to seal the well which is very important to 
prevent the influx reach surface. Moreover, it is also more practicable to conduct stripping or 
snubbing operation through annular preventer than through ram to ram stripping method.  
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 Redundancy and effect table presents four critical components which are shuttle valve, 
pressure safety valve (PSV), flange and gasket. There is no criticality rank in this table since 
all the components are analyzed based on the redundancy and back-up operation they might 
have to compensate the failure of the component.  
 Pressure safety valve is a component which does not have direct impact with regard to 
BOP function. In the analysis, the pressure safety valve is used to release pressure of 
hydraulic fluid only when overpressure occurs in the accumulator. Furthermore, criticality 
matrix shows low consequences of fatality and tolerable occurrence probability. Thus, 
pressure safety valve can be excluded as a critical component.  
 Overall, shuttle valve for ram and annular function is the most critical component in 
BOP. It is used to shuttles hydraulic fluid from the control pod to annular preventer and rams 
preventer. There is no other way and no other redundancy for the hydraulic fluid to enter 
annular or ram without shuttle valve. Moreover, the annular and preventer are function only 
by means of hydraulic fluid. No manual intervention can be initiated to operate annular and 
ram. The failure of shuttle valve means no annular or ram function. 
 Each preventer and ram have their own shuttle valve. In this case the most important 
shuttle valve is for the blind shear ram function. Other shuttle valves such as for pipe rams 
and variable bore rams functions have advantage to substitute their function to shuttle the 
hydraulic which drive the rams to seal the well. Shuttle valve in annular preventer could also 
substitute the function of every rams including blind shear ram for shut in operation. 
However, annular preventer is not design to seal the well in case of emergency, only blind 
shear ram has the capability to completely shut off the well. The maximum pressure that 
annular preventer can hold usually less than the maximum pressure that blind shear ram can 
hold. Moreover, in case of drifting floating platform due to bad weather, the drill string need to 
be cut off and LMRP disconnection is initiated. If the string cannot be cut, it can endanger the 
personnel on platform. Therefore, the shuttle valve for blind shear ram function and the blind 
shear ram itself are the most critical component in the BOP.  
 Leakage is the main problem for flange and gasket. In the subsea accumulator 
connector or other pipe connection, the leakage problem usually never make sudden 
catastrophe. Usually the problem is only a small leakage and seepage of fluid. The drainage 
of hydraulic fluid in the accumulator or drilling fluid in the pipe connection can be detected 
with alarm to prevent bigger leakage. However, in case of large leaks and operator does not 
have time to react, then it could be a catastrophe. Thus, flange and gasket become the next 
critical component in the BOP. 
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9.2 BOP Criticality Component With Regards to the Use of BOP for Well 
Shut-in, Stripping, Snubbing and BOP Testing 
 In the drilling operation, BOP has several roles such as well shut in, stripping, snubbing 
and BOP testing. In author opinion, the most important operation is well shut in. Shut in the 
well is needed when kicks occur to prevent influx into the surface by sealing the well either 
with annular or ram preventer. Shut in process is the first approach to close the well to 
protect the crew, stop the flow and pressure reading. The operations of well shut in is just 
simply close the ram/preventer and operate the choke and kill valve for pressure reading. 
Special attention should be taken for shut in when the drill string/pipe/casing/collar/tool joint 
are in the ram position. Drill string or pipe can be cut by means of blind ram, but drill casing, 
tool joint and drill collar are too thick for blind ram. The position of drill collar and tool joint 
should be maintained in the ram, so only the pipe section that should be in the position of the 
ram. 
 In this case, the critical component of BOP mentioned before such as shuttle valve for 
blind shear ram function, blind shear ram and annular preventer are very critical to the 
successful closing of the well. If these components fail during shut in, it can create very 
catastrophe fatality and damage to the platform as well as environment.  
 Well shut in usually follows by stripping or snubbing operations (depends on the hole 
pressure) in order to gives killing fluid access into the bottom hole of the well. The killing fluid 
in the bottom hole is necessary to perform the well control based on constant bottom-hole 
method. Since the stripping or snubbing is perform after well shut in, then it is necessary for 
the critical component, shuttle valve (blind shear ram) and blind shear ram/annular preventer, 
to maintain its functionality. If the critical component fails after well shut in, the ram or annular 
preventer can still have the locking wedge as a safety device to prevent the rams or sealing 
element move backward. In this case, it only cause delay in the operation of stripping or 
snubbing. Otherwise, kill line can be used to direct killing fluid into the well without having to 
put drill string into the bottom hole of the well.  
 BOP testing is part of the precautionary action to know the condition and performance 
of the BOP system. During this test, the performance of the critical component can be tested 
and ascertained. In this operation, the critical component might not be critical as it has many 
safety measure and procedure to handle with the expected raising problems.  
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
 Safety of drilling operation, particularly during the event of kicks, can be improved by 
having more component redundancy or back-up operation in the subsea blowout preventer 
(BOP). It is important for well shut in, stripping, snubbing and BOP testing operation. The 
redundancy is particularly required for the critical components in the BOP as it has been 
analyzed in this report. The critical components of BOP can be summarized and prioritized 
as follows: 
1. Shuttle valve for blind shear ram (e.g., for closing function) 
2. Blind shear ram, additional critical components inside shear ram: 
 Ram piston 
3. Flange and gasket (in the BOP stack) 
4. Annular preventer (rubber housing) 
 In the event of kick and well shut in is initiated, the above critical component is very 
critical to the safety of personnel. Stripping and snubbing operation also require the critical 
components to be function properly. It might not be a big problem if the critical components 
are fail when the shut in has been initiated since it is only causing the delay of the operation. 
Alternatively, well control can be done by regulating kill fluid directly into the hole through kill 
line. During BOP testing operation, the critical components might not be critical if it fail as 
there are many safety measure and procedure for safety.  
   
 
 
10.1 Recommendation 
 If possible the design of rams and annular preventer are equipped with two shuttle 
valves for each preventer. It might not common for the BOP design nowadays. There is a 
need for additional shuttle valve for each annular and ram preventer as this is the most 
critical equipment for operation of closing BOP (well shut in). Shuttle valve should also be 
more robust against fire and explosion to ensure its functionality in case of blowouts.  
 The design of BOP should consider two blind shear rams in the stack to give more 
availability for well shut in operation. Annular preventer should have the same maximum rate 
pressure such as in the blind shear ram so it can act like blind shear ram when blind shear 
ram is unavailable due to failure. 
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10.2 Suggestion for further works 
 The works conducted in this report is the analysis of criticality based on qualitative 
approach. The scarce of data and the amount of time required to finish the report making 
qualitative analysis become a good approach for the analysis. Literature study and experts 
judgment with experience are the dominant sources for the analysis. There could be a 
hidden or mislead information during the analysis, study, discussion and brainstorming 
session. Hence, thorough quantitative analysis of criticality and reliability of BOP component 
in more detail is necessary for further works to give a better insight of criticality in the BOP 
component. Moreover, the consequences for loss of asset and environment damage should 
also be analyzed in more detail in the further work.  
 The work done in this report is mainly for hydraulic BOP system. Further analysis on 
electrohydraulic, multiplex system, ram intervention and acoustic intervention can also be 
conducted.  
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12. APPENDICES 
12.1 FMECA sheet 
Table 12.1 FMECA of hydraulic BOP system 
ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure Cause(s) Failure effect(s) Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party Local Global 
1.1 Accumulator 
Bottles 
 
Function: 
Store energy 
(hydraulic fluid) 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.1.1 
Burst 
bladder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wear due to ageing 
 
Human error when 
refilling the bottles 
 
Potential for damage 
to bladder from 
Valve in the bottom 
of the bottle, when 
the bladder expands 
downwards during 
depressurization of 
the bottles. 
Gas in the 
system 
(increased 
motive force 
behind the fluid 
during 
hydraulic 
return to 
reservoir). 
 
Reduced 
accuracy of 
the flow meter 
 
Affected 
bladder will 
not function 
Some 
reduced 
capacity 
 
Worst case: 
possibility of 
particles from 
burst bladder 
to pressure 
regulating 
valve in the 
hydraulic 
system 
 
BOP functions 
will still be 
upheld due to 
overcapacity 
Maintenance 
and 
inspection 
procedures. 
 
When 
draining 
the system; if 
the pressure 
decreases 
below the 
charging 
pressure, it is 
an indication 
of a burst 
bladder in 
the bottle 
rack. 
Redundancy 
with regards to 
number of 
bottles (25% 
overcapacity + 
3 extra bottles) 
 
Routine for 
control of 
charge pressure 
in place 
 
Competence of 
operators when 
refilling the 
accumulator 
bottles. The 
bottles are rated 
for 5000 psi 
 
Function testing 
of BOP 
functions every 
week 
1 3 L  Evaluate to add 
strainer upstream 
pressure regulating 
valve in the shear 
boost system 
 
Check the 
calculations for precharge 
pressure on 
the accumulator 
bottles 
 
Evaluate having one burst 
disk for the entire 
accumulator bank. Take into 
consideration that this may 
reduce the number of leak 
points compared to having 
one bursting disk for each 
bottle. 
 
Update P&ID to 
reflect the chosen solution 
 
F-1.1.2 
Leakage 
through 
nitrogen 
"fill"- 
system 
(valve) 
Poor quality of valve 
 
mechanical damage 
Affected 
accumulator 
has reduced 
capacity/does 
not function 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
 
BOP functions 
will still be 
upheld due to 
overcapacity 
Audible if a 
big leakage. 
 
When 
draining 
the system; if 
the pressure 
decreases 
below the 
charging 
pressure, it is 
an indication 
of a burst 
bladder in 
the bottle 
rack. 
Maintenance 
procedures 
(leak check 
each time the 
valve is 
operated) 
Redundancy 
with regards to 
number of 
bottles (25% 
overcapacity + 
3 extra bottles) 
Function testing 
of BOP 
functions every 
week 
1 2 L    
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure Cause(s) Failure effect(s) Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party Local Global 
   F-1.1.3 
Lack of 
stored 
accumulation 
pressure, 
reduced 
capacity, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rupture of 
bladder, leaks 
Affected 
accumulator(s) 
will have 
reduced 
capacity 
Dampening 
effects 
Nitrogen 
blown back 
to reservoir, 
causing 
foaming 
Maintenance 
procedures. 
 
Redundancy gives 
loss of one bottle will 
not effect other. 
 
Bladders are 
changed out every 
five years 
 
The gauges on the 
accumulator banks 
are included in the 
maintenance program. 
API 
RP 53, section 
12.5.3g gives 
requirements with 
regards to the 
pressure gauges. 
Accumulator 
pressure gauges 
are currently 
checked for 
calibration yearly 
 
Optional: 
There are currently 
provisions in the 
design for using 
nitrogen as a pressure 
source for operating 
the BOP. 
This is not taken 
into consideration 
in the risk ranking 
1 2 L  When bringing a 
rack of accumulator 
bottles back into 
operation, there will be 
3000 psi on one side of the 
isolation valve (towards the 
rest of the hydraulic 
system), and no pressure on 
the other side of the valve. 
A sudden opening of the 
isolation valve could cause 
damage to the valve itself. It 
should be considered 
to include a balancing 
line/tubing with a needle 
valve between each rack of 
accumulators in order to 
minimize the potential for 
damage to the isolation 
valve due to sudden 
pressure 
Enginee
ring 
F-1.1.4 
Lack of 
stored 
accumulation 
pressure, 
reduced 
capacity, 
 
Leak on gas side 
of bladder, failure 
in nitrogen fill valve 
assembly 
Affected 
accumulator(s) 
will have 
reduced 
capacity 
Dampening 
effects 
Measurement 
of bladder 
Maintenance 
procedures. 
 
Redundancy gives 
loss of one bottle will 
not effect other  
 
Testing. 
1 2 L  Ensure that maintenance 
and inspection procedures 
include snooping of the 
nitrogen fill valves. It is also 
a possibility to use soapy 
water to detect leaks (via 
bubbling) every time the 
valve are operated 
Mainten
ance 
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5) 
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Risk 
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H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
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Resp. 
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Local  Global 
1.2 Hydraulic line from 
HPU to BOP 
(Jumper hose line, 
subsea hose 
bundle, choke and 
kill line) 
 
Function: 
Route of hydraulic 
fluid from HPU to 
BOP 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.2.1 
Leakage, 
bursting, 
plugged line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanical 
failure. 
Corrosion. 
Fatigue 
External forces 
Insufficient or 
incorrect support, 
vibration. 
Climbing on the 
pipes. 
Mechanical failure 
in fittings, 
gaskets, etc 
Spillage 
(water, glycol, 
hydraulic fluid) 
to 
environment. 
 
Potential for 
personnel 
injury 
Worst case: 
Drain all 
hydraulic fluid 
in the bottle 
racks 
(normally the 
alarms will 
ensure that 
this does not 
happen, 
except for 
very large 
leaks where 
the operator 
does not have 
time to react) 
 
Potential loss 
of individual 
BOP functions 
 
Potential loss 
of the 
complete 
surface volume 
of hydraulic 
fluid through 
burst hose 
Visual 
 
Low level and 
low pressure 
alarms 
 
Excessive 
running of the 
pumps 
Support in accordance 
with regulations and 
standards. 
 
Use environmentally 
friendly hydraulic fluid. 
 
Fittings are stainless 
steel, reducing 
corrosion issues 
 
Hoses are fire 
resistant and placed in 
a restricted area 
 
Hoses are equipped 
with whip-checks  
 
Short pipe stretches. 
 
Operators 
(competence) 
normally have 
time to react 
and isolate a 
leak 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week. 
 
Maintenance 
and inspection 
procedures 
 
Redundant BOP 
functions and 
hydraulic line for both 
each pod 
2 3 M  Ensure that layout and 
design ensures access to 
the valves etc. that need 
maintenance. 
Ensure that grating 
or similar is in place 
/ available to prevent 
climbing on pipes 
 
Verify the design 
specification concerning 
piping to the accumulator 
banks. Take into 
consideration that a break or 
leak from a common 
hydraulic pipe could 
increase the potential for 
draining all hydraulic fluid 
from the accumulator banks, 
compared to separate 
piping. 
 
Ensure that all valves in the 
main hydraulic lines are 
equipped with a car seal 
system, and ensure that 
procedures and routines 
incorporate this. 
 
Ensure that inspection (and 
documentation) of hoses 
and pipes are included in 
the maintenance and 
inspection programs. 
 
Review the required 
change-out intervals for the 
hoses, including 
maintenance procedures. 
 
Ensure that 
hoses and connected 
pipes are properly tagged, in 
order to prevent 
misunderstandings when 
reattaching hoses after 
maintenance 
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Dwg. Additional Information 
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Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
Ensure that the hose are 
manufactured in accordance 
with relevant standards, 
and that there are no weak 
links in the fire protection of 
the hose 
 
Ensure that a scenario with 
rupture of a hose and a 
rapid loss of hydraulic fluid 
surface volume is included 
in the operator training, in 
order to ensure that correct 
actions are being taken to 
isolate the leak source in an 
emergency situation. 
 
After implementation of 
these recommendations, the 
probability of the failure 
mode may be reduced from 
3 to 2, and the risk thus 
becomes L (Low) 
1.3 Solenoids to 
valves 
 
Function: 
Controlling the 
opening and closing 
of valves and rams 
 
Type: 
Solenoid valves to 
valves and rams (13 
off) 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.3.1 
Fail to move 
Burnt/broken coil 
Wire break 
Dust 
Contamination 
Stuck (too high 
friction) 
Electrical failure 
Loss of air 
Mechanical failure 
Obstruction  
Affected 
solenoid 
cannot be 
operated from 
the panels, 
and thus 
corresponding 
pilot control 
valve cannot 
be activated 
from panel 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
BOP functions 
manually from 
the BOP 
control unit 
room) 
Loop 
monitoring of 
solenoid 
through the 
PLC, raising 
an alarm 
 
Flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
monitoring 
 
Visual, when 
function is 
activated 
 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position on 
the remote 
panels 
Manual override and 
manual initiation of 
pilot control valve 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week. Function testing 
of the sheer boost 
system every new well 
1 3 L  The solenoid is attached on 
the central hydraulic control 
manifold 
 
Consider to include a test of 
the high/low override 
function  
Mainten
ance 
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1.4 Pilot Valve (air) 
 
Functions: 
Close shuttle valve 
to the hydraulic 
manifold 
 
 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-1.4.1 
Not operating  
No credible failure 
causes found 
None No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
Visual Redundancy, i.e., it is 
possible to close the 
sub plate mounted 
(SPM) valve on the 
shear ram via the 
panels 
 
Manual override (it is 
possible to manually 
close the sub plate 
mounted (SPM) valve 
on the shear ram) 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Function testing of the 
hydraulic system for 
every new well 
1 1 L  Since no credible failure 
causes were identified, the 
probability and 
consequence of the failure 
mode was considered low 
 
1.5 Subsea Regulated 
Valve 
 
Functions: 
Regulating pressure 
of hydraulic fluid to 
the annulus and 
rams system 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.5.1 
Regulator 
stuck in 
position  
Loss of air 
pressure, 
error in air 
solenoid, 
corrosion, 
solenoid valve 
failure, electric 
failure 
Cannot 
operate the 
regulator from 
the panels 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
Visual  
 
Pressure 
gauges 
Can be operated 
manually (to be 
verified) 
 
Upper and lower pipe 
ram are on a separate 
line, and have a 
separate pressure 
regulator, and may 
therefore still be 
operated 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Used often, thus 
corrosion is not a 
problem  
 
Built in pressure relief 
valve in annulus 
system, relieving back 
into reservoir, will 
prevent pressures 
above 1500 psi in 
downstream annulus 
system 
1 3 L  Confirm if the regulator can 
be operated manually (hand 
wheel, etc). update P&ID 
accordingly 
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   F-1.5.2 
Fail to 
open/close 
Broken spring  
 
 
Fail to open: 
No 
consequence 
(all equipment 
is rated for 
3000 psi) 
 
Fail to close: 
No pressure to 
downstream 
equipment  
Fail to open 
gives no 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
 
Fail to close 
gives loss of all 
equipment 
functions 
downstream 
except the 
sheer boost 
and the 
annular (other 
main hydraulic 
lines) 
Visual. 
 
Pressure 
transmitters 
Upper and lower pipe 
ram are on a separate 
line, and have a 
separate pressure 
regulator, and may 
therefore still be 
operated 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week  
1 1 L  Check whether the pressure 
regulator fails open or 
closed (confirm failure 
modes) – if it fails close it 
can be evaluated whether 
the bypass should be 
included. Vendor should 
provide information about 
failure rates. Thus 
probability may be changed 
 
 
 
1.6 Shuttle Valve (rams 
and annular 
preventer) 
 
Function: 
Shuttles hydraulic 
fluid from the control 
pod to the shear ram 
and preventer  
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-1.6.1 
Not able to 
change 
position 
Wear on slide, 
causing jam, 
corrosion (shuttle 
valve is exposed)  
Shuttle valve 
cannot move 
Loss of 
redundancy 
with regards to 
shear ram 
functions 
 
Worst case: 
Delayed or no 
shearing 
Visual when 
shuttle valve 
should move. 
Indicator light 
on shear ram 
functions 
Function testing of the 
control pod for every 
new well 
 
 
5 1 M  The shuttle valve is deemed 
to be critical for safety, and 
thus needs to be better 
documented 
 
Vendor should document 
how the valve functions in a 
situation with equal pressure 
on both sides (e.g., in a 
situation with 3000 psi 
pressure on the normal 
system, and the sheer boost 
system needs to be 
initiated).  
 
The probability for having 
the same pressure on both 
sides is low, as the pressure 
in the manifold system is 
normally down to 1500 psi 
 
Evaluation of test frequency 
and documentation of 
reliability of valve can 
decrease the overall risk 
level. It should be evaluated 
if the sheer boost system 
should be included in 
weekly function test. Take 
into consideration the 
increased wear on the pipe 
and valve system if 3000 psi 
is routed through every 
week  
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1.7 Fluid Reservoir 
 
Function: 
Open tank (with lid) 
storage for hydraulic 
fluid. Closed 
hydraulic circuit (all 
returns to tank)  
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.7.1 
Rupture of 
reservoir 
Too small or 
clogged vent on 
hydraulic 
reservoir  
Leakage of 
hydraulic fluid 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
BOP functions) 
Alarm from 
the level 
transmitter 
(leakage) 
 
Visual  
Vent is designed to 
take full blow down 
from bottle rack 
 
Accumulator banks 
store enough 
hydraulic power to 
ensure operation of 
BOP  
1 4 M  Check calculations 
(dimension of the vent), to 
ensure that the vent line has 
sufficient capacity to prevent 
over pressurization of the 
reservoir in case of a full 
blow down from bottle rack. 
Also take into consideration 
the potential for larger 
motive force in case of a 
nitrogen leak  
 
Probability was rated as 4, 
but when calculations have 
been confirmed and if they 
show that the vent is big 
enough then the probability 
may be reduced, and thus 
the risk  
 
 
 
 
F-1.7.2 
Contaminatio
n of hydraulic 
fluid  
Failure in lining 
giving rise to 
contaminants in 
hydraulic fluid 
entry of dirt and 
other 
contaminants to 
reservoir through 
breathers 
Hydraulic fluid 
quality is 
inadequte 
Clogging of 
suction 
strainers 
upstream 
hydraulic 
pumps. Fine 
particles may 
pass through 
and increase 
wear on pump 
Sampling of 
hydraulic 
fluid. 
Sampling is 
done on a 
regular basis 
(monthly or 
every three 
months) as 
part of the 
maintenance 
procedures 
Strainers on suction 
side of hydraulic 
pumps will remove 
large particles. Place 
filters downstream the 
pumps, after the 
accumulators 
 
The filters will be 
monitored during 
regular maintenance 
in order to detect if 
there are any particles 
in the hydraulic fluid  
1 3 L  The Y strainers on the 
suction side of the electrical 
pumps may have too large 
mesh size to protect the 
pumps adequately. Too fine 
filters may cause cavitation. 
The mesh size of the filters 
should be considered taking 
this into consideration 
 
To prevent layering of water, 
glycol and chemicals, 
circulation in the reservoir 
should be considered. A 
filter could be installed in 
such a circulation system in 
order to facilitate cleaning 
and improve quality of the 
hydraulic fluid. It is 
recommended to circulate 
three times the reservoir 
volume each eight hours 
Mainten
ance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enginee
ring 
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   F-1.7.3 
Too low 
volumetric 
capacity of 
reservoir 
(1200 gal. 
reservoir) 
Reservoir volume 
too small, too low 
level in reservoir, 
too high volume 
in reservoir 
Tank will be 
emptied, or 
reservoir may 
overflow if 
there are more 
stored energy 
(hydraulic fluid) 
in the system 
and 
accumulators 
that the 
capacity of the 
reservoir  
Potential for 
spills of 
hydraulic fluid 
to the 
environment  
Level switch 
detects low 
level, gives 
alarm and 
trips pumps. 
Sight glass is 
the detection 
method for 
too high level 
in reservoir 
Environmental friendly 
hydraulic fluid. Low 
level alarm. 
Maintenance / 
inspection routines 
1 2 L  The calculations should be 
reviewed and the need for a 
day tank should be 
considered 
 
1.8 Pressure Regulator 
(hydraulic 
manifold) 
 
Functions: 
Regulating the 
pressure of the 
hydraulic fluid to the 
manifold  
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.8.1 
Regulator 
stuck in 
position  
Loss of air 
pressure, error in 
air solenoid, 
corrosion, failure 
in solenoid 
valves, electrical 
failure 
Cannot 
operate the 
regulator from 
the panels 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
Visual 
(manifold 
pressure 
does not 
change when 
you are trying 
to regulate) 
Can be operated 
manually. Regulator 
system could be 
bypassed 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Used often, thus 
corrosion is not a 
problem 
1 3 L  Confirm if the regulator can 
be operated manually 
 
F-1.8.2 
Fail to open  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broken spring  Fail to open: 
No 
consequence 
(all equipment 
is rated for 
3000 psi) 
 
Fail to open: 
no 
consequence 
due to 
safeguard 
 
 
Visual  
 
Pressure 
transmitters 
Annular preventer is 
on a separate line, 
thus may still be 
operated 
 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Check whether the pressure 
regulator fails open or 
closed (confirm failure 
modes) – if it fails close it 
can be evaluated whether 
the bypass should be 
included. Vendor should 
provide information about 
failure rates. Thus 
probability may be changed  
 
 
 
F-1.8.3 
Fail to close  
 Fail to close: 
no pressure to 
downstream 
equipment 
Fail to close: 
Lose all 
equipment 
functions 
downstream  
3 1 L 
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   F-1.8.4 
Seal failure / 
washout 
failure  
Contaminated 
hydraulic fluid  
Leak of 
hydraulic fluids 
due to seal 
washout 
No global 
effects due to 
safeguards 
allowing for 
BOP functions 
to be upheld 
Visual 
Noise 
Pumps will be 
starting 
frequently 
Spare regulator 
available on the rig. 
Leak rate will be 
smaller that pump 
capacity, allowing for 
the BOP function to 
be upheld even in 
case of a leak. This 
means that leaks does 
not need to be 
repaired in critical 
situations. It is also 
possible to bypass the 
regulator via the high 
pressure bypass, and 
route 3000 psi 
hydraulic fluid directly 
to the ram valves  
 
Maintenance program  
 
Filter  
1 3 L    
1.9 Flow meter, 
instrumentation on 
HPU, pressure 
transmitter 
 
Functions: 
Provide information 
about the status 
(pressure and flow) 
of the hydraulic 
system 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.9.1 
Failure of 
pressure 
transmitter, 
loss of signal 
Mechanical 
failure, 
mechanical 
damage, 
electrical failure 
Loss of 
pressure 
reading from 
affected 
transmitter 
No global 
effect, still 
possible to 
perform BOP 
function  
Visual, check 
of manifold 
pressure low 
pressure 
alarm 
inspection 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Yearly calibration 
check  
 
Daily check of 
functionality 
1 2 L    
F-1.9.2 
Failure of 
pressure 
transmitter, 
wrong signal 
Electric failure, 
clogging of 
transmitter 
False pressure 
reading 
No global 
effect, still 
possible to 
perform BOP 
functions 
Visual, check 
of manifold 
pressure low 
pressure 
alarm 
inspection 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Yearly calibration 
check  
 
Daily check of 
functionality 
1 2 L  When running casing, 
ensure that cross checks of 
pressures are made in order 
to ensure that a false low 
pressure reading would not 
lead to damage of the 
casing. Check that this is 
stated in the operational 
procedures 
 
Evaluate to amend the daily 
check list to include cross 
referencing of pressure 
measurements from the 
different gauges 
Operati
on  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operati
ons & 
mainten
ance 
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   F-1.9.3 
Failure of 
flow 
transmitter, 
loss of signal  
Mechanical 
failure, 
mechanical 
damage, 
electrical failure 
Loss of flow 
reading 
No global 
effect, still 
possible to 
perform BOP 
functions 
Visual, 
inspection on 
BOP 
pressure 
changes, 
pumps are 
running 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures  
 
Functional cross 
checks every 4 weeks 
1 2 L  Include in the maintenance 
procedure that the flow 
meter is cross checked and 
calculated against the time 
for closing in depletion tests, 
and the pressure before and 
after, and the pump running 
time 
mainten
ance 
F-1.9.4 
Failure of 
flow 
transmitter, 
wrong signal 
Mechanical failure False flow 
reading 
No global 
effect still 
possible to 
perform BOP 
functions 
Visual, 
inspection on 
BOP 
pressure 
changes, 
pumps are 
running 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures  
 
Functional cross 
checks every 4 weeks 
1 2 L    
1.10 Pump in hydraulic 
manifold 
 
Functions: 
Providing flow and 
pressure in the 
hydraulic system 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.10.1 
Pump does 
not start, 
pump not 
running when 
intended to 
run 
Broken 
transmission belt, 
electrical errors, 
mechanical 
errors, pressure 
switch controlling 
pump not 
working, damage 
to chain drive 
Affected pump 
does not run 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
BOP functions) 
PLC registers 
if a pump 
does not run  
 
Alarms 
 
Visual  
 
Visual 
readout on 
pressure 
switch  
100% redundancy 
with regards to pump 
capacity in hydraulic 
manifold. If all power 
are lost, one of the 
pumps will run on 
emergency power 
 
Accumulator banks 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection 
procedures. A check 
of the chain drive is 
part of the planned 
maintenance 
procedures 
1 3 L  The duty and standby pump 
will be switched by the PLC, 
to prevent increased wear in 
one of the pumps compared 
to the other 
 
The bleed valve from the 
pulse dampener on the 
pressure side of the pumps 
is currently a ball valve. 
Consider to replace the ball 
valve with a needle valve to 
facilitate regulation of air 
purging from the system 
Enginee
ring 
F-1.10.2 
Pump does 
not start, 
pump not 
running when 
intended to 
run 
Poor quality 
linings in 
electrical motor 
Affected pump 
will not run  
No global 
effect. System 
will still operate 
as intended 
due to 
redundancy 
Visual  
 
Visual 
readout on 
pressure 
switch 
A check of this is a 
part of the planned 
maintenance  
 
Redundant pump 
system, accumulators 
1 2 L    
F-1.10.3 
Pump does 
not stop 
Electrical failure, 
MCC failure, 
signal failure 
Increased 
wear of pump 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(PSV) 
Redundant 
PTs 
programmed 
to start/stop 
the pumps 
High 
pressure 
alarm 
 
Excessive 
running alarm 
PSVs prevent over 
pressurization on the 
system 
Redundant pressure 
transmitters 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
1 2 L  Check max design pressure 
of the pumps, and confirm if 
the pumps may over 
pressurize the system. 
Confirm with vendor what 
max design pressure is and 
evaluate against set and 
design pressure in system 
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   F-1.10.4 
Pump 
running but 
not building 
up pressure, 
or giving 
enough flow 
Broken piston 
shaft, wear and 
tear in pump, 
blocked strainer, 
low level in 
reservoir, leaking 
piston packers, 
other leaks, 
damage to 
downstream 
check valve 
Affected pump 
cannot build up 
pressure 
 
No or reduced 
flow trough 
affected pump 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards. 
System will still 
operate as 
intended due 
to redundancy 
Excessive 
running alarm 
(observe 
stable low 
pressure over 
a long time) 
Accumulator banks 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Redundant pump 
system in hydraulic 
manifold 
1 2 L  There are one primary and 
one secondary pump. This 
is not switched around 
during normal operation. 
This was deemed good as 
the pumps are mainly 
needed when the BOP is 
used, and in that case, both 
pumps will be used. I.e., 
there will not be increased 
wear and tear on the 
primary pump compared to 
the secondary 
 
 
 F-1.10.5 
Vibration  
Positive 
displacement 
pumps. 
Misalignment of 
drive chain  
Failure of 
pump 
No global 
effect due to 
adequate 
pulsation 
dampener 
Noise, visual Inspection. 
Pulsation dampener 
as safeguard against 
pulses from PD 
pumps 
1 2 L    
 F-1.10.6 
Pump runs 
when not 
intended to 
run 
Electrical failure, 
failure in pressure 
switch controlling 
the pump 
High pressure 
in the system, 
over 
pressurization 
No global 
effect due to 
pressure relief 
valves and 
redundant 
system 
Pump 
running light 
on drillers 
and auxiliary 
panel. 
Visual 
Pressure relief valves 
 
Redundant pump 
system 
 
Maintenance 
procedures, 
competence of drillers 
  
1 3 L    
1.11 Air pressure switch 
for pumps 
 
Functions: 
Supply air to air 
driven pumps 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.11.1 
Switch is not 
switching 
when 
intended to 
Mechanical failure 
in the switch itself 
No air supply 
to pump, pump 
will not start 
No global 
effect. 
Pressure will 
be maintained 
in order to 
allow for 
operation of 
BOP 
Pressure 
indication in 
the hydraulic 
system. Low 
pressure 
alarms 
Electrical driven 
pumps as primary 
pumping system.  
Accumulators. 
Maintenance 
procedures cover the 
functionality of the 
whole pump system, 
including the switch 
1 2 L    
F-1.11.2 
Switch is not 
closing when 
intended to 
Mechanical failure 
in the switch 
itself, dirt/particles 
High pressure 
in the system, 
over 
pressurization 
No global 
effect due to 
pressure relief 
valves and 
redundant 
system 
Visual (it will 
be noticed 
when the 
pressure 
relief valves 
lifts).  
Pressure 
gauges 
Pressure relief valves. 
Maintenance 
procedures, 
competence of drillers 
1 2 L    
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1.12 Strainer upstream 
pumps 
 
Functions: 
Removing particles 
to prevent damage 
to pump 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.12.1 
Clogging of 
strainer 
Contamination of 
hydraulic fluid 
Cavitation of 
pump (loss of 
redundancy) 
 
Reduced 
capacity 
through 
strainer, lower 
NPSH for 
pump 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
BOP functions) 
Excessive 
running alarm 
(will alert 
operator 
before the 
pump breaks) 
 
Physical 
inspection 
Acid resistant 
strainers 
 
100& redundancy with 
regards to pump 
capacity in hydraulic 
manifold 
 
Redundant strainer 
and pump system 
 
Accumulator banks 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
1 2 L  Verify that inspection of 
filters and strainers is 
included in the maintenance 
manual and procedures 
 
Verify that isolation valves is 
available for maintenance 
purpose 
 
1.13 Filter downstream 
pumps 
 
Functions: 
Filtering hydraulic 
fluid and removing 
impurities / 
contamination 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.13.1 
Clogging of 
filter 
Contamination of 
hydraulic fluid 
Clogged filter, 
erratic 
operation of 
the pumps, 
increased wear 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
Clogging 
indicator 
(gree/yellow/ 
red) 
Bypass of filters is 
possible 
 
Redundant pump 
system and filters 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Accumulator banks 
1 2 L  The set points of dP alarms 
should be evaluated in order 
to prevent unnecessary 
alarms. 
 
Consider to measure the 
condition of the filters via dP 
measurement over the filter 
in order to minimize the 
need for change of filters on 
a regular basis 
 
 
F-1.13.2 
No filtering 
effect  
Burst filter  
Wrong installation 
of filter (human 
error) 
A burst filter 
may cause a 
leak, and in 
worst case 
empty the 
accumulators 
and hydraulic 
reservoir.  
 
Particles not 
being filtered 
out of the 
system. 
Potential for 
clogging of 
downstream 
system  
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
Pump 
running, low 
level alarm 
on reservoir 
(first low, 
then low-low 
and stop). 
 
Visual. 
 
Wrong 
installation of 
the filters will 
be detected 
visually when 
starting the 
system 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Competence of 
operators  
 
Accumulator banks 
1 2 L    
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   F-1.13.3 
Bursting 
filter/filter 
collapse 
High differential 
pressure over the 
filter caused by 
clogging of the 
filter 
Damaged filter No global 
effect due to 
redundancy 
Clogging 
indicator 
internally in 
each filter 
Redundant filters. 
Filters are exchanged 
when needed through 
normal maintenance. 
 
Safety factor built into 
filter element with 
regards to structural 
integrity/strength 
1 2 L  Consider to measure the 
condition of the filters via dP 
measurement over the filter 
in order to minimize the 
need for change of filters on 
a regular basis 
 
 
1.14 Hose Upstream 
Strainers 
 
 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.14.1 
Ingress of air 
into hydraulic 
system gives 
potential 
small 
vacuum/ 
under 
pressure on 
the pump 
suction side 
when pump 
is stroking 
Deterioration of 
clamps for 
connection of 
hose or the hose 
itself 
Pump damage, 
reduced 
operational 
capacity 
No global 
effect. System 
will still operate 
as intended 
due to 
redundancy 
Visual, noise Maintenance 
procedures, 
inspection 
 
Redundant strainer 
and pump system 
1 2 L    
1.15 Level transmitter in 
reservoir 
 
Functions: 
give low level alarm 
and trip pumps at 
low level in reservoir 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.15.1 
Fails to read 
correct level 
(i.e. reading 
low level 
when level 
are not low) 
 
Damaged wire, 
electric failure 
Unnecessary 
trip of electrical 
pumps 
No global 
effect 
Audio and 
visual alarm 
on drillers 
and auxiliary 
panels.  
Low pressure 
alarm in 
accumulators 
Air pumps will start 
when electric pumps 
are shut down. 
 
Accumulators will 
maintain pressure in 
system. Maintenance 
procedures (testing of 
switch) 
1 3 L  Ensure that testing 
incorporates a physical 
verification of the level 
switch function 
mainten
ance 
F-1.15.2 
Fails to read 
correct level 
(i.e. not 
reading an 
actual low 
level) 
Level switch hung 
up 
Dry running of 
electrical 
pumps, 
damage to 
pumps 
No global 
effect 
Low pressure 
alarm in 
accumulators 
 
Running 
pumps 
indication on 
panels (light) 
Accumulators will 
maintain pressure in 
system 
 
Alarm, pumps will not 
be damaged 
immediately, so there 
is time to react. 
Competence of the 
drillers.  
1 3 L  Ensure that testing 
incorporates a physical 
verification of the level 
switch function 
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1.16 Pressure safety 
valve (PSV)s 
 
Functions: 
Pressure reduction 
to prevent over 
pressurization of the 
equipment 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.16.1 
Open when 
not suppose 
to open 
(manifold) 
Corrosion 
 
Human error 
(installation error)  
 
Wrong set point 
Affected PSV 
will lift when 
not intended to 
Will empty the 
accumulators. 
All BOP 
functions will 
be unavailable 
Inspection, 
visual 
 
Pressure 
transmitter 
will indicate 
falling 
pressure 
 
Excessive 
running alarm 
Excessive running 
alarm 
Yearly control of PSVs 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Competence of 
operators 
PSVs is made of 
corrosion resistant 
material 
1 3 L  If the PSV opens when not 
intended to, the accumulator 
banks may be emptied back 
into the hydraulic reservoir 
 
1.17 Pilot Control 
Valve/Panel Valve 
 
Functions: 
Controlling the 
opening and closing 
of valves and rams 
 
Type: 
Panel valve  
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.17.1 
Fails to move 
Loss of air from 
solenoid valve, 
mechanical 
failure, stuck (too 
high friction), 
obstruction, 
corrosion 
Affected 4 way 
valve does not 
work, 
corresponding 
BOP function 
(depending on 
which 4 way 
valve that fails) 
will be lost 
No global 
effects due to 
safeguards 
Visual 
monitoring of 
flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter. 
 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position on 
the remote 
panels 
Manual operation / 
override of valves. 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
1 3 L  Consider to include greasing 
of the 4 way valves in the 
maintenance program 
 
F-1.17.2 
Wash out 
Contaminated 
hydraulic fluid 
Leak of 
hydraulic fluid 
due to seal 
washout 
No global 
effects due to 
safeguards 
allowing for 
BOP functions 
to be upheld 
Visual, noise. 
 
Pumps will be 
starting 
frequently. 
 
Leak will be 
back to 
reservoir 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
Filters 
1 3 L    
1.18 Flange and Gasket 
 
Function: 
Connection and seal 
between pipe and 
valves 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.18.1 
Leakage  
Poor quality of 
gaskets. Wrong 
torque applied 
when fastening 
bolts (too little 
torque or 
skewed). 
Insufficient or 
wrong support, 
vibration 
 
Human error 
(wrong 
installation) 
 
Misalignment 
Spillage (water 
and glycol) 
Worst case: 
drain all 
hydraulic fluid 
in the bottle 
racks (normally 
the alarms will 
ensure that 
this does not 
happen, 
except for very 
large leaks 
where the 
operator does 
not have time 
to react) 
Visual 
 
Low level and 
low pressure 
alarms 
 
Excessive 
running of the 
pumps 
Certificate for each 
flange after installation 
 
Pipe support respects 
the current standards 
and requirements 
 
Short pipe stretches  
 
Standard, proven 
gaskets will be used 
 
Piping, flanges and 
gaskets will comply 
with TR2000  
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
2 3 M  Evaluate to include a torque 
check in maintenance 
programs (e.g., on a 5 years 
basis) 
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1.19 Master Electric 
Panel and Electric 
Mini Panel 
 
Function: 
Initiate electric 
command for BOP 
function, valves, flow 
of hydraulic. 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.19.1 
Fail to give 
electric 
signal for 
some 
intended 
valves and 
BOP function 
Failed electric 
power cable, 
human error 
when switching 
panel 
No initiation of 
valve or BOP 
function 
No global 
effect due to 
safeguard 
Visual, 
Feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system 
 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges (to 
see if the 
electric signal 
has been 
sent) 
 
 
Testing, 
 
Redundancy by 
having master electric 
and mini panel for 
initiation of command 
1 2 L    
1.20 Electric Power 
Pack with Battery 
Back Up 
 
Function: 
Independent supply 
of electric power into 
manifold 
 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.20.1 
Fail to give 
electric 
power for 
BOP panel 
command 
initiation 
Obsolete battery, 
failed electric 
power cable 
Not significant 
effect  
No global 
effect due to 
safeguard 
Indicator light Redundancy by 
having generator as a 
main power 
 
Testing and 
maintenance 
1 2 L    
1.21 Electric Power 
Cable 
 
Function: 
Provide flow of 
electric command 
from control panel 
into manifold 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.21.1 
Not able to 
distribute 
electric 
signal 
Worn cables, 
short circuit, no 
signal sent from 
electric panel, 
cables are cut 
Unable to 
initiate 
solenoid valve 
and other 
function of 
valves 
Worst case 
scenario: 
No command 
can be initiated 
from the 
control panel  
Visual 
 
Feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system 
 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges (to 
see if the 
electric signal 
has been 
sent) 
 
Regular visual check 
to see if cables are 
worn, scratch, etc.  
 
Manual override of 
valve or other 
command 
1 2 L    
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1.22 Air Operator 
 
Function: 
Allow the opening 
and closing of pilot 
control valve by 
using air as a media 
 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.22.1 
Fail to 
regulate  
Air leakage, worn 
parts of air 
operator, 
corrosion, not 
enough air 
pressure, failure 
of solenoid valve  
Pilot control 
valve cannot 
be operated 
No pilot 
hydraulic fluid 
can be 
regulated into 
subsea pod for 
BOP function  
Visual, noise Manual intervention 1 2 L    
1.23 Pod Selector Valve 
 
Function: 
Select one of the 
subsea pods to be 
flowed by hydraulic 
power fluid for BOP 
function. There are 
two subsea pods for 
redundancy and only 
one pod should only 
be flowed at a time 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-1.23.1 
Fail to move 
(change 
position) 
Loss of air from 
solenoid valve, 
mechanical 
failure, stuck (too 
high friction), 
obstruction, 
corrosion 
Routing failure 
of hydraulic 
fluid into the 
intended 
subsea pod 
In case of 
failure in one 
of the subsea 
pods, the 
hydraulic fluid 
cannot be 
routed into 
another 
subsea pod. It 
gives no BOP 
function 
causing high 
probability of 
blowout 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position  
 
Visual 
monitoring of 
flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Manual intervention 
1 2 L  Manual intervention with 
ROV requires longer 
response time. It could be 
the last effort for BOP 
intervention when other 
electric and hydraulic 
system for BOP function has 
failed. 
 
1.24 Sub Plate Mounted 
(SPM) Valves 
 
Function: 
Direct the power 
hydraulic fluid either 
to close ram or open 
ram by closing and 
opening its valve 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-1.24.1 
Fail to close 
Hydraulic 
leakage, 
worn/degrade 
parts in the valve 
causing leakage, 
corrosion, stuck, 
mechanical 
failure, loss of 
instrumented air, 
broken solenoid, 
loss of signal 
 
Not enough pilot 
hydraulic fluid 
pressure 
Affected sub 
plate mounted 
(SPM) valve 
will not close 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
SPM from 
other pods) 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position  
 
Visual 
monitoring of 
flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
 
Alarms 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Redundancy by 
operating other SPM 
valve trough other 
pods 
 
Manual override 
(possible to manually 
operate BOP 
functions) 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week 
1 3 L    
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F-1.24.2 
Fail to open 
Hydraulic 
leakage, 
worn/degrade 
parts in the valve 
causing leakage, 
corrosion, stuck, 
mechanical 
failure, loss of 
instrumented air, 
broken solenoid, 
loss of signal 
 
Over pressure in 
the pilot hydraulic 
fluid 
Not able to 
circulate the 
hydraulic fluid 
properly 
causing not 
proper 
ram/annular 
function (not 
significant 
effect, just 
cause delay) 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
SPM from 
other pods) 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position  
 
Visual 
monitoring of 
flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
 
Alarms 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Redundancy by 
operating other SPM 
valve trough other 
pods 
 
Manual override 
(possible to manually 
operate BOP 
functions)  
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week 
1 3 L    
   F-1.24.3 
Fail between 
positions (not 
completely 
closed nor 
opened) 
Contaminated 
hydraulic fluid, 
mechanical fail in 
actuator, wear 
Affected sub 
plate mounted 
(SPM) valve 
will not close 
or open 
completely 
No 
consequence 
due to 
safeguards 
(still possible 
to operate the 
BOP functions 
manually from 
the BOP 
control unit 
room) 
Visual (flow 
meter) 
 
Pressure 
transmitter 
 
Indication 
lights on 
panels 
 
Alarms 
Manual override 
(possible to manually 
operate BOP 
functions) 
 
Maintenance and 
inspection procedures 
 
In some cases there is 
redundancy from 
other rams/preventer 
for closing 
 
Function testing of 
BOP functions every 
week 
1 3 L    
1.25 Fluid Mixing 
System 
 
Function: 
Mixing the fluids to 
become hydraulic 
fluid needed for BOP 
operation 
Used for all 
operational 
mode, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.25.1 
Fail to make 
the required 
hydraulic 
fluid 
Inadequate 
mixture, human 
error, leakage   
Might need 
more powerful 
pump to 
transfer into 
accumulator 
 
Might 
deteriorate 
accumulator 
Improper 
opening/closin
g of SPM valve  
 
Improper 
opening/closin
g of rams or 
preventer 
 
Pump stroke 
reading 
Quality control of 
hydraulic fluid from 
fluid mixing system 
1 2 L    
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1.26 Accumulator 
Isolator Valve 
(inside HPU) 
 
Function: 
Isolate hydraulic 
fluid from 
accumulator   
 
Used for all 
operational 
mode, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.26.1 
Failed to 
open/close 
Corrosion, 
mechanical failure  
Fail to open: 
Unable to flow 
the hydraulic 
flow from the 
valve 
 
Fail to close: 
The flow can 
still be stop 
with isolator 
pilot valve or 
hose reel 
No 
consequence 
due to 
redundancy 
Flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
monitoring 
Regular testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having the flow 
through other valve 
1 3 L    
1.27 Accumulator 
Isolator Pilot Valve 
(inside control 
manifold) 
 
Function: 
Regulate and control 
the flow of fluid 
through isolator 
valve into subsea 
pod  
Used for all 
operational 
mode, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.27.1 
Failed to 
open/close  
Stuck, 
mechanical 
failure, corrosion, 
no pilot supply 
Fail to 
open/open: 
No 
consequence 
(the flow can 
be directed 
from other 
valve) 
No 
consequences 
due to 
safeguard 
Flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
monitoring  
 
Indicator light 
for valve 
position 
Regularly testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having pod selector 
valve to regulate the 
hydraulic flow into 
subsea accumulator 
1 3 L    
1.28 Pod mounted 
accumulator 
isolation valve  
 
Functions: 
Isolate hydraulic 
fluid in the pod 
Used for all 
operational 
mode, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.28.1 
Failed to 
open/close 
Corrosion, 
mechanical failure 
Fail to open: 
Unable to flow 
the hydraulic 
flow from the 
valve 
 
Fail to close: 
The flow can 
still be stop 
with other 
accumulator 
isolator valve 
No 
consequence 
due to 
redundancy 
Flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
monitoring 
Regular testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having the flow 
through other valve 
1 3 L    
1.29 Stack mounted 
accumulator 
isolation valve 
 
Function: 
Isolate hydraulic 
fluid in the stack 
accumulator 
 
Used for all 
operational 
mode, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-1.29.1 
Failed to 
open/close 
Corrosion, 
mechanical failure 
Fail to open: 
Unable to flow 
the hydraulic 
flow from the 
valve 
 
Fail to close: 
The flow can 
still be stop 
with other 
accumulator 
isolator valve  
No 
consequence 
due to 
redundancy 
Flow meter 
and pressure 
transmitter 
monitoring 
Regular testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having the flow 
through other valve 
1 3 L    
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1.30 Batteries inside 
subsea pod 
 
Functions: 
Give electric power 
and signal into 
subsea solenoid 
valve to activate the 
emergency BOP 
functions. Usually 
the batteries will 
function 
automatically by 
means of PLC when 
there is no 
communication 
(electric and 
hydraulic) from the 
surface 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-1.30.1 
No voltage 
Obsolete battery, 
corrosion, thermal 
variations  
Solenoid valve 
inside subsea 
not function  
In case of 
emergency 
well shut in, 
the AMF will 
not activate 
blind shear 
ram to 
function, 
causing a high 
probability of 
blowout into 
surface. 
 
Reduce effect 
due to 
redundancy  
After 
emergency 
situation (no 
electricity and 
hydraulic 
communicatio
n), where 
there is no 
sign of influx 
sealed by the 
BOP 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Redundancy by 
having batteries from 
other pod 
 
Redundancy of 
initiating blind shear 
ram function by 
having BOP acoustic 
intervention system 
1 2 L    
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
2.1 Fixed Pipe Rams 
 
Function: 
Protecting topside 
from uncontrolled 
pressure from the 
well  
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-2.1.1 
Not able to 
close 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operate 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges 
 
Feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system 
 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP 
 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Function test every 
week 
 
Redundancy 
 
Competence of 
personnel 
 
Pressure testing 
1 3 L    
F-2.1.2 
Not able to 
open 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure, human 
error 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operated  
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges 
 
Feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system 
 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Function test every 
week 
 
Redundancy 
 
Competence of 
personnel 
 
Pressure testing 
1 2 L    
F-2.1.3 
Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Wrong ram with 
regards to tubular 
diameter/geometr
y 
 
Worn parts (e.g., 
seals and 
packers), closing 
pressure not 
maintained, not 
correct space-out 
During well 
control 
situations, 
unable to seal 
off the well, 
leading to well 
fluid leaking 
through 
Unwanted 
amounts of 
fluids or gas 
influx into the 
wellbore, and 
also possibility 
for influx to 
surface for the 
amount of time 
it takes from 
trying to close 
the first ram 
until the next 
one is closed 
Potential for 
increase in 
trip tank 
volume.  
 
Unstable 
shut-in 
pressures 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week 
 
More than one fixed 
ram available.  
Variable ram available 
 
Competence of 
personnel 
 
Pressure testing 
1 2 L  Verify that pressure testing 
according to 
recommendations from 
manufacturer and 
regulations 
mainten
ance 
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
   F-2.1.4 
Degradation 
of packers 
over time 
High temperature Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Elastomers 
may have to 
be exchanged 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP.  
Visual 
inspection of 
the weep 
hole on the 
rod seal. 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume 
Pressure testing every 
two weeks.  
Function tests every 
week 
 
When temperature 
reach 180
0
F, pumping 
rate will be reduced in 
order to allow fluids to 
cool before reaching 
the surface 
 
Temperature gauges 
in the systems. 
Spares of the 
elastomers are kept 
on the rig  
1 3 L  Evaluate to keep a log of the 
temperature readouts on all 
temperature sensors 
 
Evaluate if the ram packers 
and seals should be 
exchanged after they have 
been exposed to 
temperature above their 
maximum continuous design 
temperature, regardless of 
their state as an extra 
safeguard 
 
Evaluate to update 
operation procedures to 
take into consideration the 
HPHT drilling 
Mainten
ance & 
operatio
ns 
Enginee
ring & 
operatio
ns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
operatio
ns 
F-2.1.5 
External 
leakage 
(bonnet/door 
seal or other 
external 
leakage 
path) 
Loosen bonnet 
bolts, 
Loosen ram 
housing flange, 
Worn parts (seal, 
packers, etc) 
Fluid leakage 
to environment 
In the worst 
case: 
Influx can 
deteriorate the 
seal and bolt 
causing 
massive 
environment 
spill 
Visual, 
Reduction in 
hydraulic 
pressure 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection  
 
Pressure testing  
 
Competence of 
personnel  
 
1 1 L    
F-2.1.6 
Internal 
leakage 
(leakage 
through a 
close ram) 
Worn part (seal, 
packers, etc,  
Some influx 
into wellbore 
In the worst 
case: 
Influx can 
deteriorate 
seal and 
packers 
causing failure 
in ram 
function. It 
allows influx to 
reach surface 
and endanger 
personnel  
Visual 
indication on 
BOP 
 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges 
 
Reduction in 
kill mud 
pressure  
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection  
 
Pressure testing  
 
Competence of 
personnel  
 
Redundancy by 
having annular 
preventer 
1 2 L    
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
2.2 Variable Bore 
Rams 
 
Functions: 
Protecting topside 
from uncontrolled 
pressure from the 
well 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-2.2.1 
Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Worn parts (e.g., 
seals and 
packers), closing 
pressure not 
maintained 
During well 
control 
situations, 
unable to seal 
off the well, 
leading to well 
fluid leaking 
through 
Possibility for 
influx to 
surface for the 
amount of time 
it takes from 
trying to close 
the variable 
ram until the 
next one 
(annular 
preventer or 
shear ram) is 
closed 
Potential for 
increase in 
trip tank 
volume.  
Unstable 
shut-in 
pressures 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week 
Competence of 
personnel 
 
Pressure testing 
 
Annular preventer 
available, depending 
on pressure. 
 
Shear ram available 
1 3 L    
F-2.2.2 
Not able to 
close 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operate 
No global 
effect due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges, 
feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system. 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP. 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week 
Competence of 
personnel 
Redundancy 
 
Pressure testing 
 
1 3 L    
F-2.2.3 
Unable to 
hold the 
hang-off 
weight 
Mechanical failure Not able to 
hang off, 
potential for 
dropped string 
No global 
effect, due to 
safeguards 
Visual, string 
movement 
Possibility for hanging 
off the fixed rams. 
Known hang-off 
weight. 
Competence to 
operate within 
tolerance limits. 
Maintenance and 
inspections 
1 2 L    
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
F-2.2.4 
Degradation 
of packers 
over time or 
high 
temperature 
High temperature  Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Elastomers 
may have to 
be exchanged 
Visual. 
Indication on 
BOP. Visual 
inspection of 
the weep 
hole on the 
rod seal. 
Increase  in 
trip tank 
volume 
Pressure testing every 
two weeks 
Function tests every 
week 
 
When temperature 
reaches 180
0
F, 
pumping rate will be 
reduced in order to 
allow fluids to cool 
before reaching the 
surface 
 
Temperature gauges 
in the system. 
Spares of the 
elastomers are kept 
on the rig. 
 
1 3 L  Review operational 
procedures to take into 
consideration dropping of 
string and tubular which is 
outside the shearing 
capacity and subsequent 
closing of shear rams 
 
Check the regulations and 
legislations to see if it is 
allowed to run casing or 
tubular that cannot be 
sheared 
 
A risk assessment should 
be performed before 
executing this kind of 
operations 
 
After implementation of 
these recommendations, the 
probability of risk of the 
failure mode may be 
 
After well 
control 
situations and 
pressure tests 
F-2.2.5 
Not able to 
open 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure, human 
error 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operate 
No global 
effect due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges, 
feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system. 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week 
Competence of 
personnel 
Redundancy 
 
Pressure testing 
 
1 2 L    
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no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
2.3 Blind Shear Ram 
 
Functions: 
Cutting drill string, 
pipe/tubular and 
protecting topside 
from uncontrolled 
pressure from the 
well 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-2.3.1 
Unable to cut 
string, thus 
unable to 
seal of 
wellbore 
Hydraulic failure, 
mechanical 
failure, human 
error (including 
incorrect space 
out) too high 
wellbore 
pressure. 
 
Pipe not in the 
centre position 
 
Potential for 
tubular 
dimensions 
outside the shear 
ram specifications 
No shearing Potential for 
need to drop 
string or 
tubular before 
closing shear 
ram 
Visual, 
datasheets, 
known ram 
specifications 
Maintenance and 
inspections 
 
Pressure testing 
 
Hang off in centre 
 
Redundancy (annular 
up to 10000psi, 
variable ram)  
 
Check of datasheets 
for tubular against 
known ram 
specifications 
3 3 M  Review operational 
procedures to take into 
consideration dropping of 
string and tubular which is 
outside the shearing 
capacity and subsequent 
closing of shear rams 
 
Check the regulations and 
legislations to see if it is 
allowed to run casing or 
tubular that cannot be 
sheared 
 
A risk assessment should 
be performed before 
executing this kind of 
operations 
 
After implementation of 
these recommendations, the 
probability of risk of the 
failure mode may be 
reduced 
 
 
 
Operati
ons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operati
ons 
 
 
 
 
Operati
ons 
 
F-2.3.2 
Not able to 
close 
 
Not able to 
perform 
complete 
shut off and 
seal the 
annulus 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operate 
No global 
effect, due to 
safeguard 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges, 
feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system. 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP. 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume 
 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week 
 
Competence 
personnel 
 
Pressure testing 
 
Possible to close 
annular on empty hole 
up to 10000 psi in 
combination with the 
choke system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 L    
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
   F-2.3.3 
Degradation 
of packers 
over time 
High temperature Not able to 
seal off the 
wellbore 
Elastomers 
may have to 
be exchanged 
Visual 
indication on 
BOP. Visual 
inspection of 
the weep 
hole on the 
rod seal. 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume 
Pressure testing every 
two weeks 
Function tests every 
week 
 
When temperature 
reaches 180
0
F, 
pumping rate will be 
reduced in order to 
allow fluids to cool 
before reaching the 
surface 
 
Temperature gauges 
in the system. 
Spares of the 
elastomers are kept 
on the rig. 
Possible to close 
annular on empty hole 
1 3 L  Evaluate to keep a log of the 
temperature readouts on all 
temperature sensors 
 
Evaluate if the ram packers 
and seals should be 
exchanged after they have 
been exposed to 
temperature above their 
maximum continuous design 
temperature, regardless of 
their state as an extra 
safeguard 
 
Evaluate to update 
operation procedures to 
take into consideration the 
HPHT drilling 
 
After implementation of 
these recommendations, the 
probability of the failure 
mode may be reduced 
 
After a well 
control situation 
or pressure test 
F-2.3.4 
Not able to 
open 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure, human 
error 
Affected ram 
not able to 
operate 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges, 
feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system, 
visual 
indication on 
BOP 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection. 
Function test every 
week. 
Redundancy. 
Competence of 
personnel. 
Pressure testing 
1 2 L    
2.4 Annular BOP 
 
Functions: 
Protecting topside 
from uncontrolled 
pressure from the 
well 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-2.4.1 
Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Worn parts, 
closing pressure 
not maintained 
During well 
control 
situations, 
unable to seal 
off the well, 
leading to well 
fluid leaking 
Possibility for 
influx to 
surface for the 
amount of time 
it takes from 
trying to close 
the annular 
until the other 
rams with 
suitable size or 
shear ram is 
closed 
Potential for 
increase in 
trip tank 
volume. 
Unstable 
shut-in 
pressures 
Testing, regularly 
scheduled testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection.  
Function test every 
week 
Competence of 
personnel  
Pressure testing 
Shear ram and 
potentially other rams 
available  
1 3 L    
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Failure 
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Compensating 
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5) 
P  
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(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
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Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
   F-2.4.2 
Not able to 
open to full 
or within 30 
minutes 
(API) 
Mechanical 
failure, hydraulic 
failure, human 
error. Worn 
elements 
Annular not 
able to operate 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Flow meter, 
pressure 
gauges, 
feedback 
from the 
hydraulic 
system 
Testing, regularly 
schedule testing, 
maintenance and 
inspection.  
Function test every 
week  
Competence of 
personnel 
1 2 L    
F-2.4.3 
Degradation 
of elements 
over time 
High temperature 
or mud type (e.g. 
OBM), extensive 
use (including 
stripping) 
Not able to 
seal around 
tubular 
Elements may 
have to be 
exchanged 
Increase in 
trip tank 
volume. 
Unstable shut 
in pressures 
Pressure testing every 
two weeks. 
Function tests every 
week 
When temperature 
reaches 180
0
F, 
pumping rate will be 
reduced in order to 
allow fluids to cool 
before reaching the 
surface 
Temperature gauges 
in the system. 
Spares of the 
elements are kept on 
the rig. 
 
Correct choice of 
element type 
1 3 L    
2.5 Automatic Subsea 
Ram Locks 
 
Functions: 
Locking the ram in 
closed position 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-2.5.1 
Unable to 
lock 
Rusted, bended, 
mechanical 
damage, human 
error 
Unable to lock 
rams in closed 
position 
No global 
effects due to 
safeguards 
Visual Testing and 
maintenance 
 
Hydraulic pressure in 
the closing chamber 
1 2 L  Update the operational 
procedure to ensure that 
testing is done according to 
API 53, and including the 
locks in the test when 
energizing the rams 
 
F-2.5.2 
Unable to 
open  
Rusted, bended, 
mechanical 
damage  
Unable to 
unlock rams, 
and thus open 
them  
Unable to 
proceed with 
operation, 
delays 
Visual  Testing and 
maintenance  
1 2 L  Update the operational 
procedure to ensure that 
testing is done according to 
API 53, and including the 
locks in the test when 
energizing the rams 
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no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
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Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
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(1-
5) 
P  
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5) 
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(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
3.1 Choke ad Kill Valve 
 
Function: 
Regulate the flow of 
kill fluid and influx 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-3.1.1 
External 
leakage 
(leakage to 
environment 
in main valve 
or valve 
connectors) 
Worn or degraded 
parts (ring gasket 
and flange) 
 
Over pressure 
 
Human error 
(improper valve 
connection 
installation) 
Leakage in the 
connection 
between the 
inner valve and 
the BOP body 
 
Leakage in 
connection 
between two 
valves 
The worst 
case: 
If leakage 
occurs in the 
lower inner 
valve below 
the LPR, the 
BOP will leak if 
attempting to 
close in a well 
kick 
Visual 
inspection 
with SSTV 
(Subsea test 
Valve) and 
ROV 
 
Pressure 
gauges 
Regularly scheduled 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
Pressure testing 
 
Regulate the flow 
through other 
redundant choke and 
kill valve is possible 
 
1 2 L    
F-3.1.2 
Internal 
leakage 
(leakage 
through a 
closed valve) 
Worn or degraded 
parts of valves 
(seat, gate, etc) 
 
Over pressured  
 
Human error 
(improper valve 
connection 
installation) 
Leakage 
through a 
closed valve 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Visual 
inspection  
 
Pressure 
gauges 
Redundancy in the 
choke and kill valve 
(have more than one 
lines) 
 
Flushed and greased 
the valves 
 
Pressure testing 
 
Regularly schedule 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
1 2 L    
F-3.1.3 
Failed to 
open 
Plugged line, 
Failure valve 
Kill fluid and 
influx flow 
cannot be 
regulated 
through the 
valve 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Visual 
inspection 
 
Pressure 
gauges 
BOP test (pressure 
test) 
 
Flushed and greased 
the valves 
 
Redundancy  
1 1 L    
F-3.1.4 
Failed to 
close 
Plugged line, 
Failure valve 
Kill fluid and 
influx flow  
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Visual 
inspection 
 
Pressure 
gauges 
BOP test (pressure 
test) 
 
Flushed and greased 
the valves 
 
Redundancy 
1 1 L    
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Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
3.2 Hydraulic 
connector  
 
Function: 
Connect BOP with 
LMRP and wellhead 
Used for all 
operational 
modes, shall be 
available at all 
times 
F-3.2.1 
External 
leakage 
Leakage in 
wellhead gasket, 
Damage seal 
ring, over 
pressure 
Leakage of 
drilling fluid 
into 
environment 
during drilling 
operation 
Delays in well 
control 
operations  
Visual 
inspection 
 
 
 
Redundancy by BOP 
during well control 
operation 
 
BOP testing 
 
Regularly schedule 
testing, maintenance 
and inspection 
 
1 2 L    
F-3.2.2 
Failed to 
unlock 
Failure in 
wellhead 
connector, failure 
in LMRP 
connector, 
Connector stuck, 
hydraulic system 
failure 
Damage to 
wellhead 
connector 
during drift off. 
Major fatalities 
damages to 
subsea riser 
and very costly 
rig downtime 
when drift off, 
kick (influx) 
and black out 
happen at the 
same time, 
especially in 
the floating DP 
vessel. 
Possibility of 
major leakage 
if not handle 
properly 
 
Leakage of 
fluid into 
environment 
No hydraulic 
response 
 
Well 
abandonment 
operation 
BOP testing 
 
Redundancy of 
secondary unlatch to 
unlatch the stack 
 
Redundancy of 
unlatching the 
connection during bad 
weather for floating 
vessel by unlatch 
LMRP or wellhead 
connector  
 
Dumped the 
accumulator fluid 
through the connector 
to flush 
hydrates/debris that 
can cause clog or plug 
 
Redundancy of BOP 
function when kick 
occur 
2 
 
2 L    
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Dwg. Additional Information 
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Local  Global 
4.1 Blind /shear ram 
seal (sealing 
element) 
 
Function: 
Seal the ram from 
influx 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.1.1 
Deformed, 
worn, stiff, 
eroded 
Chemical 
corrosion, 
mechanical 
elastic/plastic 
deformation 
Kick influx flow 
not contained 
The 
deterioration of 
seal during 
kick influx 
might escalate 
the leakage. 
The small 
leakage of kick 
influx could 
create influx 
liquid splash 
out of the ram 
like water jet 
that can erode 
the blade and 
string being cut 
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
 
Volume of 
mud pit 
 
(might be 
general, it is 
not only 
showing the 
failure of ram 
seal 
 
 
Schedule testing and 
maintenance  
 
Redundancy by 
having other rams 
and/or annular 
preventer close 
 
 
2 1 L  The shearing of drill pipe 
during drilling and when kick 
occur is necessary when 
pipe ram and annular 
preventer could not hold the 
pressure generated during 
the influx. In this case the 
well need to be shut 
completely by using shear 
ram   
 
4.2 Piston on both 
sides 
 
Function: 
Convert hydraulic 
pressure to 
mechanical energy 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.2.1 
Galling, 
seizure, 
misalignment
, pitting 
Corrosion, 
thermal variation 
Shear ram not 
operational 
In the worst 
case, Influx 
might escalate 
and escape 
into surface  
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
 
Volume of 
mud pit 
 
(might be 
general, it is 
not only 
showing the 
failure of 
piston) 
 
 
Schedule testing and 
maintenance  
 
Redundancy by 
having other rams 
and/or annular 
preventer close 
3 2 M  Other type of ram (pipe ram) 
and annular preventer are 
designed to hold the influx 
but not intended to shut off 
the well completely. The 
well needs blind shear ram 
to complete shut off. 
 
4.3 Wedge on both 
sides 
 
Function: 
Secure linier 
mechanical energy 
on piston 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.3.1 
Galling, 
seizure, 
misalignment
, impact 
failure 
Thermal variation 
in combination 
with excess force 
Oil contained 
temporarily 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
Scheduled testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having hydraulic fluid 
to secure the linier 
mechanical energy on 
piston 
1 2 L    
4.4 Blade on both 
sides 
 
Function: 
Shear or cut the 
string and/or casing 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.4.1 
Impact 
failure, brittle 
failure, 
pitting, 
dulling 
Excess force, 
corrosion, thermal 
fatigue 
Shear ram not 
effective, fails 
to cut pipe 
In the worst 
case, influx 
might enter the 
riser up to the 
surface 
endanger 
personnel live 
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
 
Volume of 
mud pit 
(might be 
general, it is 
not only 
showing the 
failure of 
piston) 
Scheduled testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having other rams and 
annular preventer to 
seal the well 
3 
 
1 L  Other type of ram (pipe ram) 
and annular preventer are 
designed to hold the influx 
but not intended to shut off 
the well completely. The 
well needs blind shear ram 
to complete shut off. 
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
4.5 Shear ram housing 
 
Function: 
Guiding piston and 
the flow of hydraulic 
fluid 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.5.1 
Deformation, 
cracking, 
erosion 
Excess pressure, 
thermal variation, 
corrosion, fatigue 
Hydraulic fluid 
not contained, 
leakage of 
hydraulic fluid 
Failure on 
rams function 
(unable to 
close and seal 
the well) 
Visual 
 
Hydraulic 
pressure 
reading 
Scheduled testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having sealing device 
such as blind ram and 
pipe ram 
3 1 L    
4.6 Annular preventer 
rubber housing 
 
Function: 
Guiding sealing 
element (rubber) to 
seal around the 
tubular 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.6.1 
Deformation, 
worn, stiff, 
eroded parts 
Excess pressure, 
thermal variation, 
corrosion, fatigue 
Hydrocarbon 
influx not 
contained, leak 
Failure on 
annular 
prevention 
function 
(unable to 
close and seal 
the well) 
Visual 
 
Hydraulic 
pressure 
reading 
Scheduled testing and 
maintenance  
 
Redundancy by 
having sealing device 
such as blind ram and 
pipe ram 
3 3 M    
4.7 Annular sealing 
element (rubber 
seal and steel 
reinforcement 
segments) 
 
Function: 
Seal the well by 
pushing the sealing 
element upward 
through piston 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.7.1 
Deformed, 
worn, stiff, 
eroded 
Chemical 
corrosion, 
mechanical 
elastic/plastic 
deformation 
Kick influx flow 
not contained 
The 
deterioration of 
seal during 
kick influx 
might escalate 
the leakage. 
The small 
leakage of kick 
influx could 
create influx 
liquid splash 
out of the ram 
like water jet 
that can erode 
the sealing 
element and 
drill string 
being clamped 
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
 
Volume of 
mud pit 
 
(might be 
general, it is 
not only 
showing the 
failure of ram 
seal 
 
 
Schedule testing and 
maintenance  
 
Redundancy by 
having other rams 
close 
 
 
2 1 
 
L  The shearing of drill pipe 
during drilling and when kick 
occur is necessary when 
pipe ram and annular 
preventer could not hold the 
pressure generated during 
the influx. In this case the 
well need to be shut 
completely by using shear 
ram   
 
4.8 Annular Piston  
 
Function: 
Convert hydraulic 
pressure to 
mechanical energy 
to pushed the 
sealing element 
upward for sealing 
purpose 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.8.1 
Galling, 
seizure, 
misalignment
, pitting 
Corrosion, 
thermal variation 
Annular 
preventer not 
operational 
In the worst 
case, Influx 
might escalate 
and escape 
into surface  
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
 
Volume of 
mud pit 
 
(might be 
general, it is 
not only 
showing the 
failure of 
piston) 
 
 
Schedule testing and 
maintenance  
 
Redundancy by 
having other rams 
close 
2 2 L  Other type of ram (pipe ram) 
and annular preventer are 
designed to hold the influx 
but not intended to shut off 
the well completely. The 
well needs blind shear ram 
to complete shut off. 
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ID 
no. 
Item/functional 
identification 
Operational 
mode 
Failure 
mode(s) 
Failure 
Cause(s) 
Failure effect(s) 
 
Detection 
method 
Compensating 
provisions 
(safeguards) 
C 
(1-
5) 
P  
(1-
5) 
Risk 
(L,M,
H) 
Dwg. Additional Information 
and recommendation 
Resp. 
party 
Local  Global 
4.9 Annular locking 
wedge 
 
Function: 
Secure linier 
mechanical energy 
on piston 
Shall be 
available at all 
times for well 
control 
operations 
F-4.9.1 
Galling, 
seizure, 
misalignment
, impact 
failure 
Thermal variation 
in combination 
with excess force 
Oil contained 
temporarily 
No global 
effect, due to 
redundancy 
and 
safeguards 
Pressure 
gauge 
reading 
Scheduled testing and 
maintenance 
 
Redundancy by 
having hydraulic fluid 
to secure the linier 
mechanical energy on 
piston 
1 2 L    
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12.2 Well Barrier elements in drilling operation 
 Well barriers are layers of one or several dependent well barrier elements which 
prevents fluids to flow unintentionally from one formation to other formation or to surface. 
Well barriers element is a dependent object to prevent flow from one side to the other side of 
itself. According to Norsok D-010 (2004), there are four conditions where well barriers 
element should be established in the drilling operations as follows: 
- Drilling, coring and tripping with shearable drill string 
- Running non shearable drill string 
- Running non shearable casing  
- Through tubing drilling and coring  
 
Figure 12.1 Well barrier schematic for running non-shearable drill string (left) and drilling, coring and 
tripping with shearable drill string (right) (Norsok D-010, 2004) 
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Figure 12.2 Well barrier schematic for running non-shearable casing (left) and drilling through tubing 
drilling and coring (right) (Norsok D-010, 2004) 
 
 According to the figures above, there are some basic well barrier elements during 
drilling operation such as fluid column, casing cement, casing, wellhead, high pressure riser, 
drilling BOP, drill string, stab-in safety valve, casing float valve, production tree, annulus 
access line and tubing hanger (Norsok D-010, 2004). The well barriers elements are 
generally accepted and required when doing some operations where BOP is used such as 
when well shut in, stripping, snubbing and BOP testing.  
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12.2.1 Fluid column 
 Fluid column is the fluid located in the wellbore which is used to balance the pressure 
in the wellbore by exerting hydrostatic pressure that will prevent influx (kicks) entering 
wellbore. It is important that the hydrostatic pressure of fluid column do not exceed the 
formation fracture pressure (Norsok D-010, 2004). Fluid column can be represented by 
drilling fluid which can be oil, oil-based fluids (oil in water, water in oil emulsions), gas-based 
mud and water-based mud. There are eight basic functions of drilling fluids as follows (Well 
Control School, 2004): 
1. Transportation of cuttings to surface 
2. Suspension of cuttings when circulation is stopped 
3. Control of annular pressure and delivery of hydraulic energy 
4. Lubrication and cooling of the drilling assembly 
5. Provision of wall support 
6. Suspension of drilling assembly and casing 
7. Provision of a suitable medium for wireline logging 
 
12.2.2 Casing cement 
 Casing cement is application of liquid slurry of cement and water to be placed inside or 
outside casing. There are three types of cementing which are primary cement, secondary 
cement and squeeze cement. Primary cement is the first cementing process into the well. 
Secondary cement is used to isolate producing formation, seal off water, repair casing leak, 
etc. Squeeze cementing is forcing cement into the wells to fill channels in the primary 
cementing (Well Control School, 2004) 
 The placement of cement should be in the annulus between concentric casing string or 
the casing/liner and the formation. Cement is used to provide continuous, permanent and 
impermeable hydraulic seal along hole in the casing annulus or between casing strings in 
order to prevent flow of formation fluids, resist pressures from above or below, and support 
casing or liner string structurally (Norsok D-010, 2004).  
 
12.2.3 Casing 
 Casing is element consist of casing/liner and/or tubing in case tubing is used for 
through tubing drilling and completion operations. The purpose is to provide a physical 
barrier to uncontrolled flow of formation fluid or injected fluid between the bore and casing 
(Norsok D-010, 2004). 
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 Conductor pipe 
Conductor pipe is established to prevent the hole from 
caving in at the surface and endangering the drilling rig 
foundation (Odland, J., 2010). It is cemented to prevent 
drilling fluids circulating outside the casing that can 
cause surface erosion (Schlumberger, 2012). The 
unconsolidated layers below seabed/surface will be 
isolated and it support template, marine riser on floating 
rigs, mud line suspension/riser system on jack up rigs, 
surface casing and wellhead (Aadnøy, B., S., 1999). 
 
Figure 12.3 Casings inside wellbore (Schlumberger, 2012) 
 
 Surface casing 
Surface casing provides protection from freshwater formations and prevents shale, 
sand and gravel to fall into the hole (Odland, J., 2010). Blow out preventer can be 
anchored to surface casing and support deeper casing strings (Schlumberger, 2012). It 
is also isolates weak formations to sufficiently form formation integrity where proper 
control of abnormal pressure from the formations below can be assured. Furthermore, 
the isolation will prevent the influx of potential shallow gas zone to establish integrity for 
further drilling (Aadnøy, B., S., 1999).  
 Intermediate casing 
Like any other basic casing function, Intermediate casing is cemented to prevent loss 
of circulation in the well by isolating the formation (Schlumberger, 2012). It also isolates 
all formations up to the surface casing to allow the safe and efficient drilling for the next 
holes sections through the pay zone. Moreover, intermediate casing gives sufficient 
well integrity for drilling the pay zone or any abnormally pressurized zones (Aadnøy, B., 
S., 1999). 
 Production casing 
The last casing which is production casing is used to prevent oil moving to thief zones 
and avoid sloughing of formations causing a reduction in productivity (Schlumberger, 
2012). In addition to isolating the productive zones, it maintains well integrity during 
production and work over periods as well as allows further drilling into deeper hole if 
needed (Aadnøy, B., S., 1999). 
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12.2.4 Wellhead 
 According to Norsok D-010 (2004), wellhead is an element consists of the wellhead 
body with annulus access ports and valves, seals and casing/tubing hangers with seal 
assemblies. It is used to provide mechanical support for the suspending casing and tubing 
strings and for hook up of risers of BOP or production tree and to prevent flow from the bore 
and annuli to formation or the environment. 
 
12.2.5 Riser (High Pressure Riser) 
 Riser is a tubular that connects drilling BOP (subsea BOP) into surface rig. It is act as 
an extension of the drilling BOP on platforms where the wellheads is positioned at different 
levels and thus prevent flow from the bore to the environment (Norsok D-010, 2004). It 
includes connectors and seals connecting the drilling BOP to the wellhead. 
 
12.2.6 Drilling BOP 
 BOP is a tool that acting as a last line of protection against kicks and blowouts. It 
consists of rams and preventers that can be closed and seal the well in case of influx 
occurrence inside the well. The elements that construct drilling BOP are consists of wellhead 
connector, BOP, kill/choke line and valves. According to Norsok D-010 (2004), the function of 
these constructions is to allow wellhead connector to prevent flow from the bore to the 
environment and to provide a mechanical connection between drilling BOP and wellhead. 
 
12.2.7 Drill String 
 Drill string is an extension of tubular pipe/column connecting drill collar and drill bit from 
the surface with attached tool joints that transmits fluid and rotational power as part of the 
drilling tools. The purpose of the drill string as well barrier element is to prevent flow of 
formation fluid from wellbore into external environment. It should be designed to resists 
against abrasive environment, fatigue and buckle as it will be used continuously as a rotating 
tools to drill a well. 
  
12.2.8 Stab in safety valve  
 Stab in safety valve is a valve that is connected to the work string when the well begins 
to flow when running or retrieving the string. It gives protection against tubing plug or 
backpressure valve pressure during snubbing operation (Schlumberger, 2012). This element 
consists of housing with a bore and a ball valve. Stab in safety valve is used to allow 
mounting and closure at the top of any free tubular joint sitting in the rotary table.  
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12.2.9 Casing float valves 
 Casing float valves is a valve used to prevent flow of fluids from the wellbore up the 
casing/liner during installation of casing/liner and to allow for circulating the well. The fluid 
should be pumped down into the casing/liner while at the same time prevent the flow back in 
the opposite direction. It consists of a tubular body with pin and box threads and internal one-
way valve (Norsok D-010, 2004). 
 
12.2.10 Production tree  
 Tree or x-mas tree is a structure consists of control valves, pressure gauges and 
chokes located at the top of a well where the primary function is to control the flow into or out 
of the well (Odland, J., 2010). According to the location of installation, production tree can be 
divided into two types, subsea and surface production tree. Subsea production tree or wet x-
mas tree is located on the top of the subsea wellhead. It has some elements consist of 
housing bores that are fitted with production and annulus master. It has some functions as 
follows (Norsok D-010, 2004): 
- Provides a flow conduit for hydrocarbons from wellbore into surface by having the 
ability to adjust the flow by opening or closing the valve and/or PMV (production 
master valve).  
- Provides monitoring and pressure adjustment of the annulus as well as provide 
vertical tool access through the swab valve(s) (Norsok D-010, 2004). 
 Surface production tree is located on the surface platform and has the same function 
as subsea production tree with additional function to gives access point where kill fluid can 
be pumped into the wellbore. 
 
12.2.11 Annulus access line and valve (AAV) 
 Annulus access line and valve is a line and valve which allows monitoring of pressure 
and flow in the annulus below the tubing hanger. It consists of wellhead housing and an 
isolation valve.  
12.2.12 Tubing hanger  
 Tubing hanger is acting as an interface between the tubing from the well and the x-mas 
tree. It directs the flow from the well to the x-mas tree and provide interface possibilities for 
downhole electrical and hydraulic lines from the x-mas tree (Subsea1, 2010). According to 
Norsok D-010 (2004), tubing hanger consists of body, seals and bore which may have a 
tubing hanger plug profile. It has some functions to support the weight of the tubing, prevent 
flow from the bore and to the annulus, provides sealing in annulus space between tubing and 
wellhead and provides a stab-in connection point for bore communication with the tree. 
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12.2.13 Diverters 
 Diverter is a low pressure system to direct well flow away from rig. It is installed to 
provide safety when there is a flow of shallow gas (Hawker, 2001). It is designed to divert low 
pressure gas which comes from a pressurized gas zone during drilling in case of incapability 
of casing shoe to hold shut in pressure. Massive flows of gas and sand can quickly destroy a 
diverter (Rig Train, 2001). Flex/ball joint between BOP stack and the rig is installed to deal 
with the relative motion of the floating platform.  
 Two diverter lines are usually 
installed to direct gas into starboard 
side and portside of the platform. In 
the event of a kick, one or both lines 
will be opened and the annulus will be 
closed. Minimum one vent must be 
open before closing annulus to prevent 
gas accumulating in the pipe. The gas 
can be directed away from the rig until 
the pressure is reduced.  
 
 
 
12.2.14 Drilling Spools 
 Drilling spool is a spool which connecting the kill lines and choke lines to the BOPs. 
When BOPs are closed, the fluid flows through the choke line and injection of drilling fluid is 
through the kill line.  
- Minimum drilling spool specifications include one or two side outlets no smaller than 
two inches nominal diameter 
- A vertical bore at least equal to the maximum inner diameter of the innermost casing 
(if the spool is to pass slips, hangers, or test tools, the bore should at least equal the 
inside diameter of the top casing head). 
 
12.2.15 Relief Lines 
 The relief line is a large line to relieve well pressure when BOP is closed and when 
there is back pressure that is resulting from the flow in the smaller choke lines which can 
endanger the well.  
 
 
 
Figure 12.4 Flow of diverted gas (left) and schematic of typical 
installation for floating drilling platform (right) (Rig Train, 
2010) (Hawker, 2001) 
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12.2.16 Rotating Preventer (Rotating Head/Stripper) 
 Rotating preventer is a tool located in the top of the BOP stack which is use to seal the 
annular space where it has a capability to prevent the well from blowing out and allowing 
underbalanced drilling. The most used application for rotating preventer is for underbalanced 
drilling. 
 Underbalanced drilling is a drilling of a well where the drilling fluid has less hydrostatic 
pressure than the formation pressure while maintaining the bottom hole pressure by using 
rotating preventer features to release and control the pressure. This method is the opposite 
of the conventional drilling where the drilling fluid should have higher pressure than formation 
pressure to prevent any influx (kick) to become a blowout. The advantages of using 
underbalanced drilling methods are: 
 Loss of circulation/mud is reduce as the pressure in the well is less than the pressure 
in the formation, preventing it from cracking or fracturing the formation in the borehole 
which can cause the flow to loss in the crack. 
 It allows hydrocarbon production while drilling. During drilling operation, drill bit will 
pass through some layer of formation and has lower hydrostatic pressure than 
formation allowing hydrocarbon that could be trapped in some drilled layers to be 
flown into the surface.   
For subsea use, the rotating preventer are mounted on top of the standard BOP stack and 
act as a rotating flow diverter. It allows rotation and vertical movement of the drill string 
during drilling while in the same time it seals around and rotates with the pipe or kelly 
(Hawker, 2001). 
 
Figure 12.5 haffer rotating head and stripper (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983) 
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12.2.17 Flex Joints 
 A flexible joint is a connector between riser and BOP stack which allows some degree 
of movement to handle the movement of a floating rig. It gives capability to allow riser system 
to rotate with minimum bending moment. The design of flex joints should consider the 
maximum accepted rotation, fatigue ranges, tensions of the riser when it is in the hang off 
mode and the effects of that tension (Bai, Y., Bai, Q., 2005, p. 444). Figure 4.21 shows some 
type of flex joints. The tendon system inside the flex joint gives possibility to accept some 
movement. 
 
 
Figure 12.6 Some type of flex joint (Oil States, 2012) 
 
 
12.2.18 Wellhead Connector 
 Wellhead connector is a connector between BOP stack and well head. It consists of 
parts (figure 4.22) that should be designed for the specific purpose of expected pressures 
and weight of the stack.  
 
Figure 12.7 Wellhead connector and its connection sequence (Radoil, 2009) 
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12.3 Pressures Acted in the Well 
1. formation related pressures that consists of: 
a. Overburden pressure is the pressure as a result of accumulated deposit in the 
sediments as a function of rock matrix and pore fluid (Hawker, D., 2001) 
b. Formation pressure is the pressure exerted from the fluid in the pores of rocks 
(Hawker, D., 2001) 
c. Fracture pressure/gradient is the maximum pressures that the formation can 
withstand without collapsing (Hawker, D., 2001) 
 
Figure 12.8 Pressures acted in a wellbore (Hawker, D., 2001) 
 
2. Wellbore balancing pressures that consists of : 
a. Mud hydrostatic pressure is the static pressure exerted by the weight of a vertical 
column of mud at a given depth. This is the pressure of drilling fluid (mud) to 
balance the fluid pressure from formation at static or when there is no drilling 
activity. When drilling activity take place there would be a frictional pressures loss 
causing an increase or decrease in the balancing pressures (Hawker, D., 2001). 
 
  Phyd mud = MW x TVD x g     
 
  Where: Phyd mud : Mud hydrostatic pressure 
    Unit  : PSI = PPG x ft x 0.052 
        PSI = SG x ft x 0.433 
        KPa = kg/m3 x m x 0.00981 
b. Equivalent circulating density is the increase of frictional pressure in annulus as a 
result of mud circulation activity which gives an increase in the annular pressure 
(Hawker, D., 2001).   
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c. Surge pressure is the increase of frictional pressure in annulus as a result of 
vertical movement of running drill string in the hole which gives an increase of 
annular pressure. Excessive surge pressure can damage formation and create 
fracture allowing drilling fluid to enter the formation and create loss of mud 
circulation which will decrease the annulus pressure (Hawker, D., 2001). 
d. Swab pressure is the loss of frictional pressure as a result of lifting pipe activity 
out from hole which gives a decrease in the annular pressure. Swab can occur 
from the slow pull out of drill string that makes drilling fluid to have an effect of 
being attached to the pipe and dragged up. Other case would be by rapid pull out 
movement of drill string that makes drilling fluid to replace the emptied volume left 
by the pipe. Both scenarios would reduce annular pressure (Hawker, D., 2001).  
 
Figure 12.9 Relationship between depth and pressure for different pressures acting in a wellbore 
(Hawker, D., 2001) 
 
The conclusions can be seen in the figure 2.6. The mud hydrostatic should be larger than the 
formation pressure to prevent a kick. On the other hand, the increase of annular pressure as 
an effect of mud circulation and drill string vertical movement should still be below the 
fracture pressure to prevent formation collapse and damage. The reduced annular pressure 
caused by swabbing should be handled to keep it above the formation pressure.  
 In order to know the required fracture pressure, a leak off test (LOT) needs to be 
performed. The test is carried out after casing or cementing activity related to the next drilling 
in the deeper depth. There are two principles in conducting this test. Firstly, cement integrity 
test is performs to know the strength of the cement in order to withstand from the high 
flowing pressures. Secondly, fracture pressure test is conducted after cement integrity test 
has proven acceptable. It is conducted in order to know the maximum value of fracture 
pressure in the formation, where the mud is allows to be pumped for the next drilling 
operation without causing fracture. It is done by letting the formation fracture under a given 
pressure from mud in a control manner. The result of this fracture pressure test also known 
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as leak of pressure (LOP). There are some factors that determine the fracture pressure such 
as rock type, in situ stresses, weakness (fractures, faults), condition on the borehole, 
relationship between wellbore geometry and formation orientation and mud characteristics 
(Hawker, D., 2001).  
     Pfracture = Phyd mud at shoe + LOP 
     Pfracture (EMW) = MW + LOP/(TVD shoe x g) 
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12.4 Basic Well Control Methods 
There are three methods to control a well when influx occurred by using constant bottom-
hole pressure method such as: 
1. Wait and weight method 
Shut in the well, prepare the required killing mud (mud weight) and when it is ready, it 
will be used to circulate out the kick (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983, p.27). 
2. Driller’s method 
The lighter mud in the well is circulated out from the hole and the well is shut in. During 
this circulation the required mud is calculated and built. The killing mud will be 
circulated to kill the well once it is ready (Hawker, D., 2001, p.62) 
3. Concurrent method 
The circulation of mud is conducting directly and the weights are added up until it 
reaches the required killing mud weight to kill the well (Hawker, D., 2001, p.64).  
In some situations where constant bottom-hole pressure could not be applied, there are other 
methods that can be used to control a well such as:  
1. Volumetric method 
This method is used when the above methods are not possible due to the position (e.g. 
out of hole, twisted off, etc.) and the pressure (less than required) of the drill string. The 
plugged bit nozzle also allows volumetric method to be used. The principal is to 
maintain the pressure in the bottom hole by allowing drilling fluid to escape from 
annulus. The volume of the escape fluid is measured. When the influx goes up into 
surface, its volume will expand and SICP should be increased to maintain the pressure 
(Hawker, D., 2001, p.65) 
2. Killing diverted blowout 
This method is used when pipe is still set in the shallow depth and a kick occur. As a 
result there is not enough back pressure that can be used at the surface. In this case a 
BOP is used to divert the well fluid out of the rig. It requires maximum rate of pumping 
to provide mud fluid in the well (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983, p.28). 
3. Low choke pressure method 
This method is used when a kick occur and there is a concern that the casing pressure 
will not sufficient enough to maintain its strength. It is important to prevent broaching. 
When a kick occurs, the bottom-hole pressure is kept constant by circulating back 
pressure in a higher rate than normal killing rate. Meanwhile, the choke holds its 
maximum allowable pressure to circulate these flows when the mud density is increase 
to balance the well. The back pressure gives higher annular friction pressure and 
increase mud-gas ratio which in turn increase bottom hole pressure used to prevent 
gas influx (Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983, p.29). 
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4. Top kill 
The temporary well control when gas influx has reached surface or when the drill pipe 
is quite far from bottom-hole where constant bottom-hole pressure method could not be 
applied to control a well. It is conducted by pumping mud and bleeding gas into the well 
(Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983, p.30). 
5. Bull heading 
Well control method by pumping the kick back into formation. It uses when there is a 
concern of surface pressure that can exceed the strength limit of casing such as when 
string plugs, pipe is out of the hole or when there is a possibility of hazardous fluid 
(Goins, W.,C., Sheffield, R., 1983, p.30). It is also used when there is an influx of 
formation fluid into the wellbore during well control operation, contamination of toxic 
gas such as hydrogen sulfide and in normal operation like for example borehole 
collapse (Schlumberger, 2012). Bull heading method is quite risky method to kill a well 
as the operator has no control on the flow of the pumped fluid. It can flow into weak 
formation and create broaching.  
 
